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Zusammenfassung
Access Control (AC) ist die erste Wahl von Dateneignern um ihre Daten vor unautorisierten
Zugriffen zu schützen, und so den Zugriff nur auf autorisierte Datenkonsumenten zu limitieren.
Sobald jedoch der initiale Zugriff einmal gewährt wurde sind Dateneigner darüber besorgt wie
deren Daten in Zukunft durch den Datenkonsumenten genutzt werden. Insbesondere mit dem
Aufkommen neuer Datenverarbeitungstechnologien, wie beispielsweise Cloud Computing,
werden diese Bedenken verstärkt.
Das Forschungsfeld um verteilte Datennutzungskontrolle ( Data Usage Control (DUC)) er-
weitert konzeptionell das Konzept von AC und liefert Mittel, Techniken und Mechanismen um
Restriktionen hinsichtlich dessen wie Daten genutzt oder auch nicht genutzt werden dürfen
sobald der initiale Zugriff einmal gewährt wurde zu erzwingen. Datennutzungsrestriktionen kön-
nen temporale, propositionale, räumliche und kardinale Einschränkungen umfassen. Moderne
DUC Systeme bedienen sich Data Flow Tracking (DFT) Techniken um Datennutzungsrestrik-
tionen auf eine daten-zentrierte Art und Weise auf allen Kopien eines zu schützenden Datums
zu erzwingen.
Obwohl bereits eine Vielzahl an verschiedenen DFT Ansätzen in der Forschung existieren
sind deren Lösungen hinsichtlich Portabilität und Performanz limitiert. Ein Hauptgrund da-
für ist, dass all diese Lösungen es erfordern ihre Trackinglogik über die gesamte Anwendung,
einschließlich deren System- (z.B. Java Systemklassen für Java basierte Anwendungen) und
3rd-party Bibliotheken, zu injizieren und zu verteilen. Ein solches Vorgehen führt dazu das der
gesamte Code, welcher für die Ausführung der Applikation notwendig ist, miteinander verzahnt
wird. Zum Beispiel wird dadurch die Ausführung einer überwachten Java Anwendung auf einer
handelsüblichen Java Laufzeitumgebung ohne passend modifizierte Java Systemklassen nicht
möglich. Ein praktikabler Weg um diesen Vorbehalt zu mildern wäre es einen DFT Monitor
auf einer unteren Software Abstraktionsschicht zu platzieren, wie beispielsweise auf der Be-
triebssystemebene, und so alle auf ihr betriebenen Anwendungen zu überwachen. Dadurch
wäre eine Trackinglogik innerhalb der Anwendung nicht notwendig. Forschungsergebnisse
zeigen jedoch, dass ein solcher Ansatz zu Überapproximation führen kann, bei der der Fluss
von Daten konservativ zwischen allen Ausgaben und Eingaben einer Anwendung propagiert
wird. Im schlimmsten Fall kann es zu einem Systemzustand führen wo alles überall hin fließt.
Diese Bedenken und daraus resultierende Probleme werden in Kapitel 1 detaillierter diskutiert
und beschrieben.
Um die zuvor beschriebenen Bedenken zu adressieren, stellt diese Thesis einen neuartigen
hybriden Ansatz vor um den Fluss von Daten innerhalb einer Anwendung zu überwachen.
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Der vorliegende Ansatz kombiniert statische Informationsflussanalyse und dynamische Da-
tenflussüberwachung um selektiv nur diese Programmstellen zu überwachen, welche auch
tatsächlich relevant für den Fluss eines Datums sind. Auf diese Weise, und wie die vorliegenden
Evaluationsergebnisse zeigen, sind wir in der Lage dynamische DFT-Tracker aus der Literatur
Performanz mäßig zu übertreffen. Des Weiteren, stellt der vorliegende Ansatz die Portabilität
einer zu überwachenden Anwendung sicher, da Trackinglogik nur an den Programmstellen
injiziert wird wo es den Fluss eines Datums auch tatsächlich zu überwachen gilt. DUC Systeme
profitieren vom vorliegenden Ansatz vor allem dadurch, dass Überapproximation bei der Da-
tenflussüberwachung reduziert wird und somit ein präziseres Datenfluss Trackingergebnis für
die Durchsetzung von Datennutzungsrestriktionen vorliegt.
viii
Abstract
Access Control (AC) is one of the first choices for data owners to protect their data from
unauthorized access and to restrict and limit data disclosure only to a selected set of authorized
data consumers. However, once initial access has been granted data owners are concerned
about how their data may be used further on in future by the data consumers. In particular, with
the advent of new data processing technologies (e.g. Cloud Computing) this concern increases.
The research field of distributed Data Usage Control (DUC) extends the concept of AC and
provides means, techniques, and mechanisms to enforce restrictions on how data may or may not
be used once initial access has been granted. Such data usage restrictions encompass temporal,
propositional, spatial, and cardinal constraints. Modern DUC systems employ DFT techniques
to enforce data usage restrictions in a data-centric manner on all copies of a protected data
item.
Although a plethora of different DFT approaches already exist in research, those solutions fall
short in terms of portability and performance aspects. The main reason is, that those solutions
require to inject and to spread their tracking logic over the entire application, including 3rd-party
libraries and code from the surrounding run-time environment (e.g. Java system-classes for Java-
based applications). However, such an approach stick together the entire code which is required
to run the application. For instance, running a monitored Java application on an off-the-shelf
Java Run-time Environment would not be possible without properly modified Java system-
classes. A practical way to address and to mitigate those caveats is to place a data flow tracker at
a lower software abstraction layer, e.g. the operating system, and to monitor all applications
which run on top of that layer. This way, no tracking logic is required at higher abstraction layers.
However, as research results have shown such an approach can result in overapproximation,
where data flows are conservatively propagated between all inputs and outputs of an application.
In the worst case this might result in a system state where everything flows to everywhere. Note,
we discuss those concerns and problems more thoroughly in Chapter 1.
To address the previously described concerns, this thesis presents a novel hybrid approach to
track the flow of data inside applications. The present approach combines static information
flow analysis with dynamic data flow tracking to track selectively only those program locations
that are actually relevant for a flow of data. This way, and as the present evaluation results show,
we are able to outperform performance-wise related dynamic DFT-trackers from the literature.
Further, by design the present solution preserves the portability of the monitored applications,
ix
as tracking logic is only injected at those code regions where the flow of data needs actually
to be monitored. Beyond that, DUC systems benefit from the present approach as it reduces
overapproximation in data flow tracking, and thus, provides a precise data flow tracking result
to enforce data usage restrictions only on those data items that are actually affected.
x
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1. Introduction
1.1. Motivation
Within the last decade, data processing systems have undergone an impressive transformation:
from heavyweight, monolithic applications towards dynamic distributed software systems.
Additionally, the rise of mobile-, ubiquitous-, pervasive-, and cloud-computing augments data
processing systems to capture and process data more efficiently and in larger quantities than
ever before. For instance, WhatsApp [123], a popular mobile messaging service, processes several
terabytes on data every day from its more than one billion users. Frequently, the processed data
D is sensitive, and hence, needs to be protected from a data security perspective.
A prevalent approach for data protection is Access Control (AC) [18, 48, 104–106]. Conceptually,
AC systems restrict and limit data disclosure only to a selected set of authorized users, henceforth
termed data-consumer. Access restrictions are specified and imposed by a data-provider in
form of past or present conditions, henceforth termed provisions, that must be fulfilled by the
data consumer at the moment in time when an access request is made, e.g. t0 in Figure 1.1.
However, once initial access has been granted AC protection for the released and disclosed data
D is lost, and especially, data providers are concerned about how their data is used further on in
the future tn ≥ t0 by the data consumer.
The research field of distributed Data Usage Control (DUC) [89] tackles such types of concerns
and provides mechanisms to specify and to enforce data usage obligations on data [83, 90].
Obligations, henceforth also termed policies, concern the future usage of data at timestep tn ≥ t0
(cf. Figure 1.1) and encompass temporal, propositional, spatial, and cardinal restrictions on how
data may or may not be used once initial access have been granted at timestep t0. Adherence to
data usage control policies, like “Do not disseminate my data", must be continuously monitored
inside a data processing system before, during, and/or after the usage of data [83]. To do so,
installed reference monitors continuously observe and evaluate a system execution against
data usage control policies. Policy enforcement may happen either in a preventive or detective
mode [91]. Conceptually, the former one actively tries to prevent a policy violation by either
allow, modify, delay, or inhibit the current execution. Whereas, detective enforcement, simply
1
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Policies
(AC+UC) Usage
Access
UCI
Data Provider Data Consumer
Data D Policy P
+
Time     d
t0-tj -ti tn
UC: ObligationsAC: Provisions
Figure 1.1.: DUC is an extension of AC and addresses the problem of how data may or may not
be used at time point tn once initial access has been granted at t0.
said, works by observing, detecting, and logging policy violations for an a posteriori analysis.
Data usage control policies are expressed either in a container- or data-centric fashion. Intu-
itively, the former one specifies policies in terms of a data item’s concrete technical representation.
A technical representation serves as a kind of storage container for a data item at one particu-
lar abstraction layer, and may be for instance a file at the file-system layer or a Java-object at
the Java-layer respectively. For example, to prevent a picture (stored in a file pic1.jpg) from
dissemination a container-centric policy specification would be “Do not disseminate pic1.jpg”
(Policy P1) [92]. Note, the container identifier, which is the file name in this case, is part of the
policy specification. As data mostly moves around in a data processing system and therefore
may take various representations and containers in particular, e.g. pic1.jpg may be copied
or edited and saved to pic2.jpg, it is necessary to write a modified version of Policy P1 that
addresses pic2.jpg as well. Otherwise, the content of pic1.jpg can be easily unlinked from
its policy by just copying the file.
However, as one assumes with such an approach the number of policies easily explodes, and
hence, makes the policy maintenance process quite cumbersome, e.g. policy updates due to
changing obligations. Because of that, the notion of representation-independent data usage
control was introduced [92], which distinguishes between abstract data (i.e. the content that
the user actually wants to protect) and its concrete representation. This concept allows the
specification of data-centric policies where data usage restrictions are tailored around the
abstract notion of a data item, and hence, are independent from a data’s concrete representation.
For instance, Policy P1 can be specified in a data-centric manner as “Do not disseminate my
picture”(Policy P2), and thus, talks about all possible representations of a data item. However, to
detect all possible representations and copies of a protected data item, DUC has been extended
2
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Database-USAOSNAlice BirthdayApp PaaS-A PersonalBlog Bob
receive()
return D
receive()
return E
storeInUs(E)
storeInUs(D')
queryOSN(D)
return D'
store(E)
store(D)
request(D) request(E)
Figure 1.2.: BirthdayApp and PersonalBlog are using the functions receive() and storeInUs
to receive and store data. Alice protects her transmitted data D by a policy that
requires to track the flow of D between those functions. As BirthdayApp and Person-
alBlog share the same Tomcat web-server instance inside PaaS-A, a flow of data is
also mistakenly reported for PersonalBlog.
and combined with concepts and mechanisms from the research field of DFT [39, 95] in order
to track the flow of data in a data processing system. That way, DUC systems are provided with
valuable information about where protected data items reside, and hence, are affected by a
DUC policy in a representation-independent manner.
This thesis investigates the DFT pillar of DUC systems. Based on a thorough and rigorous
analysis of current state of the art data flow tracking approaches and the illumination of their
drawbacks in the field of DUC, this work provides a new data flow tracking concept. Taking the
identified caveats into account, this thesis contributes with novel DFT approaches that make
improvements regarding precision, performance, and portability of current state of the art DFT
solutions.
1.2. Running Example
To illustrate and emphasize the core problems that this thesis builds upon, this section describes
a figurative sample use case scenario from the cloud domain (cf. Figure 1.3): BirthdayApp and
PersonalBlog, both Java-based web-services, are operated on a single Tomcat web-server instance
running inside PaaS-A. To serve their functionality both services rely on external data storage.
For the sake of simplicity, we assume in Figure 1.3 a database instance for that function. Although
the following scenario description is based on Java web-services, our proposed approach and
solution is generic and can also be applied for other kinds of programs, like Java standalone
applications.
For an Online Social Network (OSN), like Facebook1, it is quite common to open its platform
1https://www.facebook.com
3
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OSN
PaaS-A (Java)
Tomcat
BirthdayApp PersonalBlog
Alice Bob
Data Data
Database-EU Database-USA
Figure 1.3.: PaaS provider PaaS-A provides a shared run-time environment for two cloud ser-
vices: BirthdayApp, an external third-party birthday calendar service for an OSN,
and PersonalBlog, a web application to manage and create a personal blog. Further,
each service uses external databases to store their generated data.
for third-party services. In Figure 1.3, Alice uses BirthdayApp to display her friend’s birthday
dates in a calendar. To do so, BirthdayApp needs to query the OSN network on behalf of Alice to
retrieve all her friends including their birthday dates (function F1). Furthermore, BirthdayApp
uses external databases to persistently store their accruing data, like friend-relationships or
birthday dates (function F2). As one may notice, those are located in the EU and the USA which
have different data protection regulations. Technically, PaaS-A provides an SDK-library with
the build-in functions queryOSN(user) to perform F1,storeInUs(data) to perform F2, and
receive() to receive data from a user’s request to its running services. As Figure 1.2 illustrates
BirthdayApp uses those build-in functions to implement its functionality.
Next to BirthdayApp the Tomcat web-server also runs PersonalBlog, a web-service to manage
and to create personal blog channels. PersonalBlog is used by Bob (Figure 1.3) to post articles
about his latest experiences in cloud programming on his public blog channel. In contrast to
Alice, Bob does not set a great value upon privacy and actually does not care that PersonalBlog
is using persistent database storage in the USA. Hence, there is no need to track the flow of data
between the build-in functions receive() and storeInUs(data) inside PersonalBlog.
Note, in theory cloud computing postulates to provide an unlimited amount of computa-
tional resources, in practice however, computational resources are still limited. Therefore cloud
providers have to share their computing platforms among their customers in order not to waste
computational resources. Because of that, BirthdayApp and PersonalBlog are operated by PaaS-A
on the same identical run-time execution platform, and thus, technically share the same Java
Runtime Environment (JRE) and Tomcat web-server instance.
As Alice is an extremely privacy-aware person, she would like to prevent BirthdayApp from
storing her data in the USA by enforcing the following DUC policies:
4
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Policy P1 “Do not disseminate my personal data”
Policy P2 “Store my data only on servers in the EU”
Policy P3 “Encrypt my data before transmitting them to servers in the USA”
Policy P4 “Delete my data within 30 days after receipt”
To enforce Policy P1– Policy P4 with a DFT based DUC system, it is necessary to track the flow
of data inside BirthdayApp, in particular, the data flow between the functions receive() and
storeInUs(data). However, as BirthdayApp runs on a shared JRE, current data flow trackers
are not able to properly track the flow of data inside BirthdayApp separately from PersonalBlog,
and therefore, would mistakenly also report a flow of data inside PersonalBlog. The following
Section 1.3 illuminates those concerns and caveats.
1.3. Gap Analysis and Problem Statement
To track the flow of data, research in the field of distributed Data Usage Control (DUC) proposes
a plethora of different Data Flow Tracking approaches and techniques which address differ-
ent abstraction layers, like Android [26], X11 [95], the Internet Protocol [53], MS-Office [108],
MS-Windows [124], or Thunderbird [69]. Conceptually, all those solutions have in common
to propagate a taint-label along the lines of executed program instructions. The value of a
taint-label is considered as an alias or identifier which represents the actual protected data item.
Depending on the abstraction layer, a DFT tracker may take into account layer-agnostic
semantics within its taint propagation mechanism and tracking result. For instance, T B U C E
[69], a data flow tracker for the T H U N D E R B I R D mail-client, is designed and implemented as
a T H U N D E R B I R D-extension, and thus, is able to take into account domain knowledge from
the inside of the mail-client, like the notion of an e-mail. This way, T B U C E is able, for instance,
to track that an e-mail was printed or that e-mail content flows from one e-mail to another or
across different T H U N D E R B I R D instances. On a figurative software abstraction layer stack,
as illustrated in Figure 1.5, T B U C E would reside at the top as it is particularly tailored and
designed for T H U N D E R B I R D. However, as one may notice, although T B U C E provides domain-
specific tracking results its field of application is limited to T H U N D E R B I R D due to its tailored
implementation. Tracking the flow of e-mails inside other mail-clients, like MS-Outlook, requires
another, dedicated implementation. This means in corollary, transferring this methodological
approach to our running example (cf. Section 1.2), we would need to implement a dedicated
monitor for BirthdayApp in order to enforce Policy P1. Enforcing Policy P1 inside another web-
5
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OS
P-A
F1 F3F2
APP
I1
O1
O2
(a) Overapproximation
O2
P-A
F1 F3F2
OS
APP
O1
I1
(b) Precise tracking from inputs to outputs
Figure 1.4.: As in Figure 1.4a no information is available about the data flow dependencies
between input- and output-channels (Ix , Ox ), data flow tracker at the OS layer
would conservatively propagate the taint-label from file F1 to F2 and F3. However, in
Figure 1.4b data flow tracking monitors are placed at the application level, which
analyzes data flow dependencies between input- and output-channels, and hence,
precisely propagates the taint-label only from file F1 to F2.
service, like PersonalBlog, would again require a dedicated monitor specifically designed for
PersonalBlog.
In contrast, Wüchner et al. [124] provide a DFT tracker at the MS-Windows operating system
layer. Using system call interposition, their solution observes and inspects low-level system calls
from all processes running on top of the operating system, and thus, their solution resides at the
bottom in our software abstraction layer stack in Figure 1.5. On one hand, such an approach
makes it quite hard for a process (or application) to hide from being monitored. But on the other
hand, as this approach operates on a low abstraction layer (cf. Figure 1.5), higher-level semantics
and processes’ internals (like input-ouput dependencies) are not available, and hence, may lead
to imprecise tracking results. Figure 1.4 illustrates this caveat: as the monitor at the OS level
has no insights about how outputs O1 and O2 depend on the input I1, Wüchner et al. consider the
Application under Scrutiny (AuS) as a black-box and conservatively propagate the taint-label ( )
to both outputs, although I1 only flows into O2, as Figure 1.4b reveals. This way, it is guaranteed
that no data flows get lost and missed. But on the downside, it overapproximates and mistakenly
propagates taint-labels to outputs that are not dependent or affected by any sensitive input,
and hence, reports data flows that do not even exist, e.g. the flow from I1 to O1 in Figure 1.4a.
Henceforth, we term this type of concern overapproximation. Due to this imprecision, the entire
system may get tainted after some time [124]. In the worst case, this approach would lead to
a scenario where a taint-label is spread over the entire AuS system, and hence, a policy like
Policy P1 would be falsely enforced on data items that are actually not even affected by Policy
6
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MS-Windows operating system
Thunderbird (x86) Tomcat (Java)
Web-ServiceTBUCE
Application
OS
File system
Hardware
Figure 1.5.: Sample software abstraction layer stack with four abstraction layers. The two layers at
the top are used by the application to perform its domain-specific function. Whereas
the two layers at the bottom provide the fundamental and rundimentary functions
to operate and run the applications.
P1. Moreover, as BirthdayApp and PersonalBlog are running on the same JRE in our running
example (cf. Section 1.2) and therefore in the same process, an OS-level monitor is not able to
differentiate data flows between those two web-services. Thus, enforcing Policy P1 would affect
both web-services.
Dynamic Taint Analysis (DTA) has been proposed as a technique to track the flow of data
inside applications, and thus, to detect dependencies between output- and input-channels.
Input-channels (henceforth termed sources) are those instructions in a program that transfer
data from the outside into an application, like reading data from the network socket. Whereas,
output-channels (henceforth termed sinks) are exactly the opposite and transfer data from the
inside to the outside, like writing data to a network-socket. Processing-Instructions reside on a
path of instructions that in sum transfer data from input- to output-channels (like arithmetic
operations). In contrast to the approaches from Lörscher [69] and Wüchner et al. [124], DTA op-
erates at the application’s code-layer, e.g. at the x86-binary- (like L I B DFT [54]) or Java-bytecode-
(like P H O S P H O R [10]) layer. DTA relies on full instrumentation of the entire application includ-
ing system- and third-party-libraries and works conceptually this way: initially, each program
variable gets a taint-label assigned. On each executed input-channel, the taint-label value of the
receiver variable inside the application, i.e. the variable which points to the data read from the
input-channel, is set to a unique identifier. At run-time, this taint-label value is propagated along
the lines of executed commands. Once an output-channel is reached, the taint-label values of
the output parameters reveal on which input-channels they depend.
However, to do so DTA requires to modify and to inject its tracking logic into the entire appli-
cation code. This includes, cf. Figure 1.6, the program, which contains the code that implements
the actual program logic, the Runtime Environment (RTE), which contains the required exe-
cution code, and possibly 3rd-party-libraries. Such modifications encompass not only adding
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program 3rd-party library
run-time environment
Figure 1.6.: Conceptually, an application is composed of code that either directly belongs to the
program, to a 3rd-party library, or to the RTE.
a taint-label for each variable, but also, for instance in case of P H O S P H O R (a popular DFT
tracker for Java-based applications), modifying the Java method- and class-signatures in order
to propagate taint-labels properly. Taint propagation happens not only at the program-code
level but also through 3rd-party-libraries and all Java system-classes which belongs to RTE.
As one may notice, such deep modifications are quite invasive and tightly bind program-, 3rd-
party-library-, and RTE-system-classes together. This thesis advocates that such an approach
affects the portability of the AuS and makes it quite difficult to port and run the adapted and
modified AuS inside other, off-the-shelf run-time execution environments. Derived from that,
this thesis addresses the research questions
RQ1: How can we improve the tracking precision, and thus, reduce overapproximation of the
tracking results compared to a pure black-box approach?
RQ2: How can we track efficiently and effectively data flows inside an AuS from its input- to
its output-channels, and simultaneously, preserve and maintain the portability of the AuS?
A common trait of existing DFT systems, like P H O S P H O R [10] or L I B DFT [54], is it, to treat an
AuS as if it owns an entire RTE where no other applications are executed and operated. However,
for particular domains where computational resources are valuable goods, and therefore are
shared among different applications, such a requirement might be too costly. For instance in our
running scenario in Section 1.2, BirthdayApp and PersonalBlog share the same identical Tomcat
web-server instance, and thus, the same JRE installation. A preliminary task to enforce Policy
P1 on Alice’s transmitted data to BirthdayApp, is the detection of all data flow dependencies
between PaaS-A’s build-in instructions receive() and storeInUs(data), which are used to
receive data from a user request and to store data in the USA respectively. To do so, a conventional
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DFT tracker, like P H O S P H O R [10], has to add its tracking logic into the code of BirthdayApp, its
used 3rd-party-library-classes, into the Tomcat web-server, and into all Java system-classes, as
it relies on a full instrumentation of the entire application code including system- and third-
party-libraries. Moreover, tracking logic must also be added into PersonalBlog, as otherwise we
would need a separated, unmodified Tomcat web-server instance only for PersonalBlog.
One may notice, as PersonalBlog uses the same RTE, i.e. the same JRE (especially the same Java
system classes which are stored within the Java system-library rt.jar of each JRE installation)
and the same Tomcat web-server instance, and therefore the same identical methods to read and
store data, P H O S P H O R [10] (and other data flow tracking solutions [81, 96]) reports a flow of data
for PersonalBlog as well. The reason is that P H O S P H O R [10] introduces a taint-label value at the
end of an input-instruction. For instance, in case of method receive(), P H O S P H O R puts a
taint-label value at the end of receive()’s implementation. In reverse, it means that with every
execution the same taint mark is introduced independently from the calling AuS. Exactly this
point leads to the issue that a critical flow of data is also mistakenly reported for PersonalBlog,
although it is not of particular interest as there is no need for DUC policy enforcement according
to our running scenario. However, to enforce Policy P1 in a representation-independent manner,
i.e. on all copies in a shared RTE, the corresponding DUC system, and its DFT system in
particular, must be able to differentiate between those web-services and track the flow of data
separately. In more generic terms and under the assumption that multiple AuS are running on
the identical RTE, this thesis addresses the research question:
RQ3: How can we track the flow of data separately inside different AuS
that share the same RTE?
In sum, this work advocates that current DFT solutions for DUC systems are insufficient (cf.
Chapter 4), as they either (i) suffer from overapproximation (Caveat 1) [39, 53, 124], and therefore
provide imprecise tracking results, (ii) or they impose too much performance overhead (Caveat
2) [54], (iii) or they affect the portability of the AuS (Caveat 3)[10]. This thesis proposes a new
approach to track the flow of data, addressing the previous caveats.
1.4. Assumptions
The term “Runtime Environment” is widely used in different domains, and thus, may have
different notions. For instance, in our running example in Section 1.2, one may consider the
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platform PaaS-A as the run-time environment which may include, apart from the Tomcat web-
server, also all other components like load-balancer, containerization, virtualization etc. Another
notion would be to consider the Tomcat web-server as an RTE. So depending on where a line is
drawn, the term RTE may have different notions and may encompass different components.
RTEs have been build for different programming languages, like Java [45], Ruby [101], or PHP
[86]. Moreover, they have been applied to different domains and pervade plenty of different
disciplines. As one of the most popular RTE, the JRE has been adapted for Android (to run
mobile applications), or for the Amazon’s Elastic Beanstalk (AEB) [2] (to run cloud services).
However, in order to avoid ambiguity, this thesis considers the immediately enclosing unit
that interprets and executes AuS’s commands and instructions as an RTE. Further, we assume
that RTEs abstract away from lower technical details and provide, via a programming interface,
a uniform view on universal, commonly used basic functions to applications. Such functions,
for instance, may encompass reading/writing from/to files or network-sockets. Concretely, as
the present work has been prototyped in Java we consider the Java Runtime Environment, their
system-classes rt.jar in particular, as the RTE to execute the AuS. We do not consider a
Tomcat web-server as an RTE (cf. our running example in Section 1.2), because simply speaking
the Tomcat web-server is a collection of libraries to support the execution of Java web-services
inside a running JRE (e.g. they provide the implementation of Java Specification Requirements
(JSR) 109). Thus, we consider them as a kind of third-party-libraries in our software-stack (cf.
Figure 1.5). Moreover, we also do not consider an entire PaaS-platform as an RTE because an
entire PaaS-plaform encompasses much more components, like load-balancer, containerization,
virtualization, etc, and thus, are out of scope in this work.
Further, we assume a lazy-but-benign AuS which lacks mechanisms to track the flow of data
inside for subsequent enforcement of data usage restrictions. This means we do not assume a
malicious AuS that actively tries to circumvent the proposed solution.
1.5. Solution and Contribution
To address the research questions from Section 1.3, this thesis proposes a hybrid approach which
combines Static Information Flow Analysis (SIFA) and Dynamic Data Flow Tracking (DDFT)
techniques to improve the data flow tracking pillar in DUC systems, concerning precision and
performance of the data flow tracker, as well as the portability of the AuS.
SIFA analyzes the flow of data statically at the programming level (or at one of its intermediate
representation) without executing the AuS. In contrast, DDFT tracks the flow of data at AuS’s
run-time by injecting a kind of reference monitor into AuS; Section 3.1 provides a more thorough
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and deeper discussion on the distinction between those two approaches. Combining both
techniques, as we do, enable us to statically precompute data flow dependencies and to track
selectively only those program locations that are actually relevant for a flow of data inside the
AuS; any other locations are omitted. That way, our approach provides valuable information
about how data propagates through and where multiple data copies reside within an AuS (web-
services in our use case scenario, cf. Section 1.2). With our approach, we aim to support data
usage control policy enforcement more precisely in a representation independent manner.
To the best of the author’s knowledge, this thesis is the first work that investigates and provides
a hybrid data flow tracking solution for data usage control enforcement. As a proof of concept,
Java-based prototypes (viz. S H R I F T and H D F T++, cf. Chapter 3) have been implemented to
show the underlying concepts. In summary, this thesis contributes with:
1. a novel hybrid data flow tracker that preserves the portability of an AuS while reducing
overapproximation and performance overhead.
2. a hybrid data flow tracker to support DUC systems in their policy enforcement. This
approach is novel as the run-time tracking logic tracks data flows only at the application
level and does not rely on tracking logic within the RTE. That way, data flow tracking
results for each application are isolated from each other and do not intervene.
3. the first instantiation of a generic data flow model [39] for Java bytecode. Backed by this
model, usage control policies are specified and enforced in a representation-independent
manner on all copies of a protected data item (cf. Chapter 2).
1.6. Thesis outline
This thesis is structured as follows. Chapter 2 provides fundamental foundations in DUC. It
describes the DUC’s underlying system model, its policy specification language, and provides a
high-level logical view on the elementary components of a DUC infrastructure. Furthermore, it
provides a generic data flow model that is instantiated in Section 3.5 for Java bytecode. The core
contribution of that thesis, viz. hybrid data flow tracking approach, is described in Chapter 3.
Furthermore, this chapter provides our evaluation results regarding tracking precision and
run-time performance overhead, and discusses the strengths and limitations of our approach.
Chapter 4 provides related work from the field of Information Flow Tracking (IFT) and DUC.
Finally, Chapter 5 concludes this thesis and describes potential future works and directions
regarding the field of IFT.
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1.7. Relevant Publications
To address the research questions RQ1 - RQ3, the research results presented in this thesis are
built upon various research publications which had been published during the conduction of
this dissertation in [51], [71], and[28]. This section gives an overview of those publications and,
wherever it is appropriate, those research publications will be referred to in this thesis.
First and foremost, our motivation’s running sample in Section 1.2 was mainly driven by the
published work in [51]. In that paper we present a compliance monitoring solution in the field
of online social networks (OSN) which prevents third-party applications to use OSN-user data
in a non-compliant way.
Research results on combining static and dynamic data flow techniques, forming the founda-
tion of this thesis, have been published in [71], a joint work between Lovat et al. and the author
of this dissertation. The work in [71] presents S H R I F T and addresses in the first place the over-
approximation problem (RQ1). Further, this paper also provides the S H R I F T implementation
for Java applications and shows its evaluation results in terms of performance and precision.
The present dissertation contributes to S H R I F T [71] with regard to the overall approach of
combining static and dynamic data flow techniques, its Java prototype implementation to track
the flow of data at the application software layer, as well as, with its performance and precision
evaluation results. We want to explicitly mention that this dissertation does not contribute to
the second part of S H R I F T [71] which combines multiple data flow tracking monitors from
different software abstraction layers in order to track the flow of data in a system-wide manner
between and across different system processes and software abstraction layers.
We have published H D F T++, an extension of S H R I F T, in [28]. H D F T++ tracks in addition
to sources and sinks also intermediate instructions residing on a data flow dependency path
between sinks and sources. This way, H D F T++ is able to detect if a statically detected data
flow dependency actually happens at run-time or not. At that point, we would like to refer to
Chapter 3 where H D F T++ is described and also compared to S H R I F T.
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Usage Control (UC) is an extension of Access Control (AC) [63, 64] and concerns not only who is
authorized to access which data, but also how data may or may not be used in future once initial
access has been granted [39, 42, 83, 90, 92, 94]. To do so, a data provider (an entity who discloses
and gives data away) imposes data usage restrictions, formally specified in data usage control
policies P with the Obligation Specification Language (OSL) (cf. Section 2.2), on their dataD.
Once access has been granted to a data consumer (entity who request and receive data), dataD is
transferred together withP in a sticky manner to the data consumer (cf. Figure 1.1). This, however,
only applies if a proper usage control infrastructure UCI (cf. Section 2.4) is installed and capable
to enforce P on the data consumer’s side. An important distinction needs to be mentioned: AC
takes decisions based on provisions, i.e. authorization constraints that refer to past conditions
upon whose fulfillment access gets granted. On the contrary, Usage Control (UC) obligations
specify constraints that refer to the future usage of data. The following sections describe the
fundamental UC concepts upon which this thesis builds upon.
2.1. Usage Control Elementaries
This section describes the fundamental concepts upon which usage control policies are built.
Conceptually, DUC policies are expressed as propositional, temporal, and cardinal constraints
over system runs. A system run is modeled as a set of timed Traces T : N→ P(E), that maps
abstract time points t ∈N to a set of events E . Each t ∈N represents the continuous timeframe
between (t −1, t ], in which an event may happen. An event consists of a nameNE and a set of
parameters J , which in turn are defined by a nameNP and a value VP . For any event e ∈ E , e .n
denotes the event’s name and e .p its set of parameters (including parameter names and values).
J ⊆NP × VP
E ⊆NE × CE ×P(J )
We assume that every event contains two special, reserved parameters by default, viz. obj ∈NP
and isActual ∈ NP . The former one denotes the target primary object of an event, such as a
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file or network request data. Whereas, the latter one is boolean-typed and denotes if an event
is actual, i.e. isActual = true, and has already happened or if it is desired, i.e. isActual = false,
and attempted to happen; syntacticallyA(·) andD(·) captures this distinction. Moreover, this
distinction is necessary to differentiate between events that trigger usage control mechanisms,
and hence needs to be approved by usage control policies, and events that are already approved
or even do not need approval, and therefore are actually allowed to be executed. In that syntax
an example event declaration is
eτ = (send,{(obj, movie), (isActual, true), (destIp, 131.154.160.1), (destPort, 8080)})
(Equation 2.1)
Event eτ specifies that data movie has been sent over the network to the destination IP
131.154.160.1 and destination port 8080. As one may notice, this is an actual event asA(eτ) = true
and therefore this event has already happened.
Further, we categorize events into specific event-classes CE which we divide into data-usage
and container-usage . Intuitively, data-usage events encompass and address every represen-
tation of a data item, and therefore all containers where a protected data item resides. Con-
trary, container-usage events address a single container. Furthermore, we define a function
getClass : E→ EventClass that determines the event-class for an event e ∈ E .
Beyond that, DUC provides the concept of event refinement which enables universal quantifi-
cation over the unmentioned parameters. To capture that, refinesEv⊆ E×E defines a refinement
relation on events. An event e1 ∈ E refines an event e2 ∈ E , if e1 and e2 have identical names and
if all parameters (names and their values) of e2 are a subset of e1
∀e1, e2 ∈ E : e1 refinesEv e2 ⇐⇒ e1.n = e2.n ∧ e1.p ⊇ e2.p
Event refinement is a helpful concept during policy specification as it allows to quantify over
all unmentioned parameters. For instance, Equation 2.2 shows an event specification (derived
from Equation 2.1) that covers all possible ports, thus eτ refinesEv e
′
τ.
e ′τ = (send, (obj, movie), (isTry, true), (destIp, 131.154.160.1)) (Equation 2.2)
However, at system’s run-time all actually executed events are “maximally refined”, i.e. all
parameters are determined and have a value; maxRefEv captures that case:
maxRefEv = {e ∈ E | @e ′ ∈ E : e ′ 6= e ∧ e ′ refinesEv e }
In consideration of the example in Equation 2.1, to declare the same event for any arbitrary
port, one would need to replicate this declaration for all possible ports, ranging from 0 to 65535.
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However, as this would be a cumbersome task variable events VE are introduced that enables
the specification of variables Var : NV → DV in an event declaration. Mapping function Var
maps a variable nameNV to a domain of possible variable valuesDV =P(NE ∪VP )
VE ⊆ (NE ∪NV ) × CE × P(NP × (VP ∪NV ))
In that context, function InstE : VE→ P(E) instantiates a variable event e ∈ VE by replacing
all variable names nv ∈NV with a concrete value vv from its domain dv ∈DV ; let e [nv 7→ vv ]
denote such a replacement (note, more than one variable nv may be specified).
∀e ∈ VE , nv1 , . . . , nvk ∈NV , dv1 , . . . , dvk ∈DV :
VarIn(e ) = {nv1 7→ dv1 , . . . , nvk 7→ dvk }
⇒ InstE (e ) = {e [nv1 7→ vv1 , . . . , nvk 7→ vvk ] | ∧ki=1vvi ∈ dvi }
Equipped with the concept of variable events, Equation 2.3 shows the the extended event
declaration from Equation 2.1 with Var = {v1 7→ {0, . . . , 65535}}
e ′′τ = (send,{(obj, movie), (isTry, true), (destIp, 131.154.160.1), (destPort, v1)}) (Equation 2.3)
2.2. Usage Control Policies and Mechanisms
The semantic of UC policies are defined over timed traces (cf. Section 2.1). Data usage restric-
tions and requirements are expressed as UC policies at two levels: specification-level and the
implementation-level. Specification-level policies express what the constraints are, whereas
implementation-level policies specify how those constraints should be enforced. In a nutshell,
the latter one serves as a configuration for a usage control mechanism.
2.2.1. Specification Level Policy
A Specification Level Policy (SLP) specifies constraints upon the future usage of data. Formally,
it is based on the Obligation Specification Language (OSL), a first-order-temporal language to
express propositional (Ψ+), temporal (Γ+), cardinal (Ω+), and spatial constraints on the usage
of data. A UC policy UcPolicy ::= P(VE)×P(Φ+) consists of a set of event declarations VE (as
described in Section 2.1) and a set of obligation formulas Φ+. Equation 2.4 shows the supported
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operators of Φ+ in Extended Backus-Naur Form (EBNF).
Θ+ ::= VE |N | String | . . .
Φ+ ::= (Φ+) | Ψ+ | Γ+ |Ω+ |A(VE) |D(VE) | forall NV i n DV : Φ+
Ψ+ ::= true | false | not(Φ+) | Φ+ and Φ+ | Φ+ or Φ+ | Φ+ implies Φ+ | eval(Θ+)
Γ+ ::= Φ+ until Φ+ | always(Φ+) | Φ+ after N | Φ+ within N | Φ+ during N
Ω+ ::= repmax(N,Ψ+) | replim(N,N,N,Ψ+) | repuntil(N,Ψ+,Φ+) (Equation 2.4)
A(·) and D(·) specify if the passed event declaration VE is an actual or desired event. The
forall [·] :ϕ operator specifies that formula ϕ ∈ Φ+ has to hold for all variablesNV , substituted
by their values VV . The eval(Θ+) is used to specify conditions that are not covered by Ψ+, Γ+,
and Ω+, and hence, for instance enables the specification of physical time- and location-based
constraints:
∀n1 ∈ TIME :A((print,{(obj, secret.doc), (time, n1)}))
→  ¬eval(8≤ n1 ≤ 18)→ e (log,{(obj, secret.doc), (time, n1)})
As eval(Θ+) takes as parameter any possible expression, its semantic is left unspecified and re-
ferred to as [[eval(θ )]]eval forθ ∈Θ+. Operators in Ψ+ have standard semantics from propositional
logic. The until operator has the weak-until semantic from Linear Temporal Logic (LTL) because
liveness-properties are not considered to be relevant in the context of data usage protection
[43]. ϕ1 until ϕ2 is true if ϕ1 ∈ Φ+ is true until ϕ2 ∈ Φ+ eventually becomes true, or ϕ1 ∈ Φ+ is
always true. always(ϕ) specifies that ϕ ∈ Φ+ must be true at each moment in time in the future;
this operator can be also expressed by ϕ until false. ϕ after n is true if ϕ ∈ Φ+ becomes true
after n ∈N timesteps. ϕ within n is true if ϕ ∈ Φ+ was at least once true within the last n ∈N
timesteps. Whereas, ϕ during n specifies that ϕ ∈ Φ+ has to be true at each timestep during the
last n ∈N timesteps. repmax(n ,ϕ) specifies that ϕ ∈ Ψ+ must happen at most n ∈N times in
future. replim(n , low, up,ϕ) is true ifϕ ∈ Ψ+ is true between low ∈N and up ∈N times within the
next n ∈N timesteps. repuntil(n ,ϕ1,ϕ2) is true ifϕ1 ∈ Ψ+ is true at most n ∈N times untilϕ2 ∈ Φ+
eventually becomes true. As one may note, SLP are expressed in future-time. The rationale for
that is: at the moment in time data usage obligations are specified, their actual intention is, to
impose constraints on the future usage of data. Given Ψ+, the semantic of events is defined by
|=e⊆ S ×Ψ+, whereas S ⊆maxRefEv × {desired, actual} specifies all maximal refined actual and
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desired events at system’s run-time:
∀e ′ ∈maxRefEv, e ∈ VE
(e ′, actual) |=e A(e ) ⇔ ∃e ′′ ∈ E : e ′ refinesEv e ′′ ∧ e ′′ ∈ InstE (e ) ∧
(e ′, desired) |=e D(e ) ⇔ ∃e ′′ ∈ E : e ′ refinesEv e ′′ ∧ e ′′ ∈ InstE (e )
For a trace t ∈ T , timestep i ∈N, and a formula ϕ ∈ Φ+, the relation (t , i ) |= f ϕ denotes that
trace t satisfiesϕ at time i . The formal semantic ofΦ+ is defined by the relation |= f ⊆ (T ×N)× Φ+:
∀t ∈ T ; i ∈N;ϕ ∈ Φ+ • (t , i ) |= f ϕ ⇔ ϕ 6= false ∧ ∃e ∈ VE • (ϕ =A(e )∨ϕ =D(e )) ∧ ∃e ′ ∈ t (i ) : e ′ |=e ϕ
∨ ∃ϕ1,ϕ2 ∈ Φ+ • ϕ =ϕ1 implies ϕ2 ∧  ¬((t , i ) |= f ϕ1) ∨ (t , i ) |= f ϕ2
∨ ∃θ ∈Θ+ • ϕ = eval(θ ) ∧ [[ϕ]]eval = true
∨ ∃nv ∈NV ; dv ∈DV ; ϕ1 ∈ Φ+ • ϕ = (forall nv ∈ dv :ϕ1) ∧ ∀vv ∈ dv : (t , i ) |= f ϕ1[nv 7→ vv ])
∨ ∃ϕ1, ϕ2 ∈ Φ+ • ϕ =ϕ1 until ϕ2 ∧  ∀n ∈N : i ≤ n ⇒ (t , n ) |= f ϕ1
∨ (∃u ∈N : i < u ∧ (t , u ) |= f ϕ2 ∧ ∀n ∈N : i ≤ n < u⇒ (t , n ) |= f ϕ1)
∨ ∃n ∈N; ϕ1 ∈ Φ+ • ϕ =ϕ1 after n ∧ (t , i +n ) |= f ϕ1
∨ ∃n ∈N1; l , r ∈N; ϕ1 ∈ Ψ+ • ϕ = replim(n , l , r,ϕ1) ∧ l ≤ #{ j ∈N1| j ≤ n ∧ (t , i + j ) |= f ϕ1} ≤ r
∨ ∃n ∈N; ϕ1 ∈ Ψ+; ϕ2 ∈ Φ+ • ϕ = repuntil(n ,ϕ1,ϕ2)
∧  (∃u ∈N1 : (t , i + u ) |= f ϕ2 ∧ (∀v ∈N1 : v < u ⇒¬((t , i + v ) |= f ϕ2))
∧ (#{ j ∈N1| j < n ∧ t (i + j ) |=e ϕ1})≤ n )
∨ (#{ j ∈N1|t (i + j ) |=e ϕ1})≤ n
∨ ∃n ∈N; ϕ1 ∈ Ψ+ • ϕ = repmax(n ,ϕ1) ∧ (t , i ) |= f repuntil(n ,ϕ1, false))
∨ ∃n ∈N; ϕ1 ∈ Ψ+ • ϕ =ϕ1 within n ∧ (t , i ) |= f replim(n , 1, n ,ϕ1)
∨ ∃n ∈N; ϕ1 ∈ Ψ+ • ϕ =ϕ1 during n ∧ (t , i ) |= f replim(n , n , n ,ϕ1)
2.2.2. Implementation Level Policy
In contrast to SLPs, which describe a particular data usage requirement (i.e. what has to be
enforced), an Implementation Level Policy (ILP)PI specifies how data usage obligations must be
enforced within a target system. To do so, ILPs are structured as Event-Condition-Action (ECA)
rules [1, 61, 70]. An ECA rule has the following semantic: On Event If Condition Do Action. This
means, when a trigger-Event E emerges and the trigger-Condition C evaluates to true then
execute Action A. Thereby, E specifies the desired eventD(E ) that triggers PI ’s verification; C
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specifies a condition inϕ ∈ Φ−, the past version of OSL (cf. Equation 2.5); and finally, A specifies
the action (inhibition, modification, execution [90]) that has to be taken, if C verifies to true at
the moment in time E occurs. Note, in the following PI .e denotes accessing the trigger event
e of an ILP policy; PI .ϕ denotes accessing the condition part ϕ of an ILP policy; and finally,
PI .a denotes accessing the action part a ∈ A of an ILP policy.
As suggested, ILP uses a past dialect of OSL for describing conditions. The reason is, that at
run-time data usage decisions have to be taken on system traces, i.e. on events that have already
happened. Equation 2.5 shows the past version of OSL. In a nutshell, all operators from Φ+
are translated into their corresponding past versions. Kumari et al. [60, 61] provide a structural
approach and methodology to translate SLP into ILP policies, i.e. to translate Φ+ into Φ−.
Θ− ::= VE |N | String | . . .
Φ− ::= (Φ−) | Ψ− | Γ− |Ω− |A(VE) |D(VE) | forall NV i n DV : Φ−
Ψ− ::= true | false | not(Ψ−) | Ψ− and Ψ− | Ψ− or Ψ− | Ψ− implies Ψ− | eval(Θ−)
Γ− ::= Φ− since Φ− |  Φ− | Φ− before N | Φ− within N | Φ− during N
Ω− ::= repmax(N,Ψ−) | replim(N,N,N,Ψ−) | repsince(N,Ψ−,Φ−) (Equation 2.5)
Almost all operators in Φ− have a similar semantic as in Φ+, except for some exceptions.
ϕ1 since ϕ2 specifies that ϕ1 ∈ Φ− has to be true ever since ϕ2 ∈ Φ− happened.   ϕ specifies
that ϕ ∈ Φ− is true in all timesteps before, including the current one. ϕ before n is true if ϕ ∈ Φ−
was true exactly in the n th ∈N timestep ago. within and during have similar semantics as their
corresponding future version, and specify that an event ϕ ∈ Φ− has to be true at least once in
the past n ∈ N timesteps, or in each past timesteps respectively. repmax(ϕ, n ) specifies that
ϕ ∈ Ψ− was true not more than n ∈N times in the past. repsince(n ,ϕ1,ϕ2) specifies that ϕ1 ∈ Ψ−
must happen at most n ∈N times ever sinceϕ2 ∈ Φ− happened. replim(n , l , m ,ϕ1) specifies that
ϕ1 ∈ Φ− was true between l ∈N and m ∈N times within the last n ∈N timesteps. The formal
semantics of Φ− is defined by |= f − (T ×N)×Φ−:
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∀t ∈ T ; i ∈N; ϕ ∈ Φ− : (t , i ) |= f − ϕ ⇔ (ϕ 6= false) ∧ ∃e ∈ VE : (ϕ =A(e ) ∨ ϕ =D(e )) ∧ ∃e ′ ∈ t (i ) : e ′ |=e ϕ
∨ ∃ϕ1 ∈ Ψ− • ϕ = not(ϕ1) ∧ ¬((t , i ) |= f − ϕ1)
∨ ∃ϕ1, ϕ2 ∈ Ψ− • ϕ =ϕ1 or ϕ2 ∧ ((t , i ) |= f − ϕ1 ∨ (t , i ) |= f − ϕ2)
∨ ∃ϕ1, ϕ2 ∈ Ψ− • ϕ =ϕ1 and ϕ2 ∧ (t , i ) |= f − not(not(ϕ1) or not(ϕ2))
∨ ∃ϕ1,ϕ2 ∈ Ψ− • ϕ =ϕ1 implies ϕ2 ∧  ¬((t , i ) |= f − ϕ1 ∨ (t , i ) |= f − ϕ2)
∨ ∃θ ∈Θ− • ϕ = eval(θ ) ∧ [[ϕ]]eval = true
∨ ∃nv ∈NV ; dv ∈DV ; ϕ1 ∈ Φ− • ϕ = (forall nv ∈ dv :ϕ1) ∧ ∀vv ∈ dv : (t , i ) |= f − ϕ1[nv 7→ vv ])
∨ ∃ϕ1, ϕ2 ∈ Φ− • ϕ =ϕ1 since ϕ2 ∧  (∀n ∈N : n ≤ i ⇒ (t , n ) |= f − ϕ1)
∨ (∃u ∈N : u ≤ i ∧ (t , u ) |= f − ϕ2 ∧ ∀v ∈N : u < v ≤ i ⇒ (t , v ) |= f − ϕ1)
∨ ∃n ∈N, ϕ1 ∈ Φ− • ϕ =ϕ1 before n ∧ n ≤ i ∧ (t , i −n ) |= f − ϕ1
∨ ∃n , l , r ∈N, ϕ1 ∈ Ψ− • ϕ = replim(n , l , r,ϕ1)
∧ l ≤ (#{ j ∈N | j ≤min(n, i) ∧ t (i − j ) |= f − ϕ1})≤ r
∨ ∃n ∈N, ϕ1 ∈ Ψ−, ϕ2 ∈ Φ−, e ∈ E • ϕ = repsince(n ,ϕ1,ϕ2)
∧  (∃u ∈N1 : u ≤ i ∧ (t , i −u ) |= f − ϕ2 ∧ (∀v ∈N : v < u⇒¬((t , i − v ) |= f − ϕ2))
∧ (#{ j ∈N | j ≤ u ∧ t (i − j ) |= f − ϕ1} ≤ n ))
∨ (#{ j ∈N | j ≤ i ∧ t (i − j ) |= f − ϕ1} ≤ n )
∨ ∃n ∈N, ϕ1 ∈ Ψ− • ϕ = repmax(n ,ϕ1) ∧ (t , i ) |= f − repuntil(n ,ϕ1, false)
∨ ∃n ∈N, ϕ1 ∈ Ψ− • ϕ =ϕ1 within n ∧ (t , i ) |= f − replim(n , 1, n ,ϕ1)
∨ ∃n ∈N, ϕ1 ∈ Ψ− • ϕ =ϕ1 during n ∧ (t , i ) |= f − replim(n , n , n ,ϕ1)
2.2.3. Usage Control Mechanisms
Usage Control mechanisms are installed at the data consumer’s side and are means by which
data providers control the usage of their data. Mechanisms are configured by a list of ILPs, that
specify when a mechanism is applicable, i.e. what are the trigger events ve ∈ VE and conditions
ϕ ∈ Φ− that must match, and what are the compensating actions that need to be taken once a
mechanism applies. Mechanisms may compensate the trigger event ve by
Inhibition minh ⊆ VE×Φ−: execution of ve is prohibited and not converted into an actual event,
i.e. ¬A(ve).
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Execution mexc ⊆ VE ×Φ−×P(VE): ve is executed if no other ILP prohibits it. Furthermore, a
set of n events may be executed ∧ni=1D(vei ) in addition. Note, those additional events are
desired as their execution may be subject to other ILPs.
Modification mmod ⊆ VE×Φ−×P(VE ): ve is executed in a modified form, e.g. some of the event’s
parameter values are changed. In reverse this means, the execution of ve is prohibited and
a modified version of ve’ is executed. Therefore, a modifier is modeled as a composition
of inhibitors and executors.
Let fire⊆ VE ×Φ− specify the situation when an ILP policy PI is supposed to fire
fire(ve,PI .ϕ) ⇔  D(ve) ∧ (A(ve)→PI .ϕ) (Equation 2.6)
Then the semantics of mexc, mmod, minh are defined as
mexc(ve,ϕ, Exc)⇔∀VarIn(ve) : fire(ve,ϕ)→∧xi∈ExcD(xi )
mmod(ve,ϕ, Mod)⇔∀VarIn(ve) : fire(ve,ϕ)→ (¬A(ve)∧mexc(ve,ϕ, Mod))
minh(ve,ϕ)⇔∀VarIn(ve) : fire(ve,ϕ)→¬A(ve)
For a set of n1 executing, n2 modifying, and n3 inhibiting ILPs in a computing system, their
union computes to
M ↔
n1∧
i=1
mexc(ve
exc
i ,ϕ
exc
i , Exci )∧
n2∧
i=1
mmod(ve
mod
i ,ϕ
mod
i , Modi )∧
n3∧
i=1
minh(ve
inh
i ,ϕ
inh
i )
Once, the desired eventD(e ) is allowed to be executed it is converted into an actual eventA(e ),
as long as, its execution does not trigger any modifying or inhibiting ILPs. An ILPPI triggers if e
refinesPI ’s trigger eventPI .e and its conditionPI .ϕ evaluates to true. In summary, a maximally
refined desired event either transforms into an actual event, or a modifying or inhibiting ILP
gets triggered by e , and hence, would prevent e ’s execution:
Mdefault↔
∧
e∈maxRefEv
D(e )→  A(e )∨ ∨
(ve,ϕ) :M →minh(ve,ϕ)
∨ M →mmod (ve,ϕ, Mod)
∃VarIn(ve) : e refinesEv ve ∧ϕ
Finally, Mcomplete defines the semantics of all combined ILPs in a system:
Mcomplete↔M ∧Mdefault (Equation 2.7)
It may be the case that the combination of different ILPs leads to inconsistent data usage
specifications. For instance, a modifying mmoda ILP transforms an event a into b and another
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ILP mmodb transforms an event b into a . This thesis does not address the problem of circular
dependencies, and formal inconsistencies in particular, between ILPs, and therefore refer to the
work in [94], where model checking techniques are used to compare and to identify discrepancies
among ILP policies.
Put it simply, once an ILP is activated, it serves as a configuration for a mechanism installed
at the data consumers’ side. This thesis assumes that once a policy is violated it remains violated
forever and the violation is reported at each moment in time. However, depending on the context
another strategy would be more applicable. For instance, to report the violation the first time
and to deactivate the ILP afterwards, and hence, to reset the mechanism respectively. Because a
general rule does not exist that determines which strategy is the best, a policy themselves must
specify what must happen once a violation occurs. Technically, mechanisms can be implemented
using run-time monitoring and verification techniques [40, 41] or Complex Event Processing
(CEP) technologies [15, 55].
2.3. Generic Data Flow Model
As described in Section 2.2.2, data usage control policies and data obligations are mostly specified
and expressed in terms of events. However, policy issuers intend to impose data usage obligations
on their actual data rather than on single events. Moreover, as data might evolve at system’s
run-time from one copy to another, policy issuers desire the protection of all copies (henceforth
also termed representations) of their data, and not only the first initial data item. For instance, a
picture F at the filesystem might be modified or converted from one format FA into another
FB . These are different representations of the same content, and hence, a policy like “Do not
disseminate my picture” (P2) must affect FA and FB . It is noteworthy, that the same content may
also exist on different abstraction layers. Related to the previous example, picture F downloaded
from the Internet may exist at least in form of an HTML DOM-object, a file within the browser
cache, and as network packets at the network layer.
As a consequence, enforcement of data obligations requires knowledge of the different repre-
sentations. To do so, the usage control model is extended with data flow tracking features that
enable to track different representations, and hence, to track how data evolves and disseminates
in a system [39]. Separating data from its concrete representations enables the expression and
enforcement of data usage requirements in terms of data, like P2, rather than layer-specific
representations, like P1. The enforcement mechanism would then need to take into account
every representation of a protected data item. This section describes a generic data flow model
that enables to model and to describe how data flows among different representations within a
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system. Chapter 3 instantiates this model for H D F T++, and hence, forms the foundation of the
proposed hybrid data flow tracking approach.
The generic data flow model [39, 95] is a state transition system and provides formal and
operational concepts to model data flows in a system. A state σ captures which data is stored in
which representation, whereas a state transition models how data flows from one representation
to another. Formally, the data flow tracking model is described by the tuple
(D,C,E ,I,F ,σ,σi ,R)
SetD represents all to be protected data items in a system. Whereas, set C denotes all possible
representations (henceforth also termed containers) in a system where potentially data may be
stored, e.g. variables or files. All relevant system events, e.g. method invocations or system calls,
that potentially cause a flow of data, and hence change the system state, are denoted by set E ;
notably, at system’s run-time only actual events cause data flows. Principals I ⊆ C are all active
entities in a system, e.g. a process or a thread that can initiate events. F is the set of all naming
identifiers that are used to identify containers in a system, e.g. process- or object-id. Finally, all
possible system states are specified by
σ := s × l × f
A state is compound by three mappings:
• A storage function s : (C→ 2D) that maps a container to a set of data items
• An alias function l : (C→ 2C) that models an alias relation between different containers.
An alias relation captures the fact that some containers get implicitly updated whenever
other containers do. If c2 ∈ l (c1) for c1, c2 ∈ C, then any data written to c1 is immediately
propagated to c2.
• A naming function f : (I ×F→ C) that maps uniquely a tuple of principle I and naming
identifier F to a container C
σi ∈σ denotes a system’s initial state. The set of all possible state transitions in a system is
defined by relationR⊂σ×E→σ. For a given moment in time n ∈N, states : (Trace×N)→σ
computes the dissemination of data after executing trace t ∈ T until timestep n −1.
states(t , n )
σi if n = 0R(states(t , n −1), t (n −1)) if n > 0
Additional notations for modelling state transitions are defined. Let x ∈ {s , l , f } denote the
access of a mapping function in state σ ∈ σ. For any mapping σ.x : J → K and a variable
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ν ∈ V ⊆ J , define σ.x ′ = σ.x [ν ← expr]ν∈V with σ.x ′ : J → K such that σ.x ′(y ) = expr if
y ∈V andσ.x ′(y ) =σ.x (y ) otherwise. Multiple state changes for disjoint sets ⋂i≤n∈NVi = ; are
defined by a function composition ◦; the replacement is done atomically and simultaneously.
σ.x [ν1← exprν1 ; . . . ; xn ← exprνn ]ν1∈V1,...,νn∈Vn =
σ.x [νn ← exprνn ]νn∈Vn ◦ . . . ◦σ.x [ν1← exprν1 ]ν1∈V1
The main driver to combine data usage control concepts with data flow tracking is, to specify
data usage control policies in a data-centric manner, i.e. policy issuers specify data obligations
in terms of data rather than layer-specific containers/representations. To complement that
approach, the concept of event refinement from Section 2.1 needs to be redefined and adapted
in the presence of states. The rationale is, that at run-time system events e ⊆maxRefEv refer
to concrete containers, while usage control policies might be specified in terms of data or
containers. Because of that, the decision-taking process must also take into account the system’s
current stateσ ∈σ, as a state provides information about which data is stored within a container.
Let getClass be defined as in Section 2.1, then the system must satisfy the conditions:
∀e ∈ E : getClass(e ) = dataUsage⇔∃par ∈D : (obj 7→ par) ∈ e .p
∀e ∈ E : getClass(e ) = containerUsage⇔∃par ∈ C : (obj 7→ par) ∈ e .p
In this respect, an event e1 refines an event e2 in the presence of states,
• if both has the same class getClass(e1) == getClass(e2) and e1 refinesEvΣ e2, or
• if both has the same name, and getClass(e1) == containerUsage, and there exist a data
item d stored in a container c such that (obj 7→ d ) ∈ e1.p and (obj 7→ c ) ∈ e2.p , and all
parameters in e1 have the same value as in e2 except for parameter obj
Formally refinesEvΣ ⊆ (E ×Σ)×E is defined
∀e1, e2 ∈ E ,∀σ ∈Σ : (e1,σ) refinesEvΣ e2 ⇔
(getClass(e1) == getClass(e2) ∧ e1 refinesEv e2 )
∨  getClass(e1) == containerUsage ∧ getClass(e2) == dataUsage
∧ e1.n == e2.n ∧ ∃d ∈D, c ∈ C : d ∈σ.s (c )
∧ (obj 7→ c ) ∈ e1.p ∧ (obj 7→ d ) ∈ e2.p ∧ (e2.p \ {obj 7→ d })⊆ (e1.p \ {obj 7→ c })
To specify data obligations in the presence of states, the OSL language Φ+ is extended with
state-based operatorsΠ+, that enables to specify conditions on the system’s data flow stateσ.
Π ::= isNotIn(D,P(C)) | isMaxIn(D,N,P(C)) | isCombinedWith(D,D,P(C))
Φ+ ::= Φ+ |Π
23
2. Foundations on Usage Control
Operator isNotIn(d,C) is true if d ∈D is not in any of the specified containersC⊆ C, isMaxIn(d, n,C)
is true if data d ∈D is contained in at most n ∈N containers inC⊆ C, isCombinedWith(d1, d2,C)
evaluates to true if there exists at least one container in C ⊆ C that contains both d1, d2 ∈ D.
Formally, the semantics ofΠ are specified by |=S⊆ (Trace×N)×Π
∀t ∈ Trace; n ∈N;ϕ ∈Π;σ ∈σ : (t , n ) |=S ϕ⇔σ= states(t , n ) ∧ ∃d ∈D,Cs ⊆ C • ϕ = isNotIn(d,Cs) ∧ ∀c ′ ∈ C : d ∈σ.s (c ′)⇒ c ′ /∈ Cs
∨ ∃d1, d2 ∈D, C⊆ C • ϕ = isCombinedWith(d1, d2,C) ∧ ∃c ′ ∈C : d1 ∈σ.s (c ′) ∧ d2 ∈σ.s (c ′)
∨ ∃d ∈D, m ∈N,C⊆ C • ϕ = isMaxIn(d, m,C) ∧ | #{c ∈C | d ∈σ.s (c )} |≤m
Dually, Φ− ::= Φ− |Π extends the past version of OSL Φ− with the state-based operatorsΠ.
2.4. Usage Control Infrastructure
As illustrated in Figure 1.1, a dedicated Usage Control Infrastructure (UCI) is required on the
data consumer’s side and must perform the following tasks to enforce usage control policies:
• Manage and deploy ILP usage control policies
• Monitor events within the system that are relevant for data-usage and verify if their execu-
tion does not violate any deployed ILP usage control policies
• Enforce usage control decisions, once they have been made, by inhibiting, modifying, or
delaying system events
• Monitor events that lead to a flow of data, and hence, might change the system’s data flow
stateσ ∈Σ
• Record and maintain a system’s data flow stateσ ∈Σ at each moment in time n ∈N
To address these requirements, the foundations on usage control, as described in Section 2.1 -
Section 2.3, are operationalized in a layer-agnostic generic architecture (cf. Figure 2.1): Policy
Enforcement Point (PEP), Policy Decision Point (PDP), Policy Information Point (PIP), and
Policy Management Point (PMP). As one may recognize, this architecture design follows the
separation of concerns principle [65] and is leaned on the established XACML [79] and COPS
[22, 57] reference architecture. However, this thesis underlying UCI infrastructure components
have slightly different semantics and assigned functions than those reference architectures. In a
nutshell, the UCI exhibits three components that build and form the carthorse of this thesis
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4. σPMP
PEP
PDP PIP0. deployPolicy(ϕ)
Figure 2.1.: Usage Control Infrastructure
underlying infrastructure: PEP, PDP, PIP. The PEP is in charge to extract and to notify context
information in the form of system events e ∈ E to the PDP (cf. step 1 in Figure 2.1). Based on the
signaled system events, the PDP decides if their executions do not violate deployed policies and
replies its decision back to the corresponding PEP for enforcement (cf. step 4 in Figure 2.1). In
case data usage events are signaled, the PDP also queries the PIP (cf. step 2 and 3 in Figure 2.1)
to take into account the current data flow state σ ∈ Σ of the system. Note, this architecture
provides a logical view on its components and their interplay, and by design is able to support
different abstraction layers, including the Java abstraction layer. Their technical implementation,
however, may differ (e.g. using simple taint analysis to implement the PIP).
The Policy Enforcement Point implements the right-hand side of Equation 2.7. In the liter-
ature PEPs have been implemented for different abstraction layers such as Android [26, 97],
Java [29, 30], JavaScript [85], ChromiumOS [122], MS Office [108] and Windows [124], Mozilla
Thunderbird [69] and Firefox [62], MySQL [68], OpenBSD [39], OpenNebula [66], and X11[95]. All
those implementations have in common, that they are tailored for one specific abstraction layer
to monitor and intercept layer-specific system events properly. For instance, a Java-agnostic
PEP [29] may intercept and interpret Java method calls as events, whereas PEPs at the operating
system layer [39, 124] interpret system calls as events. However, because the PEPs are unaware
of any deployed policies and do not have semantics about monitored events, the PEP must
signal each intercepted event to the PDP to get its execution approved. Depending on the PDP’s
taken decision the PEP allows, denies, or modifies the execution of the currently intercepted
event. Note, each generated and signaled event e ∈ E is maximally refined, i.e. e ∈maxRefEv.
Beyond that, the PEP also intercepts and signals all data flow relevant events to the PIP to notify
and to keep track of how data flows.
The Policy Decision Point implements the function in Equation 2.6 and continuously evalu-
ates if the execution of a particular signaled system event could potentially violate a deployed
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policy. To do so, the PDP is configured with a set of ILP policies and works from a high-level
perspective as follows:
1. First, an intercepted event e ∈ maxRefEv is matched against deployed policies PI . An
event e matches a policy event PI .e if e refinesEv PI .e holds.
2. Second, the PDP evaluates the policy’s condition partPI .ϕ. In case the condition includes
state-based operators pi ∈Π, the PDP also queries the PIP to get additional information
about the current data flow state of the system.
3. Finally, if the condition part of a policy evaluates to true, the specified action is applied.
Moreover, for temporal constraints where it is not trivial and probably also not practical to
determine the exact moment in time, the PDP supports the concept of a timestep interval.
A timestep interval may have different sizes and allows to cluster a set of events that occur
within a certain timeslot (e.g. 2 seconds or 1 hour). This concept is quite helpful to estimate
approximately when a refining event actually happened. For instance, PI (cf. Equation 2.8)
specifies that a manager must be notified (PI .a) in case a clerk process a service request (PI .e)
not within the prescribed time of 10 days (PI .ϕ).
PI =

PI .e = (processReq,{(obj, d), (role, clerk), (type, service)})
PI .ϕ = not((reqService,{(obj, d)}) within 10) and
repsince(1, (reqService,{(obj, d)}), false)
PI .a = (notify,{(obj, d), (role, manager)})
(Equation 2.8)
Whenever PI ’s evaluation is triggered by PI .e, it is quite unlikely that exactly at the same
point in time the condition event e1 refinesEv (reqService,{(obj, d)}) happened exactly 10 days
(864000 seconds) before. It is more likely, that an event e1 happened approximately 10 days ±
12 hours ago. Related to Equation 2.8, this means, that once PI gets triggered, a PDP instance
would evaluate the condition part for a timeframe between 9.5 days ± 12 hours.
Once, a policyPI gets deployed on the PDP, the PDP instantiates a new evaluation mechanism
MI and configures its ECA parts according to the information provided by PI , i.e. MI .e =
PI .e,MI .ϕ =MI .ϕ, andMI .a = PI .a. While ILPs specify how obligations must be fulfilled,
mechanismsMI are concrete instances that are able to verify if such obligations actually hold
at run-time. As a policy condition PI .ϕ might exhibit complex and nested structures, the PDP
represents the condition part MI .ϕ as an expression tree. Figure 2.2 shows the expression
tree for condition PI .ϕ from Equation 2.8. Thereby, an expression tree’s leave nodes represent
either events E , state-based operators Π, or boolean constants true and false. Whereas, its
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(reqService,{(obj,d)}) false
(reqService,{(obj,d)})
Figure 2.2.: Sample expression tree that shows the condition part PI .ϕ from Equation 2.8.
internal nodes represent all the other operators, including temporal, propositional, and cardinal
operators. Moreover, all nodes of an expression tree are stateful and store how often their state
changes during the current (and in case of temporal operators, in previous) timesteps.
Figure 2.3 illustrates the interplay between the UCI components. Once a policy gets instan-
tiated and deployed on the PDP (cf. steps 1-3), the PEP continuously monitors and signals
intercepted events e ∈ E to the PDP (cf. steps 4 and 5). To evaluate a received event e on an
up-to-date data flow state, the PDP first redirects e to the PIP, which updates its data flow
state according to e ’s semantic (cf. step 6 and 7). If e is of type dataUsage, i.e. getClass(e ) =
dataUsage, the PDP updates the internal state of all leaf nodes of an expression tree. For leave
nodes of type state-based operator, the PDP delegates the update process to the PIP. Boolean
typed leave nodes true and false are invariant and do not need an update. The internal state of
event-typed leave nodes e ∈ E counts the number of refining events that happened within the
current timestep, i.e. (e ′,σ) refinesEvΣ e =true. The update process for leave nodes happens for
all instantiated mechanism, independent of their trigger event. That way, the state of all leave
nodes of all expression trees are consistent with the happened event.
Once all leave nodes of all expression trees are updated, a policy is triggered for two rea-
sons: either a signaled event occurs or a timestep has elapsed and a policy mechanism gets
triggered. In both cases the entire condition MI .ϕ needs to be evaluated, starting from the
root node (which represents the outermost operator of aMI .ϕ condition) to its leave nodes.
Let assess(MI .ϕ,EoT,n) denote this recursive evaluation process for a timestep n ∈ N
and a root conditionMI .ϕ. EoT = true holds in case the evaluation process gets triggered by
an elapsed timeframe. Formally, assess(MI .ϕ,EoT,n) is reflected by (t , n ) |= f −MI .ϕ and
(t , n ) |=S MI .ϕ with t ∈ T , but technically, however, this evaluation process might be more or
less complex depending on the internal node’s operator type. Mechanism’s actionsMI .a are
applied in case the evaluation process results in assess(MI .ϕ,EoT,n)=true. Table 2.1 pro-
vides a technical view in pseudo-code on how assess(MI .ϕ,EoT,n) works for the different
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User PMP PEP PDP PIP
3. deployPolicy(ϕ')
1. deployPolicy(ϕ) 2. ϕ'=instantiatePolicy(ϕ)
4. monitorEvent(e)
5. signal(e)
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7. updateState(σ,e)
8. getState()
σ
9- eval(ϕ',e,σ)
loop [e  S]
[allow|modify|deny|execute]
Figure 2.3.: Usage Control Infrastructure
operators in Φ−.
The Policy Information Point keeps track of how data flows within a data processing system.
To do so, it implements the generic data flow model (cf. Section 2.3) and provides the possibility
to instantiate the state transition function R for a concrete system. Based on the intercepted
system events, the PIP updates its internal data flow stateσ ∈Σ according to the system events
semantic. Thus, the PIP knows at each moment in time which data d ∈D is stored in which
container c ∈ C in a system. Chapter 3 provides a detailed view on the implementation and
instantiation of that model for the present work.
The Policy Management Point is responsible for the management of usage control policies.
This includes deployment and revocation of policies, as well as, editing and translating policies
between different formats [59].
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Table 2.1.: Technical evaluation of operators PI .ϕ ∈ Φ− by the PDP [52]
PI .ϕ ∈ Φ− Description
not(ϕ) Returns the negated result of the recursive
evaluation of ϕ ∈ Ψ− at a timestep n ∈N.return !assess(ϕ,EoT,n)
ϕ1 and ϕ2 Evaluates ϕ1 ∈ Ψ− and ϕ2 ∈ Ψ− recursively
for timestep n ∈N, and returns the AND
conjunction of both.
return assess(ϕ1,EoT,n) &&
assess(ϕ2,EoT,n)
ϕ1 or ϕ2 Evaluates ϕ1 ∈ Ψ− and ϕ2 ∈ Ψ− recursively
for timestep n ∈N, and returns the OR
conjunction of both.
return assess(ϕ1,EoT,n) ||
assess(ϕ2,EoT,n)
ϕ1 implies ϕ2 Evaluates ϕ1 ∈ Ψ− and ϕ2 ∈ Ψ− separatetly
and returns true if either ϕ1 is false or ϕ2 is
true.
return not(ϕ1)
|| assess(ϕ2,EoT,n)
  ϕ Returns true if ϕ ∈ Φ− was true at each
moment in time in the past. To do so, state
variable always stores the evaluation result
of ϕ for the current timestep n.
if (!s.always)
return false
s.always &= assess(ϕ,EoT,n)
return s.always
replim(n , l , m ,ϕ) An internal buffer s.prev of size n stores if
ϕ ∈ Ψ− was true at timestep s.next, which
is initialized with zero. An internal state
counter s.counter stores if ϕ was true at
timestep next. Finally, true is returned if ϕ
happened between l ∈N and m ∈N times
within the last n ∈N timesteps.
boolean statePhi =
assess(ϕ,EoT,n)
if (s.prev[s.next]){
s.counter -= 1
}
if (statePhi){
s.counter += 1
}
s.prev[s.next] = statePhi
result = s.counter >= l
result &= s.counter <= m
return result
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ϕ1 since ϕ2 Variable s.statePhi1 and s.statePhi2
temporarily store the evaluation result of
ϕ1 and ϕ2 respectively.
s.alwaysPhi1SincePhi2 and
s.alwaysPhi1 are internal boolean
[s]tate variables of since-node and store if
ϕ1 has been true since ever ϕ2 happened,
or ϕ1 was true since ever. Those state
variables are initialized to
s.alwaysPhi1=true and
s.alwaysPhi1SincePhi2=false.
boolean statePhi1 =
assess(ϕ1,EoT,n)
boolean statePhi2 =
assess(ϕ2,EoT,n)
s.alwaysPhi1 &= statePhi1
if (s.alwaysPhi1)
return true
if (s.statePhi2)
s.alwaysPhi1SincePhi2 =
true
else
s.alwaysPhi1SincePhi2 &=
statePhi1
return s.alwaysPhi1SincePhi2
ϕ during n Returns true if ϕ ∈ Φ− happened in all the
last n ∈N timesteps. To do so, s.counter
is set initially to n. If ϕ is true, every
evaluation cyclus decrements s.counter
by one for the respective timestep. The
total evaluation results in true if
s.counter reaches zero.
boolean statePhi =
assess(ϕ,EoT,n)
if (statePhi){
s.counter -= 1
}
else{
s.counter = n
}
return (s.counter ==0)
ϕ within n Returns true if ϕ ∈ Φ− happened at least
once within the last n ∈N timesteps. To do
so, an internal state counter s.count is
set to n, once ϕ verifies to true. With every
evaluation cycle s.count is reduced by
one. True is returned in case s.count is
bigger zero.
boolean statePhi =
assess(ϕ,EoT,n)
if(statePhi){
s.counter = n
} else {
s.counter -= 1
}
return (s.counter > 0)
30
2.4. Usage Control Infrastructure
ϕ before n State variable s.prev is a boolean array of
size i, and stores the evaluation results of
ϕ for the last i timesteps. All entries in
prev are initialized with false. In case
the end of timeframe is reached, i.e.
EoT = true, the evaluation result for the
last n timestep is updated.
boolean result = s.prev[n %
i]
if (EoT)
s.prev[n % i] =
assess(ϕ,EoT,n)
return result
repmax(ϕ, n ) On each successful evaluation of ϕ an
internal state counter s.counter is
incremented by one. True is returned, as
long as the upper limit n is not reached.
boolean statePhi =
assess(ϕ,EoT,n)
if (statePhi)
s.counter += 1;
return (s.counter < n)
repsince(n ,ϕ1,ϕ2) An internal state variable s.counter
stores the number of times ϕ1 ∈ Ψ− was
true, either since ever or since ϕ2
happened. Once, s.counter exceeds the
upper limit n, false is returned. State
variables are initialized as follows:
s.alwaysPhi1 = true,
s.alwaysPhi1SincePhi2 = false,
and s.counter = 0.
boolean statePhi1 =
assess(ϕ1,EoT,n)
boolean statePhi2 =
assess(ϕ2,EoT,n)
if (!(s.counter < n))
return false
s.alwaysPhi1 &= statePhi1
if (s.alwaysPhi1){
s.counter += 1
return (s.counter < n)
}
if (s.statePhi2){
s.alwaysPhi1SincePhi2 =
true
s.counter = 0
}
else{
s.alwaysPhi1SincePhi2 &=
statePhi1
if(s.alwaysPhi1SincePhi2)
s.counter += 1
}
return (s.counter < n)
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2.5. Policies by Examples
Based on the previously described foundations in DUC, Table 2.2 illustrates the formal represen-
tation of our example policies Policy P1– Policy P4, from our running scenario (cf. Section 1.2), as
ECA rules. To enforce Policy P1 we assume, for the sake of simplicity, that dissemination of data
happens only through network communications. Because of that, Policy P1 inhibits a send event
if the network container Cnet contains protected data from the file “secret.txt”. Under the assump-
tion of the variable mapping function Var = {r 7→ {EU , US, RUS, CHN , JPN , . . .}}, Policy P2 speci-
fies to inhibit any attempts to store data on non-EU servers, i.e. condition not(eval(r == “EU ′′))
is satisfied, whereas Policy P3 permits the storage of encrypted data on US servers, i.e. condition
eval(r == “USA′′) holds; note, Policy P3 uses a helper function enc to encrypt data. In both
policies, the event parameter receiver specifies the destination server on which data is stored.
In contrast to the previous policies, Policy P4 is evaluated on every trigger event < any > inside
the target system and specifies to delete data after 30 days of reception.
Table 2.2.: Policy P1- Policy P4 from our running scenario in Section 1.2 as formal ECA-rules.
Policy P1 “Do not disseminate my data from secret.txt"
PI .e (send,;)
PI .ϕ not(isNotIn(data,Cnet ))
PI .a inhibit
Policy P2 “Store my data only on servers in the EU"
PI .e (store,{(obj, data), (receiver, r)})
PI .ϕ not(eval(r == “EU ′′))
PI .a inhibit
Policy P3 “Encrypt my data before transmitting it to servers in the USA"
PI .e (store,{(obj, data), (receiver, r)})
PI .ϕ eval(r == “USA′′)
PI .a (store,{(obj, enc(data)), (receiver, r)})
Policy P4 “Delete my data within 30 days after receipt”
PI .e < any >
PI .ϕ (receiving,{(obj, data)}) before 30 and replim(30, 0, 0, (receiving,{(obj, data)}))
PI .a (delete,{(obj, data)})
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This chapter describes a hybrid data flow tracking approach to sup-
port distributed Data Usage Control policy enforcement. Contents
of this chapter have been published in [28, 71].
As Section 2.3 describes, DFT trackers are an integral component of modern DUC systems to
specify and to enforce data usage restrictions in a representation independent manner. Although
the research field of DFT has been and is being researched, existing solutions fall short in terms of
Caveat 1, Caveat 2, and Caveat 3 (cf. Section 1.3). In particular, in a domain where computational
resources are shared between different applications, as it is the case within our running scenario
(cf. Section 1.2), Caveat 3 might affect AuS’s portability too much and tightly binds the data flow
tracking mechanism with the web-service’s run-time environment [10, 81, 96].
To counteract those limitations, this chapter provides and describes a hybrid approach in
two different flavors, namely S H R I F T and its extended version H D F T++, which both leverage
statically precomputed information flow analysis results to track the flow of data through appli-
cations at run-time. In particular, S H R I F T and H D F T++ aim to enhance the portability of AuS
and to increase the tracking precision compared to a pure black-box approach (cf. Section 3.1).
As a proof-of-concept, S H R I F T and H D F T++ are implemented in Java and evaluated on a set of
different applications.
This chapter is structured as follows: Section 3.1 recaps state-of-the-art data flow tracking
approaches and techniques and unveils the main caveats and drawbacks of those approaches.
Section 3.2 provides a high-level overview of the methodology that underpins S H R I F T and
H D F T++. Section 3.3 describes the static analysis part of the proposed hybrid approach, and in
Section 3.4 the integration and deployment of S H R I F T and H D F T++ is provided. Section 3.5
provides the formal data flow model which H D F T++ builds upon, to track not only data flow
dependencies but also their taken execution paths; in a nutshell, this model is an instantiation
of the generic data flow model from Section 2.3 and can be considered as a configuration for
33
3. Hybrid Data Flow Tracking
the PIP component inside our UC architecture (cf. Section 2.4). Evaluation results and the
strengths and limitations of both hybrid approaches are discussed in Section 3.6 and Section 3.7
respectively.
3.1. State of the Art Information Flow Analysis
Research literature proposes two fundamentally different approaches to analyze the flow of
data: Static Information Flow Analysis (SIFA) and Dynamic Data Flow Tracking (DDFT) [102].
SIFA analyzes the AuS at the program level (or at one of its intermediate representation).
They are popular as they detect data flow (henceforth termed explicit flows) and control flow
(henceforth termed implicit flows) dependencies without executing the AuS, and aim to detect
all possible information flows [20, 120]. In particular, for implicit flows they also provide certainty
about information flows for non-executed branches. A given program is certified as secure, if its
(critical) sources do not interfere with its critical sinks, i.e. if no information flows between them.
Such a static certification can be used, for example, to reduce the need for run-time checks [21].
Various static approaches (apart from Program Dependence Graph (PDG) [98]) are proposed
in the literature, which are usually based on type checking [76, 88, 120] or dataflow analysis
[3, 4, 9, 20]. To this day, SIFA based approaches are instantiated for different programming
languages (like F R A M A -C for C code [27, 56], or J O A N A for Java-bytecode [49]) and for different
domains (like Andromeda for Java-based web-services [114, 115], or F L O W D R O I D for A N D R O I D
applications [8]). Although SIFA based tools are quite powerful and widely used, for instance
within an app store vetting process to assess if an application adheres to predefined properties,
they suffer from scalability issues: even for small and mid-size applications, static analysis
demands huge computational resources. In addition, due to implicit dependencies and missing
run-time values, SIFA reports information flows which are hard to assess if they may get “really
problematic” at run-time. Moreover, handling dynamic aspects in applications, like dynamic
callbacks or reflective code, are confined to the AuS. Further, declassification, i.e. relaxing the
non-interference property of data flow dependencies, needs to be performed at programming
language level without the support of higher-level semantic or run-time values.
In contrast, DDFT-approaches implement a kind of reference monitor and analyze the flow
of data at run-time for a specific abstraction layer (e.g. the operating system layer [39, 124] or
the application layer [10, 54, 69]). Taking into account applications’ run-time information, and
possibly higher-level semantics, DDFT approaches are popular to be very precise, specifically in
the presence of callbacks and reflection. To this day, DDFT based approaches are implemented,
for different programming languages (e.g. P H O S P H O R [10] for Java-bytecode, or Trishul [77, 116]
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for the Java VM, or L I B DFT [54] for x86-binaries) and different domains (like TA I N T D R O I D
[23] for A N D R O I D, or Maalej [72] for iOS). A prevalent technique used and implemented by
those tools is taint analysis, which attaches meta-information in form of a taint-label to each
program variable. By default, the value of a taint label is empty. New taint values are introduced
once data flows into an application via a critical source. For instance, a file read-operation
would set the taint value of the receiving variable to a specific value. At run-time, those taint
values are propagated with every executed instruction according to their semantic. To this end,
DDFT-approaches need to monitor each command on the execution path, and therefore, on the
downside incur a non-negligible performance overhead; that is where Caveat 2 originates from,
cf. Section 1.3. Moreover, taint-labels are not only propagated at the application level but also
through the whole RTE. To this end, for instance, the approach in T R I S H U L [77, 116] requires
to modify the JRE, whereas P H O S P H O R [10] requires modifications of all Java system classes
and its used 3rd-party libraries. Moreover, TA I N T D R O I D relies on tracking logic inside the
operating system itself, and therefore, requires a modified version of A N D R O I D, which needs
to be installed on the device beforehand; especially, the latter one is a tedious and cumbersome
task. However, this thesis advocates that such approaches make it quite difficult to port and
run the adapted and modified AuS inside other, off-the-shelf run-time execution environments
(that is where Caveat 3 originates from). Moreover, for particular use case domains, like within
our running scenario from Section 1.2, where run-time environments usually run multiple
SaaS services at the same time, e.g. multiple Java web services are served by a single Tomcat
[112] web-server instance, such deep modifications may also lead to intersections of data flows
between different SaaS services running simultaneously on the same run-time environment.
3.2. Overview of the hybrid approach
This section provides a high-level overview of our hybrid approach which builds the foundation
for S H R I F T (cf. Figure 3.2a), and its extension H D F T++ (cf. Figure 3.2b). The basic idea is to
use statically pre-computed information flow analysis results to employ a minimal run-time
monitor that monitors the actual executed data flows inside the AuS. Whereas S H R I F T tracks
the flow of data from inputs Ix to outputs Ox based on a statically pre-computed mapping,
H D F T++ extends this approach and also tracks the executed program locations Cx that are
taken on the dependency path from Ix to Ox . The advantage of H D F T++ is a potential increase
of the data flow tracking precision at run-time, as it reports only those data flows which are
actually executed; we provide a tangible example in section 3.4 and compare S H R I F T and
H D F T++ in section 3.6.2 to illustrate this advantage. Although the Java programming language
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Figure 3.1.: First, our approaches statically analyze the AuS for possible sources, sinks, and sink-
source-dependencies. The result is stored into an analysis-report. Second, based on
the result, we instrument the code of AuS and inject a minimal run-time monitor
(IRM). At run-time, the IRM signals the actually executed sources and sinks to the
UC- PIP. In addition, H D F T++’s IRM also signals the executed instructions on a
sink-source-dependency path. This way, the PIP keeps track of how data flows and
disseminates inside the AuS.
is used to illustrate the idea, the overall approach is generic and can be instantiated for other
run-time environments as well, like PHP or Ruby. The S H R I F T and H D F T++ approach is built
upon three parts.
Static Information Flow Analysis (cf. Section 3.3): This step statically analyzes the AuS to
detect all input (source) and output (sink) channels within the application (cf. Figure 3.1). Input
channels are those instructions that transfer data from the outside to the inside, like e.g. reading
data from a file or a Http-request, whereas output channels are exactly the opposite, like e.g.
writing data into a file or a Http-response. Beyond that, this phase also computes dependencies
between the set of sources and sinks, as well as the instructions that reside on those dependencies.
A dependency exists if data, originating from a source, flow either explicitly or implicitly into a
sink [37]. As S H R I F T and H D F T++ are prototypically instantiated for Java, an invocation of a
Java standard library method, that reads or writes data from and to the file- and network-I/O, is
considered as a source or a sink. Finally, all identified sources, sinks, as well as dependencies
between them are reported in an analysis-report at the end of this step.
Run-time Data Flow Tracking (cf. Section 3.4): Based on the analysis-report, S H R I F T and
H D F T++ inject additional instructions into the AuS (cf. Figure 3.2). The S H R I F T approach
instruments only those commands which correspond to a source- or a sink-instruction, and
propagates data flows based on the reported data flow dependencies. At run-time, S H R I F T
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signals for each executed sink the list of sources it depends on to the PIP. Based on the internal
PIP-state and the list of sources, the PIP propagates only those sources to the sink which have
been executed and therefore have already a mapping inside the PIP-state. For instance in
Figure 3.2a, once sink O2 is going to be executed S H R I F T signals that it depends on the sources
I2 and I3. However, at that moment in time only source I2 was executed before, and thus, the
PIP propagates only the data item from I2 into O2. The PIP ignores source I3 as no mapping
exists for it.
H D F T++ instruments, in addition to sources and sinks, also all instructions Cx that reside on
a sink-source dependency. This way, H D F T++ is able to propagate the flow of data along the
taken execution path, and thus, to distinguish if a reported data flow actually happens or not at
run-time. To make this advantage more tangible, assume that the instruction C5 in Figure 3.2b
is an if-condition, as illustrated for instance in the code example in Listing 3.4. Depending on
the input data, which is read by the input()-method in this code snippet, the instruction in
Listing 3.4 line 4 is executed (which corresponds to C9 in Figure 3.2) or not (which corresponds
to C6 in Figure 3.2). H D F T++ is able to distinguish which path is taken, and thus compared to
S H R I F T, only reports a flow of data if the instruction in Listing 3.4 line 4 is executed, otherwise
no flow is reported by H D F T++.
Anyway, at run-time S H R I F T and H D F T++ serve as an IRM and extract information about
the running application. For instance, for sources and sinks which read and write data from
and to files, S H R I F T and H D F T++ extract the filename and file-descriptor of the respective
file and signal that information to the UC infrastructure. Based on that, the PIP updates its
internal state and creates a mapping between the filename and the container. Note, the filename
serves as a naming identifier in our data flow model, cf. section 3.5. Extracted information is
signaled in form of events to a UC infrastructure, which is conceptually designed as described
in Section 2.4. Events are classified in desired eventsD(e ) whose execution admissibility needs
to be approved by the PDP, and actual eventA(e ), which are directly sent to the PIP to keep
track of data flows. The latter one instantiates and implements the data flow tracking model
(cf. Section 3.5), and thus, based on the signaled eventsA(e ) keeps track of how data flows and
disseminates inside an application. That way, the PIP knows at each moment in time which
data originates from which input-channel, is stored at which program location, and flows into
which output-channel inside the AuS.
Data Flow Tracking Model (cf. Section 3.5): Depending on a sink-source-dependency, data
might flow from a source to a sink across different program locations at run-time. To track those
locations and the dissemination of data inside an application, the generic data flow tracking
model from Section 2.3 is instantiated for the Java domain, taking into account the different
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Figure 3.2.: H D F T++ in Figure 3.2b is an extension of S H R I F T and tracks not only the execution
of one particular dependency {Ix , Ox }-tuple, but also all executed instructions Cx
residing on a sink-source dependency. This way, H D F T++ is able to distinguish
if a statically reported data flow dependency actually happens or not at run-time
(Section 3.4 elaborates in detail on that aspect).
operations and their semantics that might occur on a dependency path. In a nutshell, the
instantiated data flow model implements a state transition system and captures the flow of
data at each moment in time as a specific state of the AuS. A state represents which sources
flow to which sinks inside the AuS at run-time. State transitions are triggered by the actually
executed instructions on a sink-source-dependency. This thesis argues, that representing the
flow of data as a sequence of state transitions, and each state as a snapshot of flowed data,
makes the enforcement of data usage restrictions in a representation independent manner
more convenient, than on a sequence or list of all execution traces that an application has taken.
Note, this model is used by H D F T++ to handle cases as illustrated in Listing 3.4 (cf. Section 3.5).
3.3. Static Information Flow Analysis
To identify program locations that might correspond to a data flow dependency, this phase
statically analyzes the AuS’s Java-bytecode and detect all locations that might correspond to a
source, a sink, or an instruction on a dependency path. To do so, this phase uses J O A N A [49], a
state-of-the-art static information flow analysis tool for Java. First, J O A N A transforms the AuS’s
bytecode into a Static-Single-Assignment (SSA) [16] form which is a language-independent
representation of the AuS. SSA demands that each variable in a program must be defined before
it is used and that a variable is assigned exactly once. If a variable is assigned more than once,
each assignment generates a new variable at the SSA level.
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Second, based on the SSA representation, J O A N A builds the System Dependence Graph (SDG)
of the application which is a special graph representation of the AuS. An SDG is a direct graph
G = (V , E ), whose vertices V represent program instructions and statements in SSA form,
whereas its edges E represent control- and data-dependencies between its vertices [37]. SDGs
incorporate inter- and intra-procedural dependencies, i.e. dependencies that are not only within
a single procedure but also cross procedure’s boundaries. A control-dependency exists between
vertices x and y if the evaluation of y influences the execution of x ; whereas, a data-dependency
exists if y may use a value that is computed at x .
Third, using a program’s SDG and a high-level description of sources and sinks, J O A N A applies
slicing techniques to compute if a set of vertices (identified as sources) might affect – either
directly or transitively via control- and data-dependencies – the execution or value of another
set of vertices (identified as sinks); Listing 3.2 illustrates a sample source-/sink-specification.
To do so, Joana uses context-sensitive slicing [99], a special form of graph reachability analysis:
given a node n of the SDG, identified as a sink, Joana computes the backward-slice for n , which
is the set B of all those nodes from where n is reachable through a path in the SDG and that
respect the calling context. For sequential programs, it has been shown that a node which is not
contained in the backward slice m /∈ B can not influence the execution of n [44, 121], and hence,
SDG-based slicing on sequential programs guarantees in a certain sense non-interference [33,
34], which stipulates that low outputs are independent from high/sensitive inputs. However, for
concurrent programs this approach was extended by Giffhorn [31, 32] to take additional kinds
of information flows into account, like e.g. probabilistic channels [103].
The result of the slicing-process is a subset-graph G ′ ⊂G of the original SDG G that represents
dependencies between sinks and sources. Henceforth, we term with chop a single dependency
path from a source to a sink inside G ′. A chop includes not only the vertices for source- and
sink-instructions, but also all vertices that correspond to instructions that lead to a flow of data
from a source to sink. Henceforth, we term all vertices residing on a single data flow dependency
as chopCMD and the union of all chopCMDs over all chops as Points of Interest (PoI). Figure 3.3
illustrates an example chop for an explicit data flow dependency path: sink in line 12 has an
information flow dependency on line 1; nodes 4 and 6 are the corresponding chopCMD on that
dependency. Put simply, a chop is considered as the intersection between a source’s Forward-
Slice, i.e. all instructions that are either explicitly or indirectly affected by and reachable from
a source, and a sink’s Backward-Slice, i.e. all instructions that affect and influence a sink [37].
Beyond that, J O A N A also supports different points-to analysis-techniques [5, 111] (like 0-1-
CFA[36], k -CFA [109], object-sensitiveness [74]), to take into account not only the static data
type but also possible dynamic data types of a variable.
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1 a = source ();
2 while (n > 0){
3 x = v();
4 d = a;
5 if (x > 0)
6 c = d + 25;
7 else
8 c = 25;
9 n--;
10 }
11 y = a;
12 sink(c);
Start
1 211 12
4 3 5
6 8
9
Figure 3.3.: Example code and its chop between a source (dashed circle) and a sink (doubly
circled). Dashed arrows symbolize data flow dependencies; solid arrows symbolize
control dependencies; bold circles are chopCMD vertices.
The results of the static analysis are written by J O A N A into an analysis-report. For each
identified sink, J O A N A provides detailed information about the sources and chopCMDs it
depends on, and where their corresponding instructions are located within the bytecode. This
includes (cf. example in Listing 3.1): the parent method (ParMethod), the bytecode-offset
(offset) where a PoI is located; the Java signature of invoked sinks or sources (signature);
and the executed operation in SSA-representation for chopCMD instruction (Label). Based on
the analysis-report, additional instructions are injected into the application to extract context
information about each PoI and to track the flow of data from sources to sinks across chopCMD
instructions.
Remarks on the source and sink specification (cf. Listing 3.2): J O A N A uniquely identifies a
source or a sink (in Java bytecode notation) by a triple, composed of the fully qualified class
name, the method name, and the parameter that is either passed to or returned from the method
invocation. As parameter names are not available in Java bytecode, the position of a parameter
inside the method signature is used instead. For instance, “param: 1” in Listing 3.2 specifies the
first parameter of the method write as a sink and the first parameter of the method read as a
source. Whereas the reserved term ret specifies the return value of getParameter as a source.
It is important to note that usually the list of sources and sinks is provided to the analysis by a
security expert, who has specific domain knowledge (e.g. does the application use only JNI to call
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Listing 3.1: Example static analysis-report generated by J O A N A. Multiple sources (cf. line 1) and
sinks (cf. line 1) are listed, as well as, dependencies between them (cf. line 1).
1 <sources>
2 <source>
3 <id>Source1</id>
4 <location>JZip.zipIt(Ljava/lang/String;Ljava/lang/String;)V:191</location>
5 <signature>java.io.FileInputStream.read([B)I</signature>
6 <param index="1"/>
7 </source>
8 <source>
9 <id>Source2</id>
10 ...
11 </source>
12 </sources>
13 <sinks>
14 <sink>
15 <id>Sink1</id>
16 <location>JZip.zipIt(Ljava/lang/String;Ljava/lang/String;)V:185</location>
17 <signature>java.util.zip.ZipOutputStream.write([BII)V</signature>
18 <param index="1"/>
19 </sink>
20 <sink>
21 <id>Sink2</id>
22 ...
23 </sink>
24 </sinks>
25 <flows>
26 <sink id="Sink1">
27 <source id="Source1"/>
28 <chop>
29 <chopNode bci="39" lab="v11.start()" om="jzip.JZip.main([Ljava/lang/String;)V"/>
30 <chopNode bci="41" lab="v13.load(v9)" om= "jzip.JZip.loadConfig(Ljava/lang/String;)V"/>
31 ...
32 </chop>
33 </sink>
34 </flows>
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its own native libraries) about critical dependencies between sources and sinks inside the AuS.
To a certain extent, the list of sources and sinks has to be chosen manually, e.g. by reading the API
documentation and then deciding which methods and parameters are relevant. For example, one
may considerFileOutputStream.write()orHttpServletRequest.getParameter() to-
gether with appropriate parameters as sinks.
Listing 3.2: Example sink- source-specification that is used by J O A N A to determine which
method invocations might correspond to a sink or a source
1 Source:
2 class: Ljava/servlet/http/HttpServletRequest
3 method: getParameter(Ljava/lang/String ;) Ljava/lang/String;
4 param: ret
5 includeSubclasses: true
6 indirectCalls: true
7 Source:
8 class: Ljava/io/InputStream
9 method: read([B)I
10 param: 1
11 includeSubclasses: true
12 indirectCalls: true
13 ...
14 Sink:
15 class: Ljava/io/Writer
16 method: write(Ljava/lang/String ;)V
17 param: 1
18 includeSubclasses: false
19 indirectCalls: false
20 ...
By default, J O A N A detects sources and sinks within the AuS by simply matching the full
method signature (including their class-membership) within the SDG against the source- and
sink-specification. However, in the presence of inheritance and polymorphism, such a strategy
would miss some sources and sinks, especially those that are overwritten within their child-
classes. For instance, consider line 17 in Listing 3.3 that reads data from a file into a buffer
via a FileInputStream and the source specification of InputStream in Listing 3.2: although
FileInputStream inherits from InputStream, and therefore has the same semantic for the
read-method as its parent-class, J O A N A by default does not detect the invocation in line 17 as
a source because this method invocation belongs to another class. A possible approach to solve
that obstacle would be to list every method manually and explicitly that could potentially be
a source or a sink. However, listing all possible sources and sinks in all their variations along
the class hierarchy might be a tedious and error-prone task because some methods may be
missed, especially when multiple child-classes overwrite methods which are actually specified
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as sources or sinks within their parent-classes. To make the source- and sink-detection process
more convenient we chose the following approach: we list only the most general source- and sink-
declarations, e.g. java.io.InputStream, java.io.OutputStream, java.io.Reader and
java.io.Writer for Java I/O classes. After that, these specifications are extended automatically
by Joana using the following rule: “If s is a source/sink and s ′ overrides s , because s ′ is a child-
method, then also s ′ is a source/sink”. J O A N A implements this rule by inspecting and analyzing
the hierarchy class of the given program; this rule is activated with includeSubclasses =
true in Listing 3.2 for each source or sink.
Another issue that we have faced is the case when applications do not invoke a source or a
sink directly from the application-code, but indirectly, e.g. via a nested library call. For example,
listing 3.3 contains a call to the method Properties.load() in line 5 which takes an input
stream as a parameter and uses it to fill a properties table. This method is not included by the
previous rule because Properties.load() itself is not a source. For that reason, the source-
and sink-specification is again extended automatically by the following rule: “If s is a source/sink,
s ′ may call s and p ′ is a parameter of s ′, then s ′ is also considered as source/sink”. J O A N A
implements this rule by using a call graph of the application, which is also built and used during
SDG construction, so it can be reused here. This feature is activated with indirectCalls =
true in Listing 3.2 for each source or sink.
3.4. Run-time Data Flow Tracking
Consider the code snippet in Listing 3.3 that is used in our test-suite application JZip to zip
files (Section 3.6): based on the sink-source-specification (cf. Listing 3.2) static information
flow analysis detects the flow from the read-method in line 17, where the to-be-zipped files are
read, to the write-method in line 18, where those files are written into the archive. Listing 3.1
shows the corresponding analysis report: line 2 – line 7 specify that the first parameter (line 6)
of the read method-invocation (line 5) at bytecode offset 191 (line 4) in method zipIt (line 4)
is identified as Source1 (line 3). The same holds for Sink1 (line 14 – line 19) but in this case
the first method parameter (line 18) is identified as a sink. The analysis-report also provides
information about the dependency between Sink1 and Source1 (line 26 – line 33); if a sink
would depend on multiple sources, i.e a 1-to-n dependency, then a sink-tag (line 26 – line 33)
would wrap multiple sources.
Based on the analysis-report, this phase injects a piece of code for each reported PoI into the
AuS. At run-time, this code serves as a minimal IRM and extracts and signals information about
each executed PoI to the PIP and PDP (cf. Figure 2.1). Such information could be, for instance,
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the filename from where data is read. To do that, this thesis proposes two different approaches:
S H R I F T and H D F T++. Although both approaches share the same static analysis phase (cf.
Section 3.3) the injected tracking and propagation logic behave differently at run-time. S H R I F T
uses the pre-computed static dependency mapping (e.g. cf. line 26 - line 33 in Listing 3.1) to
propagate the flow of data between sources and sinks, whereas H D F T++ also takes into account
all chopCMDs residing on a sink-source dependency. Beyond that, both approaches verify on
every executed source or sink instruction if the execution trace of the AuS adheres to deployed
DUC policies. Thus, both IRM approaches take the role of the PEP in our UCI infrastructure (cf.
Figure 2.1); from henceforth, we use the terms IRM and PEP interchangeably. The outcome of
this phase is an instrumented version of the original AuS augmented with a PEP that interacts
with the DUC’s PDP and PIP on each executed PoI. We use the tool ObjectWeb ASM [80], a
bytecode manipulation and engineering framework for Java bytecode, to instrument and to
inject the PEP into the AuS. The remaining section describes both approaches in detail and
illuminates and emphasizes the differences between them.
Listing 3.3: Example Java code fragment for zipping files inside an application
1 void zipIt(String file , String srcFolder) {
2 byte[] buffer = new byte [1024];
3 Properties prop = new Properties ();
4 InputStream is = this.getClass (). getResourceAsStream("jzip.properties");
5 prop.load(in);
6
7 is.read(buffer );
8
9 FileOutputStream fos = new FileOutputStream(file);
10 ZipOutputStream zos = new ZipOutputStream(fos);
11 List <String > fileList = this.generateFileList(srcFolder );
12 for (String file : fileList) {
13 ZipEntry ze = new ZipEntry(file);
14 zos.putNextEntry(ze);
15 FileInputStream in = new FileInputStream(file);
16 int len;
17 while ((len = in.read(buffer )) > 0)
18 zos.write(buffer , 0, len);
19 in.close ();
20 }
21 }
S H R I F T instruments only source- and sink-instructions inside the AuS that have a data flow
dependency between each other (cf. Figure 3.2a). For instance, according to the analysis-report
in Listing 3.1 S H R I F T instruments Sink1 and Source1 inside the AuS and leaves out Source2,
as it does not have any data flow dependencies to any sinks. Furthermore, as one may notice, all
information provided by the analysis-report are inherently static by nature, i.e. they are elicited
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from the AuS’s bytecode by inspection without executing the AuS. For instance, Source1 is
specified as a Java FileInputStream.read invocation which is located at offset 191 inside
the method JZip.zipIt. However, the analysis-report does not provide dynamic run-time
information, like the filename that was read at Source1 or which data was written into Sink1.
Such information are extremely valuable as they provide further details about a source or a sink,
and reveal in particular, if data emanated from a source is already tainted, i.e. is linked to and
affected by a DUC policy or not. To catch such information, our PEP injects for each source-
and sink-instruction an extractor, which filters and extracts additional information about the
respective sources and sinks at run-time. As those extractors are quite specific for one particular
type of source or sink, and may also differ from one type to the other, the set of extractors are
extendable and configurable inside the PEP to extract also information which have not been
considered before, like e.g. extracting REST-Urls from a REST-interface. This thesis underlying
prototype implementation contains extractors for
1. file-I/O: extracts the file-descriptor (fd ∈F) and the file-name (fn ∈F) on each file-system
read or write operation
2. network-I/O: extracts the IP-(ip ∈F) and port-information (port ∈F) from incoming and
outgoing network accesses
3. database-I/O: extracts the database-(dbName ∈F), table-(tabName ∈F), and table-field-
name (tabFieldName ∈F), on each database read or write access
For instance, as Source1 in Listing 3.1 reads data from a file our injected file-I/O extractor
extracts (if available) the filename fnI ∈F and file-descriptor fdI ∈F from where the data was
read; for the sake of illustration only the filename is used in the following. The extracted filename
fnI is signaled along with the source identifier (cf. id-tag inside the enclosing source-tag in
Listing 3.1) as an actual eventA(e ) to the DUC’s PIP. Based on this information, the PIP updates
its internal data flow storage functionσ′.s [σ. f (Source1)←σ.s(σ. f (fnI ))∪σ.s(σ. f (Source1))]
and thus keeps track of which data was read by the AuS.
Processing and handling of sinks works similar (note, sinks are only signaled if at least one of
its depending sources are executed): as Sink1 writes zipped data into a file our injected file-I/O
extractor extracts and signals the filename fnO ∈ F along with the sink identifier (cf. id-tag
inside the enclosing sink-tag in Listing 3.1) to the PIP. Based on the sink identifier and the
precomputed analysis-report, the PIP determines all sources a sink depends on and updates its
internal data flow storage function accordingly, i.e. in this sample the storage mapping forSink1
is updated as followsσ′.s [σ. f (Sink1)←σ.s (σ. f (Sink1))∪σ.s (σ. f (Source1))]. Furthermore,
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the PIP also maintains an alias relation between the sink identifier and the filename fnO, as on
every sink execution the entire data a sink points to (according to the current PIP’s state) may
flow into the output-file fnO, i.e.σ
′.l [σ. f (Sink1)←σ. f (Sink1)∪σ. f (fnO)]. This way, the PIP
traces that the output data, which is written into the file fnO at Sink1, may potentially contain
derived data from file fnI . Thus, the PIP knows at each moment in time which data flowed from
which source into which sink through an application.
Listing 3.4: Example of an explicit flow depen-
dency.
1 byte[] in=input (); // source
2 byte[] out;
3 if (condition) {
4 out=in;
5 } else {
6 out = new byte [10];
7 }
8 output(out); //sink
However, as one may notice S H R I F T de-
tects the flow of data based on a statically pre-
computed mapping. It does not differentiate if
a particular data flow path is still critical when
a sink is reached. Regardless of the instruc-
tions on a data flow dependency, S H R I F T al-
ways reports that a flow of data happened. For
instance, consider the code in Listing 3.4: the
actual crucial instruction that leads to a flow
of data is wrapped in an if-branch in line 4,
whose execution actually depends on the con-
crete value of the variablecondition. However, for SIFA tools it is almost impossible to compute
statically the concrete value for variable condition, especially when its computation also de-
pends on user input. Therefore, SIFA tools conservatively overapproximate such cases and
report the flow of data from line 1 to line 8 in Listing 3.4.
H D F T++ extends S H R I F T (cf. Figure 3.2b) and also monitors all chopCMDs (cf. Section 3.3),
i.e. all those instructions that reside on a sink-source dependency path. In detail, H D F T++
monitors all executed PoI, i.e. the source-, sink-, and chopCMD-instructions, and extracts and
signals information about each of them to the PIP at run-time. To do that, H D F T++ also uses
the same set of extractors for source- and sink-instructions as S H R I F T and extracts additional
information about each executed source and sink, like e.g. the filename of a source. Further,
H D F T++ leverages the chopNode-tag from the analysis-report and injects its tracking logic in
such a way, that all statically raised information about chopCMDs are signaled to the PIP at
run-time. For instance, from the chopNode-tag in Listing 3.1 line 30 H D F T++ derives that at
the bytecode offset 41 (cf. bci-attribute) the method load is called on an object identified by
v13 at J O A N A’s SSA representation layer (cf. lab-attribute in Listing 3.1 line 30). Moreover, a
parameter, identified with v9, is passed to that method call. At run-time, H D F T++ signals that
information to the PIP together with the following extracted from the involved operands in a
chopCMD:
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1. Java Caller-ObjectId, -Class, -Method
2. Java Callee-ObjectId, -Class, -Method
3. Java Parameter-ObjectId and -Names
4. Memory-Addresses of involved Java objects
5. Process-, Thread-Id
Based on that information, H D F T++’s PIP continuously updates its internal data flow state
on every executed chopCMD. However, depending on actual run-time values only a subset of
all chopCMDs on a dependency path may be executed and thus may lead to different tracking
results. For instance, the value of variable condition in Listing 3.4 controls if data either flows
from the variable in to out or not. This example illustrates, that depending on the actually
executed chopCMDs and run-time values, data may flow differently inside the AuS (involving
different program variables) for the same statically reported data flow dependency, and thus, may
result in different PIP’s data flow states. In case the variable in is assigned to out in Listing 3.4
line 4, the PIP would end up in a state where both variables point to the same data item, otherwise
not. As H D F T++ monitors the execution of each chopCMD on a dependency path, H D F T++ is
able to cope with situations where run-time values influence the actual tracking result, and thus,
is able to differentiate if a flow of data really happens or not at run-time. To reflect and to model
how data flows across chopCMDs inside an AuS, H D F T++ instantiates in Section 3.5 the formal
data flow model from Section 2.3 for Java bytecode. Simply speaking, this instantiation serves as
a configuration for the DUC’s PIP component. Notified by the PEP about the executed PoI,
the PIP updates continuously its current state of flowed data, and hence, keeps track of how
data propagates through the AuS from sources, along chops, to the sinks. Thus, the PIP knows
at each moment in time which data originates from which source and is flowed into which sink
inside the AuS.
Fundamentally H D F T++ does not propagate a taint-label along the lines of executed bytecode
commands, as it happens in a pure dynamic approach, but instead, it updates the PIP’s internal
data flow state on every executed chopCMD. This way, H D F T++ does not need to inject complex,
performance-affecting tracking logic at each chopCMD, as the complete taint propagation logic
(cf. Section 3.5) happens inside the PIP. Depending on the actual taken data flow path at run-
time, PIP’s data flow state may result in different storage-, alias-, and naming-mappings, which
either comply with a data usage control policy or not. This means, that once a sink is reached the
PIP state (i.e. the current storage-, alias-, and naming-mapping, cf. Section 3.5) reveals which
data flow path was taken and if one of the sink’s parameter may contain data that is affected and
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protected by a data usage control policy. For instance, Policy P1 is violated if the storage function
s (srcnet) returns for a sink network container srcnet = f ((ip×port)) a data item d ∈D that is
covered by Policy P1, i.e. d ∈ s ( f ((ip×port))). As we do not know beforehand which of those
chopCMDs are the actual crucial and relevant ones, H D F T++ has to monitor all chopCMDs on
a data flow dependency from a source to a sink.
Listing 3.5: Example application which reads data from a file and transmits it to a remote server.
1 public class SampleReadSend {
2 public static void main(String [] args) {
3 new SampleReadSend (). sample ();
4 }
5 public void sample () {
6 int rand = new Random (). nextInt (10);
7 String [][] ips = {{"172.16.33.1","8080","EU"},
8 {"110.22.55.1","9090","US"}};
9 String [] dest = rand%2 == 0 ? ips [0] : ips [1];
10 String fileContent = "";
11 try {
12 fileContent = this.readFile("secret.txt");//Read secret file
13 if(rand > 5){
14 fileContent = this.readFile("public.txt");//Read public file
15 }
16 Socket destSocket = new Socket(dest[0], Integer.parseInt(dest [1]));
17 System.out.println("Sending data to "+dest [1]+" "+rand);
18 PrintWriter pw = new PrintWriter(destSocket.getOutputStream (),true);
19 pw.write(fileContent );
20 pw.close ();
21 destSocket.close ();
22 } catch (IOException e) { e.printStackTrace (); }
23 }
24 private String readFile(String fileName) throws IOException{
25 String _return = "", line = "";
26 FileReader fr = new FileReader(fileName );
27 BufferedReader bf = new BufferedReader(fr);
28 while ((line = bf.readLine ()) != null)
29 _return += line;
30 return _return;
31 }
32 }
At run-time, however, depending on the taken control flow path only a subset of those mon-
itored chopCMDs are actually executed, and thus, may produce a slightly different data flow
state inside the PIP once the sink at the end of a dependency is reached.
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Listing 3.6: Static analysis-report excerpt for the example code in Listing 3.5.
1 <source >
2 <id>Source0 </id>
3 <location >SampleReadSend.readFile(Ljava/lang/String ;)...
4 ... Ljava/lang/String;:51</location >
5 <signature >java.io.BufferedReader.readLine () Ljava/lang/String;</signature >
6 <return/>
7 </source >
8 ...
9 <sink>
10 <id>Sink0</id>
11 <location >SampleReadSend.sample () V:195</location >
12 <signature >java.io.PrintWriter.write(Ljava/lang/String ;)V</signature >
13 <param index="1"/>
14 </sink>
15 ...
16 <flows>
17 <sink id="Sink0">
18 <source id="Source0"/>
19 <chop>
20 <chopNode bci="-8" lab="PHI v20 = #(), v19"
21 om="SampleReadSend.readFile(Ljava/lang/String ;)Ljava/lang/String;"/>
22 <chopNode bci="6" lab="v5 = new java.io.FileReader"
23 om="SampleReadSend.readFile(Ljava/lang/String ;)Ljava/lang/String;"/>
24 <chopNode bci="35" lab="v14 = valueOf(v20)"
25 om="SampleReadSend.readFile(Ljava/lang/String ;)Ljava/lang/String;"/>
26 <chopNode bci="42" lab="v17 = v12.append(v10)"
27 om="SampleReadSend.readFile(Ljava/lang/String ;)Ljava/lang/String;"/>
28 <chopNode bci="45" lab="v19 = v17.toString ()"
29 om="SampleReadSend.readFile(Ljava/lang/String ;)Ljava/lang/String;"/>
30 <chopNode bci="51" lab="v10 = v7.readLine ()"
31 om="SampleReadSend.readFile(Ljava/lang/String ;)Ljava/lang/String;"/>
32 <chopNode bci="60" lab="return v20"
33 om="SampleReadSend.readFile(Ljava/lang/String ;)Ljava/lang/String;"/>
34 <chopNode bci="107" lab="v36 = this.readFile (#( public.txt))"
35 om="SampleReadSend.sample ()V"/>
36 <chopNode bci="120" lab="v40 = this.readFile (#( secret.txt))"
37 om="SampleReadSend.sample ()V"/>
38 <chopNode bci="176" lab="v63 = new java.io.PrintWriter"
39 om="SampleReadSend.sample ()V"/>
40 <chopNode bci="195" lab="v63.write(v41)"
41 om="SampleReadSend.sample ()V"/>
42 </chop>
43 </sink>
44 </flows >
The following illustrates H D F T++’s behavior along the Java code example in Listing 3.5. Note,
here we use a simplified example to illustrate the core idea behind H D F T++. But conceptually,
this piece of code reflects how web-applications, e.g. our BirthdayApp from Section 1.2 may
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transmit data to a remote server. Typically, a web-application would read input data from an
HttpRequest instead from a file and transmit it to a remote service via a socket connection.
Listing 3.5 reads data in line 12 from a secret file into the variable fileContent and transmits
it to a remote server in line 19. Depending on the randomly generated value rand (cf. Listing 3.5
line 6) the content of variable fileContent may be overwritten by some public data from the
file public.txt in Listing 3.5 line 14. Further, we assume that the content of secret.txt is
protected by Policy P1. For the sake of simplicity, we suppose that Policy P1 is technically enforced
by prohibiting network access if the payload contains data from secret.txt. Thus, depending
on the actual run-time value of the variable rand the sink in Listing 3.5 line 19 may be executed,
because variable fileContent contains data from the file public.txt or its execution is
prohibited because variable fileContent contains data from the file secret.txt.
Listing 3.6 shows the analysis-report for our code sample in Listing 3.5 (note, Listing 3.6
is an excerpt from the full analysis-report in Listing A.1). As expected, the data flow depen-
dency between the source BufferedReader.readline (cf. Listing 3.5 line 28) and the sink
PrintWriter.write (cf. Listing 3.5 line 19) is reported, including all related chopCMDs. When
Policy P1 is deployed in the PDP, an initial state mapping is created inside the PIP between
the filename secret.txt and the data identifier D1 ∈D (cf. Listing 3.7 line 1); for the sake of
simplicity, we use D1 as a data identifier in this example. Once the source in Listing 3.5 line 28 is
executed, H D F T++ extracts and signals to the PIP from which file the content was read. Based
on this information, the PIP determines the corresponding data identifier and propagates it
along the lines of executed chopCMDs towards the sink; for the file secret.txt, the PIP deter-
mines D1 from its state as the data identifier. H D F T++ also deduces from the analysis-report (cf.
Listing 3.6 line 30) that the source’s return value is assigned to a variable that is identified by
v10 at J O A N A’s SSA representation. Because of that, the PIP updates its state with Listing 3.7
line 4. Moreover, H D F T++ derives from the chop node label ’v17 = v12.append(v10)’ in
Listing 3.6 line 26 that v10’s data identifier also may potentially flow into v17 and v12. H D F T++
tracks that at run-time with line 6 and line 5 in Listing 3.7. All the other, remaining chopCMDs
on a dependency path are processed the same way, i.e. the PIP updates its current state accord-
ingly to the executed chopCMD at run-time. As a chopCMD may be any possible Java bytecode
command, and thus, may update the PIP state differently depending on its semantic, Section 3.5
instantiates the formal data flow model from Section 2.3 for the Java bytecode level.
Once the sink in Listing 3.5 line 19 is reached, H D F T++ determines if the PrintWriter object
pw is writing variable fileContent into a network-socket outputstream or not. In case of a
network-socket outputstream, H D F T++ also extracts the destination IP and port to which data
is sent. However, at that point in time the PIP state in Listing 3.7 reveals to the PDP that the sink
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parameter, which is identified by v41 at J O A N A’s SSA representation (cf. Listing 3.6 line 40),
contains data from the file secret.txt. Therefore, as executing the sink would violate Policy
P1 the PDP rejects the execution of the sink in Listing 3.5 line 19.
Listing 3.7: PIP state only reading secret.txt.
1 secret.txt ---> D1
2 Proc4222|Source0 ---> D1
3 3775970392| readFile(Ljava/lang/String ;) Ljava/lang/String ;|ret ---> D1
4 3775970392| readFile(Ljava/lang/String ;) Ljava/lang/String ;|v10 ---> D1
5 3775970392| readFile(Ljava/lang/String ;) Ljava/lang/String ;|v12 ---> D1
6 3775970392| readFile(Ljava/lang/String ;) Ljava/lang/String ;|v17 ---> D1
7 3775970392| readFile(Ljava/lang/String ;) Ljava/lang/String ;|v19 ---> D1
8 3775970392| readFile(Ljava/lang/String ;) Ljava/lang/String ;|v20 ---> D1
9 3775970392| sample ()V|v36 ---> D1
10 3775970392| sample ()V|v40 ---> D1
11 3775970392| sample ()V|v41 ---> D1
12 3783646496| readFile(Ljava/lang/String ;) Ljava/lang/String ;|v20 ---> D1
13 3783817496| append(Ljava/lang/String ;)Ljava/lang/StringBuilder ;|p1 ---> D1
Listing 3.8: PIP state reading secret.txt and subsequently public.txt.
1 NET :172.16.33.1:8080 ---> D2
2 public.txt ---> D2
3 secret.txt ---> D1
4 Proc3068|Source0 ---> D2
5 Proc3068|Thread1|Sink0 ---> D2
6 3775970248| readFile(Ljava/lang/String ;) Ljava/lang/String ;|ret ---> D2
7 3775970248| readFile(Ljava/lang/String ;) Ljava/lang/String ;|v10 ---> D2
8 3775970248| readFile(Ljava/lang/String ;) Ljava/lang/String ;|v12 ---> D2
9 3775970248| readFile(Ljava/lang/String ;) Ljava/lang/String ;|v17 ---> D2
10 3775970248| readFile(Ljava/lang/String ;) Ljava/lang/String ;|v19 ---> D2
11 3775970248| readFile(Ljava/lang/String ;) Ljava/lang/String ;|v20 ---> D2
12 3775970248| sample ()V|v36 ---> D2
13 3775970248| sample ()V|v40 ---> D2
14 3775970248| sample ()V|v41 ---> D2
15 3783646520| readFile(Ljava/lang/String ;) Ljava/lang/String ;|v20 ---> D2
16 3783860112| readFile(Ljava/lang/String ;) Ljava/lang/String ;|v20 ---> D2
17 3783817520| append(Ljava/lang/String ;)Ljava/lang/StringBuilder ;|p1 ---> D2
Listing 3.8 shows the PIP state when variable rand in Listing 3.5 is larger than 5. In that
case, the value of variable fileContent is overwritten with the content from public.txt
(identified with D2 ∈D inside the PIP state) in Listing 3.5 line 14. This means, that in this case
executing the sink is no longer prohibited by Policy P1. Thus, the PIP updates its state with line 1
in Listing 3.8 once the sink is executed; we use the extracted target IP and port information
inside the naming identifier to track to which remote machine data was transmitted. In contrast,
Listing 3.7 has no “NET:[ip]:[port]” mapping entry in its state as the sink execution was
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prohibited by Policy P1. Note, we show in Listing 3.7 and Listing 3.8 all PIP state entries which
have been generated during our runs. Although only some of them are relevant to decide if
Policy P1 is violated or not, all other entries are needed to follow the dependency chain from
a source to a sink. As the PIP state may grow quite fast after several runs a proper extension
mechanism, which sanitizes the PIP state from unneeded mappings, could be implemented in
future work.
3.5. Data Flow Tracking Model for Java
In contrast to S H R I F T, which tracks the flow of data from sources to sinks based on a statically
pre-computed mapping, H D F T++ leverages chopCMDs in order to follow the actually taken
data flow path through an application. We argue, that depending on run-time values and the
executed instructions only a subset of the reported data flow dependencies between sources and
sinks are actually triggered. This section instantiates the generic data flow model (cf. Section 2.3)
for the Java programming language, to reflect the actual propagation semantic and logic for a
single executed chopCMD. Moreover, this instantiation implements a state transition system
where each state captures which data is stored at which program location inside the application.
State transitions are triggered at run-time by the executed Java bytecode-instruction at each
chopCMD. H D F T++ leverages not only the Java bytecode semantic, but also SSA-information
provided by J O A N A (cf. e.g. Label in Listing 3.1) about each sink, source, or chopCMD. Put
it simply, this instantiation is used as a configuration for the PIP to reflect the propagation
semantic at the chopCMD level.
In contrast to a pure dynamic run-time tracker that has to monitor any single bytecode
instruction (like P H O S P H O R [10]), H D F T++ monitors point-wise only those commands that
are actually relevant for a flow of data. Furthermore, H D F T++ does not propagate a taint-label
via shadow variables inside the AuS, but instead it updates the internal PIP’s mapping on every
executed chopCMD according to the state transition update rules, which are described in the
following. This way, the PIP state reveals at each moment in time which data has flowed from
which sources to which sinks, and thus, provides valuable information to enforce data usage
policies. For instance, consider a temporal data usage restriction like Delete my data after 5 days.
As personal data might move from one to the other container within 5 days, it is necessary to
track and record its dissemination inside the AuS. Otherwise, policy enforcement would miss
some of the protected personal data.
Containers, C. Java variables are used to read and write data in memory regions (like Java
Stack or Java Heap). Apart from the variable’s data type, Java distinguishes between primitive-
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(like numeric or boolean types) and reference-typed (like class or interface types) variables. They
differ in their assignment behavior: primitive-typed variables are assigned by copying the value
of the variable. As opposed to this, reference-typed variables are assigned by copying the memory
address of the stored data. Therefore, after a reference-typed assignment both variables point to
the same data item, so that, data modifications are immediately propagated to both variables.
H D F T++ defines set C = CP ∪CR as the union between primitive- (CP ) and reference-typed (CR)
containers.
Principals, I. Each command in a Java application is executed by a Java-Thread and might
lead to a flow of data. Therefore, set I is instantiated as all threads inside a Java program. A
thread always runs within a process, thus a Java-Thread is identified by the tuple I = ProcessID×
ThreadID. In this context setD defines all data items that can be processed by I.
Naming identifiers, F . A Java variable is identified by its name inside a scope. A scope is a
code region where a variable is visible and accessible. Depending on the variable’s lifetime,
H D F T++ distinguishes between class-, instance-, and method-level scopes. Class-level scopes
are labeled with the fully qualified name (FQN) of the class (ClassFQN), whereas instance-level
scope-labels take also into account the memory address Address of an object. Method-level
scope-labels extends the previous one and identify local variables that only life during the
execution of method MethodName. We distinguish between identifiers for objects FI , arrays
FA, array elements FAE , static fields FSF , instance fields FIF , local variables in static FSV and
instanceFIV methods, as well as, return values of staticFSR and instanceFIR methods. Hence,
set F =FI ∪FA ∪FAE ∪FSF ∪FIF ∪FSV ∪FIV ∪FSR ∪FIR.
FI ⊆ (ClassFQN ×Address)
FA ⊆ (ClassFQN ×Address)
FAE ⊆ (FA×N)
FSF ⊆ (ClassFQN ×FieldName)
FIF ⊆ (FI ×FieldName)
FSV ⊆ (ClassFQN ×MethodName×VarName)
FIV ⊆ (FI ×MethodName×VarName)
FSR ⊆ (ClassFQN ×MethodName)
FIR ⊆ (FI ×MethodName)
Events, E . Depending on the kind of chopCMD instruction, H D F T++ distinguishes between
different groups of operations that lead to a flow of data: assignments, arithmetic operations,
and method invocations. H D F T++’s event definition does not only rely on the semantic of pure
Java bytecode (like iload bytecode instruction) but also takes into account SSA-information
provided by J O A N A’s intermediate program representation (cf. for instance Label in Listing 3.1).
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Therefore, any pure Java bytecode instruction that leads to a data flow can be classified into
one of those groups. Note, arithmetic operations and method invocations result only in a flow
of data if their computed result values are used in another, subsequent instruction. Moreover,
we intentionally exclude Java exceptions in our model because they may negatively affect the
precision of our tracking results. This has to do with the fact that every operation, in particular
I/O operations, may cause an exception in Java, and thus, may result in unprecise tracking
results where everything flows to everything. However, S H R I F T and H D F T++ can be extended
in future work to track also those kinds of flows, but at the charge of less precise tracking result.
We define a helper function isOpaque(c) to determine if a specific Java-class c ∈ ClassFQN ,
or their instantiation c ∈ FI respectively, shall be equipped with our H D F T++ tracker (i.e.
isOpaque(c) == false) or not (i.e. isOpaque(c) == true). Henceforth, we term c an opaque-class
if it is not equipped with H D F T++. Furthermore, function isOpaque(c) builds the foundation to
implement, realize, and increase portability within the H D F T++ approach, as it allows us to
keep the tracking logic only at the program level, and e.g. independent from tracking code inside
Java system classes (c.f. Figure 1.6). For instance, for the Java system class c = java.lang.Object,
isOpaque(c) returns true. The remaining of this section provides the formal description of all
events that were identified to lead to a flow of data. Note, we do not provide an event definition
for each single Java bytecode command, but instead, an event definition which covers and
includes multiple Java bytecode commands. For instance, BinaryAssign covers all arithmetic
bytecode commands which include, addition, subtraction, division, and multiplication. Note,
the present model does not cover Java exceptions or threads.
BinaryAssign is triggered whenever the result of an arithmetic operation between two local
variables arg1 and arg2 is assigned to a result variable res. Hence, data flows from arg1 and arg2
to res, and replaces the previous content in res. We model this event only for primitive-typed local
variables because an arithmetic operation can not be performed on reference-typed variables.
∀s ∈ [C→ 2D];∀l ∈ [C→ 2C];∀ f ∈ [I ×{FIV ∪FSV}→ CP ];∀p ∈ I;∀arg1, arg2, r e s ∈FIV ∪FSV :
(σ, p , BinaryAssign(arg1, arg2, res),σ′) ∈R
=⇒ σ′.s [σ. f (p , res)←σ.s (σ. f (p , arg1))∪σ.s (σ. f (p , arg2))]
∧ σ′.l =σ.l
∧ σ′. f =σ. f
UnaryAssign is triggered whenever a unary operation is executed. In case of primitive-typed
variables, this event performs either a type conversion (like the Java bytecode command i2b
which converts an integer into a byte value), or negation (like the Java bytecode command ineg
which negates an integer value) of the operator arg. Furthermore, as this operation modifies the
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original value of the arg, the result of this operation defines, according to the SSA specification,
a new variable res which contains the result of a unary operation.
∀s ∈ [C→ 2D];∀l ∈ [C→ 2C];∀ f ∈ [I ×F→ C];∀p ∈ I;∀arg, res ∈FIV ∪FSV :
∀σ. f (p , arg),σ. f (p , res) ∈ CP : (σ, p , UnaryAssign(arg1, res),σ′) ∈R
=⇒ σ′.s [σ. f (p , res)←σ.s (σ. f (p , arg))]
∧ σ′.l =σ.l
∧ σ′. f =σ. f
In case of reference-typed variables, a unary operation corresponds to a typecast on variable
arg, and therefore, variable res still points to the same object as arg after a typecast.
∀s ∈ [C→ 2D];∀l ∈ [C→ 2C]; f o r a l l f ∈ [I ×F→ C];∀p ∈ I;∀arg, res ∈FIV ∪FSV :
σ. f (p , arg),σ. f (p , res) ∈ CR : (σ, p , UnaryAssign(arg1, res),σ′) ∈R
=⇒ σ′.s =σ.s
∧ σ′.l =σ.l
∧ σ′. f [(p , res)←σ. f (p , arg)]
ReadArray is triggered whenever an element at index i is read from an array arr and is
assigned to a local variable var. For primitive-typed values the content of the array element
(arr, i) is copied to var
∀s ∈ [C→ 2D];∀l ∈ [C→ 2C];∀ f ∈ [I ×F→ C];∀p ∈ I;∀arr ∈FA;∀i ∈N;∀var ∈FIV ∪FSV ;
∀σ. f (p , (arr, i )),σ. f (p , var) ∈ CP : (σ, p , ReadArray(arr, i, var),σ′) ∈R
=⇒ σ′.s [σ. f (p , var)←σ.s (σ. f (p , (arr, i )))]
∧ σ′.l =σ.l
∧ σ′. f =σ. f
In case of reference-typed variables variable var points to the same object as (arr, i)
∀s ∈ [C→ 2D];∀l ∈ [C→ 2C];∀ f ∈ [I ×F→ C];∀p ∈ I;∀arr ∈FA;∀i ∈N;∀var ∈FIV ∪FSV ;
∀σ. f (p , (arr, i )),σ. f (p , var) ∈ CR : (σ, p , ReadArray(arr, i, var),σ′) ∈R
=⇒ σ′.s =σ.s
∧ σ′.l =σ.l
∧ σ′. f [(p , var)←σ. f (p , (arr, i ))]
WriteArray is triggered whenever a local variable var is assigned to an array arr at index i .
H D F T++ models arr and each array element (arr, i) as separated containers and link them via
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an alias mapping. For a primitive-typed variable var this mapping is fixed, and thus, the content
of an array element (arr, i) is overwritten with the content of var.
∀s ∈ [C→ 2D];∀l ∈ [C→ 2C];∀ f ∈ [I ×F→ C];∀p ∈ I;∀arr ∈FA;∀i ∈N;∀var ∈FIV ∪FSV ;
∀σ. f (p , (arr, i )),σ. f (p , var) ∈ CP : (σ, p , WriteArray(arr, i, var),σ′) ∈R
=⇒ σ′.s [σ.Fp , (arr, i )←σ.Fσ. f (p , var)]
∧ σ′.l =σ.l
∧ σ′. f =σ. f
In case of reference-typed variables, H D F T++ models each array element as an alias relation
to var. For doing so, H D F T++ first deletes all possibly existing alias mappings for (arr, i), except
the mapping with arr, and afterwards, create a new alias mapping between (arr, i) and var.
∀s ∈ [C→ 2D];∀l ∈ [C→ 2C];∀ f ∈ [I ×F→ C];∀p ∈ I;∀arr ∈FA;∀i ∈N;∀var ∈FIV ∪FSV ;
∀σ. f (p , (arr, i )),σ. f (p , var) ∈ CR : (σ, p , WriteArray(arr, i, var),σ′) ∈R
=⇒ σ′.s =σ.s
∧ σ′.l [σ. f (p , arr)←σ. f (p , var) ∪ σ.l (σ. f (p , arr)) \σ. f (p , (arr, i ))]
∧ σ′. f [(p , (arr, i ))←σ′. f (p , var)]
ReadField is triggered whenever a static or instance field fld is read and their content is
assigned to a local variable var. After the assignment variable var either contains a copy of the
field data
∀s ∈ [C→ 2D];∀l ∈ [C→ 2C];∀ f ∈ [I ×F→ C];∀fld ∈FIF ∪FSF ;∀p ∈ I;∀var ∈FIV ∪FSV ;
∀σ. f (p , fld),σ. f (p , var) ∈ CP : (σ, p , ReadField(fld, var),σ′) ∈R
=⇒ σ′.s [σ. f (p , var)←σ.s (σ. f (p , fld))]
∧ σ′.l =σ.l
∧ σ′. f =σ. f
or variable var points to the same container as fld
∀s ∈ [C→ 2D];∀l ∈ [C→ 2C];∀ f ∈ [I ×F→ C];∀fld ∈FIF ∪FSF ;∀p ∈ I;∀var ∈FIV ∪FSV ;
∀σ. f (p , fld),σ. f (p , var) ∈ CR : (σ, p , ReadField(fld, var),σ′) ∈R
=⇒ σ′.s =σ.s
∧ σ′.l =σ.l
∧ σ′. f [(p , var)←σ. f (p , fld)]
WriteField is triggered whenever the content of a local variable var is assigned to a static
or instance field fld. Here we also have to distinguish between primitive- and reference-typed
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variables, as depending on its type fld either contains the same value or points to the same data
as var. For primitive-typed variables, H D F T++ assumes that the alias relationship between o
and fld is already established as the field container stays the same.
∀s ∈ [C→ 2D];∀l ∈ [C→ 2C];∀ f ∈ [I ×F→ C];∀p ∈ I;∀fld ∈FIF ∪FSF ;∀var ∈FIV ∪FSV ;
∀σ. f (p , fld),σ. f (p , var) ∈ CP : (σ, p , WriteField(fld, var),σ′) ∈R
=⇒ σ′.s [σ. f (p , f l d )←σ.s (σ. f (p , var))]
∧ σ′.l =σ.l
∧ σ′. f =σ. f
Furthermore, if fld belongs to an instance of an opaque class o , i.e. isOpaque(o) == true, then
H D F T++ adds an alias relation between o and fld; this makes it easier to get all data from the
opaque object.
∀s ∈ [C→ 2D];∀l ∈ [C→ 2C];∀ f ∈ [I ×F→ C];∀p ∈ I;∀fld ∈FIF ∪FSF ;∀var ∈FIV ∪FSV ;
∀σ. f (p , fld),σ. f (p , var) ∈ CR : (σ, p , WriteField(fld, var),σ′) ∈R
=⇒ σ′.s =σ.s
∧ σ′.l [σ. f (p , fld)←σ.l (σ. f (p , fld)) ∪ σ. f (p , o )]o∈{FI |i s O p a q ue (o )}
∧ σ′. f [(p , fld)←σ. f (p , var)]
CallInstanceMethod is triggered whenever an instance method is invoked. Method param-
eters are passed via a stack frame on the operand stack into the method. H D F T++ distinguishes
between actual variable identifiers as ∈ FIV ∪FSV and the formal identifiers ps ∈ FIV . The
former ones are used inside the caller method to pass values into the method, whereas the
latter ones are identifiers which are used inside the called method. When a method returns its
corresponding stack frame is removed from the stack. What possibly remains on the stack is the
return value. In a broader sense, H D F T++ considers passing variables into a method as a kind
of variable assignment between formal and actual parameters of a method invocation, and thus,
also distinguishes between primitive- and reference-typed variables: ps either takes a copy of its
corresponding as or points to the same data as as. If the class of the callee object o is opaque
H D F T++ adds an alias relation from parameter ps to o because H D F T++ does not have any
information about how data is further distributed inside the callee object.
∀s ∈ [C→ 2D],∀l ∈ [C→ 2C],∀ f ∈ [I ×F→ C],∀p ∈ I,∀o ∈FI ,∀ps ∈FIV ,∀as ∈FIV ∪FSV :
(σ, p , CallInstanceMethod(o, as, ps),σ′) ∈R
=⇒ σ′.s [σ. f (p , ps)←σ. f (σ. f (p , as))]σ. f (p ,as), σ. f (p ,ps)∈CP
∧ σ′.l [σ. f (p , ps)←σ.l (σ. f (p , ps)) ∪ σ. f (p , o )]isOpaque(o)
∧ σ′. f [(p , ps)←σ. f (p , as)]σ. f (p ,as), σ. f (p ,ps)∈CR
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CallStaticMethod is triggered whenever a static method is invoked. Formally, it is similar
to CallInstanceMethod except that there is no callee object o . Thus, adding aliases from the
object to the parameters is not needed.
∀s ∈ [C→ 2D];∀l ∈ [C→ 2C];∀ f ∈ [I ×F→ C];∀p ∈ I;∀ps ∈FSV ;∀as ∈FIV ∪FSV :
(σ, p , CallStaticMethod(as, ps),σ′) ∈R
=⇒
σ′.s [σ. f (p , p s )←σ.s (σ. f (p , a s ))]σ. f (p ,a s ),σ. f (p ,p s )∈CP
σ′.l =σ.l
σ′. f [(p , p s )←σ. f (p , a s )]σ. f (p ,a s ),σ. f (p ,p s )∈CR
Passing return values back from a callee method to a caller method are modeled in H D F T++
with two separated events: PrepareMethodReturn and ReturnInstanceMethod, or respec-
tively ReturnStaticMethod for static method invocations. For the sake of simplicity, we con-
sider only the case where return values are assigned to local variables inside the caller method. As-
signments to object fields are modeled with two consecutive events: ReturnInstanceMethod
followed by a WriteField.
PrepareMethodReturn is triggered at the end of a method just before it returns. At this point,
the value of the method’s local variable var is temporarily stored into an intermediate return-
variable ret and provided as a copy or a reference to the caller-method, where it is possibly
assigned to another variable.
∀s ∈ [C→ 2D];∀l ∈ [C→ 2C];∀ f ∈ [I ×F→ C];∀p ∈ I;∀v a r ∈FIV ∪FSV ;∀ret ∈FIR ∪FSR;
∀σ. f (p , var),σ. f (p , ret) ∈ CP : (σ, p , PrepareMethodReturn(var, ret),σ′) ∈R
=⇒ σ′.s [σ. f (p , ret)←σ.s (σ. f (p , var))]
∧ σ′.l =σ.l
∧ σ′. f =σ. f
In case of reference-typed return values, the formal definition is as follows
∀s ∈ [C→ 2D];∀l ∈ [C→ 2C];∀ f ∈ [I ×F→ C];∀p ∈ I;∀v a r ∈FIV ∪FSV ;∀ret ∈FIR ∪FSR;
∀σ. f (p , var),σ. f (p , ret) ∈ CR : (σ, p , PrepareMethodReturn(var, ret),σ′) ∈R
=⇒ σ′.s =σ.s
∧ σ′.l =σ.l
∧ σ′. f [(p , ret)←σ. f (p , var)]
ReturnInstanceMethod is triggered after a method execution m on instance o returns to
its caller-method and the method’s stack frame is popped from the operand stack. H D F T++
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models that by emptying all local variables lvar ∈FIV , including primitive- and reference-typed,
that were instantiated inside method m . Additionally, a possible return value ret is assigned to a
local variable var inside the caller method. In case isOpaque(o) == false this event is modeled
as
∀s ∈ [C→ 2D];∀l ∈ [C→ 2C];∀ f ∈ [I ×F→ C];∀ret ∈FIR;∀m ∈MethodName;∀lvar ∈FIV ;
∀var ∈FIV ∪FSV ;∀p ∈ I,∀o ∈FI : (σ, p , ReturnInstanceMethod(o, m),σ′) ∈R
=⇒ σ′.s [σ. f (p , var)←σ.s (σ. f (p , ret)); f (p , lvar)←;]σ. f (p ,var),σ. f (p ,lvar),σ. f (p ,ret)∈CP
∧ σ′.l =σ.l
∧ σ′. f [(p , var)←σ. f (p , ret); (p , lvar)←;]σ. f (p ,var),σ. f (p ,lvar),σ. f (p ,ret)∈CR
Return values from opaque objects o are modeled differently, i.e. isOpaque(o) == true: as
H D F T++ do not track data flows inside o , H D F T++ can not determine which data is flowed
into ret, either passed via method parameters ps or instance fields fld. Therefore, H D F T++
models the connection between ps, fld, and o as an alias relationship (cf. WriteField and
CallInstanceMethod) and assign all data items of o , as well as from its aliases, to var.
∀s ∈ [C→ 2D];∀l ∈ [C→ 2C];∀ f ∈ [I ×F→ C];∀ret ∈FIR;∀m ∈MethodName;
∀var ∈FIV ∪FSV ;∀p ∈ I;∀o ∈FI : (σ, p , ReturnInstanceMethod(o, m),σ′) ∈R
=⇒ σ′.s [σ. f (p , var)←σ.s (o )∪σ.s (c )]c∈{C|o∈σ.l (c )}
∧ σ′.l =σ.l
∧ σ′. f =σ. f
ReturnStaticMethod is triggered after the invocation of a static method m returns to its
caller method. It slightly differs to the ReturnInstanceMethod, as there is a callee class cl ∈
ClassFQN instead of a callee object o . Furthermore, as we do not model data flows within opaque
classes, i.e. isOpaque(cl) == true, we directly propagate data from a method’s actual parameters
prm to its return value ret = (cl, m) ∈FSR, and hence, possibly to a local variable var that receives
the return value inside the caller method. lvar are all those variables that are created and used
during the execution of m .
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∀s ∈ [C→ 2D];∀l ∈ [C→ 2C];∀ f ∈ [I ×F→ C];∀p ∈ I;∀var ∈FIV ∪FSV ;∀ret ∈FSR;
∀prm, lvar ∈FSV ;∀m ∈MethodName;∀cl ∈ClassFQN : (σ, p , ReturnStaticMethod(cl, m),σ′) ∈R
=⇒ σ′.s [σ. f (p , var)←σ.s (σ. f (p , prm))]σ. f (p ,prm)∈CP
∧ σ′.l =σ.l
∧ σ′. f [(p , var)←σ. f (p , prm)]σ. f (p ,prm)∈CR
In case isOpaque(cl) == false, we know that a precedent PrepareMethodReturn has hap-
pened, and therefore, either copy the content of variable ret into the container of var (for
primitive-typed values) or remap the var to the same container as ret (for reference-typed
values).
∀s ∈ [C→ 2D];∀l ∈ [C→ 2C];∀ f ∈ [I ×F→ C];∀p ∈ I;∀var ∈FIV ∪FSV ;∀ret ∈FSR;
∀prm, lvar ∈FSV ;∀m ∈MethodName;∀cl ∈ClassFQN : (σ, p , ReturnStaticMethod(cl, m),σ′) ∈R
=⇒ σ′.s [σ. f (p , var)←σ.s (σ. f (p , ret));σ. f (p , lvar)←;]σ. f (p ,var),σ. f (p ,lvar),σ. f (p ,ret)∈CP
∧ σ′.l =σ.l
∧ σ′. f [(p , var)←σ. f (p , ret); (p , lvar)←;]σ. f (p ,lvar),σ. f (p ,ret)∈CR
Source is triggered whenever a Java application reads data from the outside into its process
memory via a file (IO), network (NET), or database (DB) read-operation. Thus, H D F T++ defines
the set TYPE = {IO,NET,DB}. Typically, a source reads data from different locations LOC that
are uniquely identified by locid (e.g. an absolute file-path/-name, or a remote system’s ip and
port). To use data dat from a source, an application must assign dat to a reference variable var.
H D F T++ uses a helper function getInputCont : TYPE ×LOC 7→ CR that provides for a TYPE and
LOC a container CR for subsequent processing.
∀s ∈ [C→ 2D],∀l ∈ [C→ 2C],∀ f ∈ [I ×F→ C],∀p ∈ I,∀var ∈FIV ∪FSV ,
∀ f (p , var) ∈ CR,∀t ∈ TYPE :
(σ, p , Source(t, locid, var),σ′) ∈R =⇒ σ′.s [σ. f (p , var)← datid]
∧ σ′.l =σ.l
∧ σ′. f [(p , var)← getInputCont(t, locid)]
Sink is triggered whenever data d is transmitted from a variable var to a location locid outside
of a process memory. This happens via a write-operation of type t ∈ TYPE. To protocol where
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data flows to the outside, H D F T++ creates a container c , identified by (t , locid), and map it to d.
∀s ∈ [C→ 2D],∀l ∈ [C→ 2C],∀ f ∈ [I ×F→ C],∀p ∈ I,∀var ∈FIV ∪FSV ,∀ f (p , var) ∈ CR :
(σ, p , Sink(var, t, locid),σ′) ∈R =⇒ σ′.s [σ. f (p , (t , locid))←σ.s (σ. f (p , var))]
∧ σ′.l =σ.l
∧ σ′. f [(p , (t , locid))← c ]
3.6. Evaluation
This section illustrates and describes our conducted experiments and provides its evaluation
results in two dimensions: precision and performance. We have used a test-suite of different Java-
based applications for our experiments, standalone- and web-applications in particular: JZip and
JFTP are standalone-applications to zip and to transmit files via FTP respectively. BirthdayApp
is a Facebook-based web-application that fetches and displays birthday data from a Facebook
user and its friends in a calendar. For doing so, it authenticates a user to and queries its birthday
data from Facebook. SnipSnap and PersonalBlog are web-applications for blogger to post and to
publish blog-entries on a personal website, like an electronic diary. To save blog entries, those
web-applications are additionally backed up with a database storage. JZip and BirthdayApp are
applications that have been implemented by a student during his bachelor thesis, whereas the
others are taken from the Stanford SecuriBench 1 repository. Note, BirthdayApp and PersonalBlog
are pretty similar to those from our running example in section 1.2, except that they are using a
local database instead of a cloud storage service to store their data.
Based on our test-suite we address in Section 3.6.1 Caveat 1 and evaluate how much more
precise the present approaches are compared to a pure black-box approach (cf. Figure 1.4a).
Moreover, we provide a case study in Section 3.6.2 and show, along the lines of Java code samples,
the benefits of H D F T++ compared to S H R I F T. Note, we do not provide a general metric to
characterize and quantify H D F T++’s strengths, as this highly depends on actual run-time values,
and thus, on the actually taken control flow path through an application.
Finally, as our hybrid approach and its prototype implementation injects additional instruc-
tions into the AuS, Section 3.6.3 addresses Caveat 2 and evaluates and reveals the performance
run-time overhead, that our approaches impose compared to the AuS’s native execution. More-
over, performance results are benchmarked and compared with P H O S P H O R [10] and L I B DFT
[54], two pure dynamic data flow tracker. Besides that, to show the applicability of our solution,
we also conducted experiments on pure Java standalone-applications.
1https://suif.stanford.edu/~livshits/securibench/
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3.6.1. Precision
This section addresses Caveat 1 and conducts experiments to answer the research question RQ1
How can we improve the tracking precision, and thus, reduce overapproximation of the
tracking results compared to a pure black-box approach?
In first place, we are interested in the precision gain of S H R I F T and H D F T++ compared
to a pure black-box approach. By construction, S H R I F T and its extension H D F T++ cannot
be less precise than treating the AuS as a black-box where every output contains every input
read so far (cf. Figure 1.4a). Compared to a pure dynamic data flow tracker which considers
only a single execution trace at a time, static information flow analysis takes into account all
possible execution traces at once, and thus, is able to detect and analyze explicit and implicit
dependencies between sources and sinks. If at least one execution trace leads to a flow of data
then the sink statically depends on the source. For instance, static analysis reports for the code
in Listing 3.4, that the sink at line 8 depends on the source at line 1, even considering explicit
flows only.
In general, however, it is hard to quantify such precision gain. Considering that a black-box
approach would always be as precise as our approach, where every source is connected to
every sink, a possible metric for precision improvement could be the number of source-to-sink
connections that can be safely discarded, thanks to static analysis. Let #Flows denote the number
of statically computed dependencies between sinks and sources, we formally define precision
gain compared to a black-box tracking as [71]
Precision := 1− (#flows/(#sources×#sinks)) (Equation 3.1)
where 0 indicates that every source flows to every sink (like in the black-box approach) and
1 indicates that all sinks are independent from the sources, i.e. no data propagation; at the
moment of writing, the author is not aware of any better metric to measure precision of static
analysis with reference to dynamic monitoring. Note, our precision metric has a reduction
notion and must not be misunderstood with a prediction accuracy.
As reported in Table 3.1, we statically analyzed each AuS in our test-suite with various points-to-
analysis (0-1-CFA [36], 1-CFA, object-sensitivity, cf. Section 3.3), considering only explicit (D) and
additional implicit (DI) information flows; multi-column “(D)/(DI)” reports our results, whereas
the left-hand side of the slash-symbol illustrates the measured values considering explicit flows
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Table 3.1.: Static analysis results with different points-to configurations. The number of detected
sources, sinks, and flows are listed in the columns “#Src./#Snk.” and “#Flows”, whereas
“Precision” shows the achieved precision in % according to Equation 3.1. All values
within the multi-column “(D/DI)” are reported considering only explicit (D) and
additional implicit (DI) information flows.
AuS Points-To #Src./#Snk. (D/DI)
#Flows Precision
JZip
0-1-CFA 33 / 56 192 / 666 89.6 / 64.0
1-CFA 10 / 55 135 / 213 75.5 / 61.3
obj.-sens. 10 / 55 115 / 186 79.1 / 66.2
JFTP
0-1-CFA 7 / 4 6 / 22 78.6 / 21.4
1-CFA 7 / 4 4 / 21 85.7 / 25.0
obj.-sens. 7 / 4 6 / 19 78.6 / 32.1
BirthdayApp
0-1-CFA 13 / 99 98 / 646 92.3 / 51.8
1-CFA 13 / 45 20 / 229 96.6 / 60.9
obj.-sens. 13 / 45 18/229 96.9 / 60.9
PersonalBlog
0-1-CFA 8 / 37 162 / 258 45.3 / 12.8
1-CFA 8 / 32 136 / 183 46.9 / 28.5
obj.-sens. 8 / 32 56 / 167 78.1 / 34.8
SnipSnap
0-1-CFA 108 / 101 2554 / 8060 76.6 / 26.1
1-CFA 108 / 95 848 / 6229 91.7 / 39.3
obj.-sens. 108 / 95 291 / 5964 97.2 / 41.9
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(D) only, and the right-hand side additional implicit (DI) flows. According to Equation 3.1, the
achieved precision gain compared to a pure black-box approach (cf. column “precision”) varies
between 58% and 89.61% for JZip, between 66.47% and 77.01% for JFTP, between 60.85% and
96.92% for BirthdayApp, between 34.76% and 46.87% for PersonalBlog, and between 41.87%
and 71% for SnipSnap, depending on the configuration. These numbers also confirm that
taking into account additional implicit flows leads to more sink-source dependencies, and thus
according to our metric in Equation 3.1, to a result that is less precise than considering only
explicit dependencies. Because of that, we use analysis-reports with a focus on explicit flows
only for our experiments in Section 3.6.3 and Section 3.6.2. Although some of these analyses are
incomparable in theory, object-sensitivity tends to deliver more precision, as already reported
for various client analyses [74]. This effect is also partially observable here, at least for the
configurations in which indirect flows are ignored (D). The reason is that the points-to analysis
result is mainly used to compute data dependencies and has only a limited effect on the control
dependencies. For instance, for JFTP object-sensitivity even results in worse precision than 1-
and 0−1-CFA. Note, these numbers are hard to relate to dynamic values because they depend
on the specific AuS and do not take into account how many times a certain source- or sink-
instruction is executed at run-time. Furthermore, our proposed metric in Equation 3.1 is only
based on parameters that are statically collected from the static analysis phase and does not
take into account run-time data and values. Therefore, we argue that our reported precision
values build the lowest threshold for precision improvement compared to a black-box approach.
Although these experiments are primarily devoted to investigate the precision gain compared
to a pure black-box approach, where sensitive inputs are conservatively propagated to all outputs,
we also measured other dimensions of our static information flow analysis experiments in order
to get an intuition about the computational-power and -resources that are required to run the
experiments. Concretely, we report in Table 3.2 the required time in minutes to build the SDG
(column “TSDG”) and to run the analysis (column “TANA”, which also includes the time to
build the SDG), as well as, the occupied memory size in GB (column “Memory”). As Table 3.2
illustrates, the analysis time and required memory size highly varies between the different points-
to configurations and also depends on considering implicit flows or not. On closer inspection,
we can observe that generating the SDG graph (column “TSDG"), which is the base to run the
static information flow analysis, takes the bulk of the total analysis time “TANA” for the majority
of experiments. In all experiments, building the SDG requires between ∼ 75% – ∼ 99% of the
total analysis time. For instance, even for small applications, like JZip, the analysis time varies
between 0.43 min. – 6.11 min., whereof 5 out of 6 experiments require more than > 75% of the
total analysis time for the SDG generation while the rest is spent on slicing and running the
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information flow analysis algorithm. Depending on the chosen points-to analysis, the SDG size
determined by the number of nodes and edges (column # SDG-nodes and # SDG-edges) varies
tremendously: for instance, for JZip the graph size exhibits between 60 ∗103 and 105 nodes, as
well as, between 75.5 ∗105 and 1.3 ∗106 edges, and thus directly affects the total analysis time.
As expected, all experiments taking into account implicit flows (DI) generate more SDG-edges
than considering explicit flows only (D), and hence, results in more dependencies between
sources and sinks. In the (D) configuration, SDGs have between 11% and 34% fewer edges
than in the respective (DI) configuration. In sum, we have observed that the chosen points-to
analysis tremendously influences the SDG size, and thus directly affects the total analysis time,
and SDG’s build time in particular. Moreover, even for small applications, like JZip, the required
memory resources are non-negligible: calling a simple Java system class from the application
code involves an avalanche of other related Java classes which have to be taken into account for
the analysis.
3.6.2. S H R I F T versus H D F T++
As S H R I F T and H D F T++ reuse a statically pre-computed analysis-report (cf. Section 3.3) to
track only those data flow dependencies that actually lead to a flow of data, both approaches
exhibit at least a better tracking precision than a pure black-box approach (cf. Section 3.6.1).
However, their run-time behavior is different. S H R I F T monitors only those sink- and source-
instructions which have a data flow dependency between each other (cf. Section 3.4), whereas
H D F T++ additionally tracks intermediate instructions which reside on a dependency path. This
way, H D F T++ is able to differentiate more accurately if a data flow actually happens or not at
run-time. For instance, consider the flow of data from line 1 to line 8 in listing 3.4: irrespective of
the condition value in line 3, S H R I F T always reports the flow of data even if the assignment
in Line 4 does not happen. In contrast, H D F T++ reports the flow of data only if the condition
value is true at run-time, because then the assignment in line 4 is executed; otherwise, no flow
of data is reported by H D F T++.
However, assessing and quantifying the precision gain of H D F T++ compared to S H R I F T in
general is non trivial. Depending on actual run-time values only a subset of chop instructions
may be executed on a data flow dependency, and thus, would make a dependency path critical,
so that data can flow from a source to a critical sink. In this section, we examine the benefits
of H D F T++ compared to S H R I F T along the lines of different Java source-code samples which
take different randomly generated input data. We show further, how the PIP-state evolves with
H D F T++ and S H R I F T and illustrate when H D F T++ provides a more accurate tracking result.
For the sake of illustration, we always show the whole PIP state with all mapping entries which
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are created at run-time. Although someone may argue that not all PIP state entries are actually
required to take a policy decision, we retort that all the other entries are needed to follow the
dependency chain from a source to a sink. As the PIP state may grow quite fast after several
runs, a proper extension mechanism which sanitizes the PIP state from unneeded mappings
could be implemented in future work.
For the sake of simplicity, we use dedicated code samples to make H D F T++’s precision gain
more tangible. We do not claim that our chosen code samples are complete, but to the best
of our knowledge they reflect common code structures, like branch- and loop-commands or
inheritance relations, which are typically used inside applications. All code samples in this
section have been statically analyzed with object-sensitiveness enabled and targeting explicit
flows only (cf. Section 3.6.1 and Section 3.6.3 for the reasoning).
Sample 1: Branch instruction
Our first code sample in Listing 3.9 shows a data flow dependency between the sink- (line 11)
and the source-method (line 3). The assignment instruction ’out=in’ in line 6 is the main
reason for the existence of this data flow dependency. Depending on the actual run-time size
of the byte-array out (which is randomly determined in line 2) the assignment instruction is
executed or not, and thus, either transfers the data item in a copy-by-reference manner from
the source to the sink or not.
Listing 3.9: Data flow dependency crosses a IF-command
1 public static void main(String [] args) {
2 int size = new Random (). nextInt (10);
3 byte[] in = source("Test"). getBytes ();
4 byte[] out = new byte[size];
5 if(in.length < out.length ){
6 out = in;
7 }
8 else {
9 out = "DoNothing".getBytes ();
10 }
11 sink(new String(out));
12 }
13
14 public static String source(String s){ return s;}
15 public static void sink(String s){ System.out.println(s);}
Listing 3.10 shows the corresponding analysis-report which is generated during the static
analysis phase for Listing 3.9 (cf. Section 3.3). As expected, it lists the data flow dependency
between the source- and the sink-method (sink-source-pairs in line 16 and line 17), as well
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as the corresponding chop nodes (chopNode-tags, line 18 – line 35) which belongs to that
dependency path. Each chop node provides information about its unique program location
inside the AuS, which is identified by the bytecode offset bci and the fully-qualified method
name om (because of limited space reason, we use a shortened version of the fully-qualified
method name and omit the Java package information).
Listing 3.10: Static analysis-report for the IF-example in Listing 3.9.
1 <source >
2 <id>Source0 </id>
3 <location >..main (.) V:38</location >
4 <signature >.. source(Ljava/lang/String ;)Ljava/lang/String;</signature >
5 <return/>
6 </source >
7 ...
8 <sink>
9 <id>Sink0</id>
10 <location >..main (.) V:76</location >
11 <signature >..sink(Ljava/lang/String ;)V</signature >
12 <param index="1"/>
13 </sink>
14 ...
15 <flows >
16 <sink id="Sink0">
17 <source id="Source0"/>
18 <chop>
19 <chopNode bci="38" lab="v20 = source (#( Test))" om="..main (.)V"/>
20 <chopNode bci="41" lab="v22 = v20.getBytes ()" om="..main (.)V"/>
21 <chopNode bci="44" lab="v23 = v22" om="..main (.)V"/>
22 <chopNode bci="46" lab="v24 = new []" om="..main (.)V"/>
23 <chopNode bci="48" lab="v25 = v24" om="..main (.)V"/>
24 <chopNode bci="50" lab="v26 = v22.length" om="..main (.)V"/>
25 <chopNode bci="52" lab="v27 = v24.length" om="..main (.)V"/>
26 <chopNode bci="53" lab="if (v26 >;= v27) goto 63" om="..main (.)V"/>
27 <chopNode bci="57" lab="v32 = v22" om="..main (.)V"/>
28 <chopNode bci="58" lab="goto 68" om="..main (.)V"/>
29 <chopNode bci="63" lab="v30 = #( DoNothing ). getBytes ()" om="..main (.)V"/>
30 <chopNode bci="66" lab="v31 = v30" om="..main (.)V"/>
31 <chopNode bci="68" lab="v34 = new java.lang.String" om="..main (.)V"/>
32 <chopNode bci="73" lab="v34.<init >;(v33)" om="..main (.)V"/>
33 <chopNode bci="76" lab="sink(v34)" om="..main (.)V"/>
34 <chopNode bci="-8" lab="PHI v33 = v22 , v30" om="..main (.)V"/>
35 </chop>
36 </sink>
37 </flows >
Moreover, it also provides the Java command statement in J O A N A’s intermediate SSA repre-
sentation language (cf. lab-attribute). Based on the analysis-report in Listing 3.10, we monitor
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the code in Listing 3.9 with H D F T++ and S H R I F T to investigate how the PIP-state evolves when
the sink-method in line 6 is reached. In particular, we are interested in the PIP-states when
the assignment instruction in Listing 3.9 line 6 is executed and also when it is not executed.
Listing 3.11 shows the excerpt from H D F T++’s PIP-state if line 6 in Listing 3.9 is executed,
i.e. in this case the byte-array size of variable out is greater than the byte-array size of variable
in in Line 3, and therefore the assignment instruction in Listing 3.9 line 6 is executed. Each
line shows a simplified mapping between the naming identifier F (left-hand side) and the data
identifierD (right-hand side). For the sake of simplicity, this mapping representation omits the
container identifier C and instead directly shows which naming identifiers point to which data
items inside the PIP-state. Because of limited space reason, we only show the last tail of the
naming identifiers and omit the fully qualified naming terms, as described in Section 3.5.
Listing 3.11: H D F T++’s PIP-state with executed assignment instruction in Listing 3.9 Line 6
1 .. Source0 ---> Source0
2 ..3863861312| main (.)V|v20 ---> Source0
3 ..3863861312| main (.)V|v22 ---> Source0
4 ..3863861312| main (.)V|v33 ---> Source0
5 ..3863861312| main (.)V|v34 ---> Source0
6 ..Sink0 ---> Source0
H D F T++ derives from the analysis-report that the sourcemethod is called inside the method
..main(..)V at bytecode-offset 38 (cf. XML-attribute bci in Listing 3.10 line 19) and that its
return value is assigned to v20 which is an identifier at J O A N A’s SSA representation language.
This fact is tracked by H D F T++ in Listing 3.11 line 2; note, Source0 is a unique identifier
inside the PIP to identify data that originates from the source method call. Next, when the
source-method’s return value is transformed into a byte-array by the getBytes() method
call in Listing 3.9 line 3, H D F T++ deduces from the corresponding chop node in Listing 3.10
line 20 that this method is called on an object identified by v20 and that the return value is
assigned tov22. At that point, the PIP state reveals that the identifierv20 is pointing toSource0,
and thus, the method call getBytes() may transfer Source0 to v20 as well. Because of that,
H D F T++ updates the PIP-state with line 3 in Listing 3.11. Line 4 and line 5 in Listing 3.11 are
the most crucial mapping-entries in the PIP-state. According to Listing 3.10 line 33, identifier
v34 represents the passed parameter to the sink-method at J O A N A’s intermediate language,
and thus, corresponds to the String-object in Listing 3.9 line 11. Whereas, v33 represents
the parameter which is passed to the String-constructor in Listing 3.9 line 11 (cf. Listing 3.10
line 32). As it is statically not possible to determine if line 6 or line 9 is executed in Listing 3.9,
Listing 3.10 line 34 reports that identifier v33 either points to v22 or v30, which themselves
either points to the source method invocation (cf. Listing 3.10 line 20) or to the constant string
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’DoNothing’ (cf. Listing 3.10 line 29). Note, Listing 3.10 line 34 does not report v32 from line 27
because the assignment in Listing 3.9 line 6 happens in a copy-by-reference manner and v32 is
not used afterwards in any Java statements. J O A N A resolves and detects this fact statically and
therefore only reports v22. However, based on Listing 3.10 line 34 H D F T++ knows that v33 may
potentially point to v22 or v30 at run-time. Therefore, whenever v22 or v30 are overwritten,
i.e. line 20 or line 29 in Listing 3.10 is executed, H D F T++ also updates the mapping for v33 to
point to the same data identifier as v22 or v30 do (cf. Listing 3.11 line 4). As in this sample only
line 20 from Listing 3.10 is executed, Listing 3.11 shows in line 4 that v33 points to Source0;
in Listing 3.12 we will discuss the case if variable out is overwritten with a constant string (cf.
Listing 3.9 line 9). Based on that information and the PIP-state, H D F T++ reports in Listing 3.11
line 6 that data from the source has flowed into the sink. UC infrastructures benefit from
such tracking results and are able, depending on the deployed policies inside the PDP, either to
preventively prohibit or detectively log the violation of such flows.
In contrast to Listing 3.11, Listing 3.12 shows the PIP-state if the assignment instruction in
Listing 3.9 line 6 is not executed. In that case, the byte-array size of variable out is smaller than
the byte-array size of variable in, and therefore, variable out is overwritten with a constant
string in line 9. Because of that, the corresponding chop node in Listing 3.10 line 29 is executed
at run-time, and thus, v33 maps to the constant string and not to Source0. Therefore, the data
flow dependency between line 3 and line 11 in Listing 3.9 gets disrupted at run-time and data can
not flow from the source to the sink. Thus, H D F T++ does not report a data flow in Listing 3.12.
Note, v20 and v22 in Listing 3.12 line 2 and line 3 are identifiers from J O A N A’s intermediate
language representation, and are pointing according to line 19 and line 20 in Listing 3.10 to the
source-method’s return value.
Listing 3.12: H D F T++’s PIP-state without executed assignment instruction in Listing 3.9 Line 6
1 .. Source0 ---> Source0
2 ..3863861312| main (.)V|v20 ---> Source0
3 ..3863861312| main (.)V|v22 ---> Source0
To make H D F T++’s achieved precision gain (cf. Listing 3.11 and Listing 3.12) more tangible,
we also monitored the code in Listing 3.9 with S H R I F T. In contrast to H D F T++, S H R I F T only
leverages source- and sink-information from the analysis-report (cf. Listing 3.10 line 1, line 8,
line 17, and line 16) and does not take chop node information into account. Because of that,
S H R I F T does not track the individual instructions on a dependency path, and thus, is not able
to differentiate if the assignment in Listing 3.9 line 6 is executed or not. Once a sink is reached,
S H R I F T signals to the PIP on which sources the sink depends on. Therefore S H R I F T always
reports a flow of data from the source- to the sink-method in Listing 3.13 line 2, even if the
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assignment in Listing 3.9 line 6 is not executed.
Listing 3.13: S H R I F T’s PIP-state after executing the code in Listing 3.9.
1 .. Source0 ---> Source0
2 ..Sink0 ---> Source0
Sample 2: Loop instruction
Listing 3.14 shows our second sample where a data flow dependency between the source-
and sink-method passes a WHILE-loop-statement. Similar to Listing 3.9, the size of the output
byte-array out, i.e. the value of variable size, is randomly determined in line 2. If the size of
byte-array out is large enough, input data from variable in is transferred in a copy-by-value
manner to byte-array out in line 7.
Listing 3.14: Example of a data flow dependency crossing a WHILE-command
1 public static void main(String [] args) {
2 int size = new Random (). nextInt (10);
3 byte[] in = source("Test"). getBytes ();
4 byte[] out = new byte[size];
5 int idx = 0;
6 while(idx < in.length && out.length >in.length ){
7 out[idx] = in[idx];
8 idx ++;
9 }
10 sink(new String(out));
11 }
12
13 public static String source(String s){ return s;}
14 public static void sink(String s){ System.out.println(s);}
Listing 3.15 shows the corresponding analysis-report. As expected, J O A N A detects the flow
from the source to the sink and also reports all chop nodes that are part of a dependency
path. The most crucial chop nodes are in line 26 and line 27: both chop nodes together forge
the assignment in Listing 3.14 line 7. Thereby, line 26 represents the right-hand side of this
assignment, i.e. reading and loading the content from the byte-array in at index idx on the
Java stack, and line 27 represents the left-hand side of the assignment, i.e. writing and storing
the top stack entry (which correspond to the previously read value from byte-array in) into the
byte-array out at index idx; v22 andv24 are identifiers at J O A N A’s intermediate representation
layer for variable in and out respectively. Note, the analysis-report reports two chop nodes for
a Java assignment-statement because assignment-statements are compiled into a load and
store bytecode command by the Java compiler and each of them represents an own chop node
inside the SDG.
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Listing 3.15: Analysis-report for the WHILE-example in Listing 3.14.
1 <source >
2 <id>Source0 </id>
3 <location >..main (.) V:38</location >
4 <signature >.. source(Ljava/lang/String ;)Ljava/lang/String;</signature >
5 <return/>
6 </source >
7 ...
8 <sink>
9 <id>Sink0</id>
10 <location >..main (.) V:89</location >
11 <signature >..sink(Ljava/lang/String ;)V</signature >
12 <param index="1"/>
13 </sink>
14 ...
15 <flows >
16 <sink id="Sink0">
17 <source id="Source0"/>
18 <chop>
19 <chopNode bci="38" lab="v20 = source (#( Test))" om="..main (.)V"/>
20 <chopNode bci="41" lab="v22 = v20.getBytes ()" om="..main (.)V"/>
21 <chopNode bci="44" lab="v23 = v22" om="..main (.)V"/>
22 <chopNode bci="46" lab="v24 = new []" om="..main (.)V"/>
23 <chopNode bci="48" lab="v25 = v24" om="..main (.)V"/>
24 <chopNode bci="50" lab="v27 = #(0)" om="..main (.)V"/>
25 <chopNode bci="52" lab="goto 69" om="..main (.)V"/>
26 <chopNode bci="61" lab="v31 = v22[v35]" om="..main (.)V"/>
27 <chopNode bci="62" lab="v24[v35] = v31" om="..main (.)V"/>
28 <chopNode bci="63" lab="v33 = v35 + #(1)" om="..main (.)V"/>
29 <chopNode bci="69" lab="v28 = v22.length" om="..main (.)V"/>
30 <chopNode bci="70" lab="if (v35 >;= v28) goto 81" om="..main (.)V"/>
31 <chopNode bci="74" lab="v29 = v24.length" om="..main (.)V"/>
32 <chopNode bci="76" lab="v30 = v22.length" om="..main (.)V"/>
33 <chopNode bci="77" lab="if (v29 >; v30) goto 61" om="..main (.)V"/>
34 <chopNode bci="81" lab="v36 = new java.lang.String" om="..main (.)V"/>
35 <chopNode bci="86" lab="v36.<init >;(v24)" om="..main (.)V"/>
36 <chopNode bci="89" lab="sink(v36)" om="..main (.)V"/>
37 <chopNode bci="-8" lab="PHI v35 = #(0), v33" om="..main (.)V"/>
38 </chop>
39 </sink>
40 </flows >
Listing 3.16 shows the corresponding H D F T++’s PIP-state with the executed assignment-
statement in Listing 3.14 line 7. Line 2 and line 3 in Listing 3.16 have the same reasoning as in
sample 1 (cf. Listing 3.11 line 2 and line 3). Line 4 and line 5 in Listing 3.16 are the mappings
which points to the byte-array out and its elements. Thereby, identifier v31 is a helper identifier
at the SSA level: it first takes a value from byte-array in (identified by v22, cf. Listing 3.15 line 20)
at index idx (identified by v35, cf. Listing 3.15 line 26), and second, assigns its value to the
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Listing 3.16: H D F T++’s PIP-state with executed assignment-statement in Listing 3.14 line 7
1 .. Source0 ---> Source0
2 ..3863862904| main (.)V|v20 ---> Source0
3 ..3863862904| main (.)V|v22 ---> Source0
4 ..3863862904| main (.)V|v24 ---> Source0
5 ..3863862904| main (.)V|v31 ---> Source0
6 ..3863862904| main (.)V|v36 ---> Source0
7 ..Sink0 ---> Source0
byte-array out (identified by v24, cf. Listing 3.15 line 27) at index idx (identified by v35, cf.
Listing 3.15 line 27). According to Listing 3.15 line 36, v36 is the intermediate variable identifier
that is passed as a parameter to the sink-method. At run-time, H D F T++ detects that v24which
points to Source0 (cf. Listing 3.16 line 4) flows into v36 (cf. Listing 3.15 line 35). Therefore,
H D F T++ reports that Source0 has also flowed into the sink Sink0 (cf. Listing 3.16 line 7).
Listing 3.17 shows the PIP-state without the executed assignment-statement from Listing 3.14
line 7. As expected H D F T++ does not report the flow of data because the copy-by-value assign-
ment is not executed. Similar as in Listing 3.12, the intermediate identifiers v20 and v22 are
pointing to the return value from the source-method invocation, cf. Listing 3.15 line 19 and
line 20.
Listing 3.17: H D F T++’s PIP-state without executed assignment-statement in Listing 3.14 line 7
1 .. Source0 ---> Source0
2 ..3863861336| main (.)V|v20 ---> Source0
3 ..3863861336| main (.)V|v22 ---> Source0
To compare H D F T++’s tracking results with S H R I F T, we also run and analyzed Listing 3.15
with S H R I F T. Listing 3.18 shows the corresponding tracking result. As both code samples,
Listing 3.9 and Listing 3.14, are structure-wise pretty similar (except that data is transferred in a
copy-by-value manner in Listing 3.14) S H R I F T provides the same tracking results for both code
samples, regardless of the assignment instruction in Listing 3.14 line 7.
Listing 3.18: S H R I F T’s PIP-state after executing the code in Listing 3.14.
1 .. Source0 ---> Source0
2 ..Sink0 ---> Source0
Sample 3: Inheritance relation
Listing 3.19 shows our third sample where the data flow dependency between the source- and
sink-method crosses a randomly chosen Java object (cf. Listing 3.19 line 6).
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Listing 3.19: Example of a data flow dependency passing through an inheritance relation
1 public static void main(String [] args) {
2 int size = new Random (). nextInt (10);
3 byte[] in = source("Test"). getBytes ();
4 byte[] out;
5
6 Copy[] copies = new Copy []{ new Copy(), new CopyByRef(), new CopyByValue ()};
7 int i = new Random (). nextInt (3);
8 out = copies[i].copy(in);
9
10 sink(new String(out));
11 }
12 public static String source(String s){ return s;}
13 public static void sink(String s){ System.out.println(s);}
14
15 // Root class for all Copy -classes. Returns an empty byte array
16 public static class Copy{
17 public byte[] copy(byte[] a){
18 System.out.println("Copy");
19 return new byte [10];
20 }
21 }
22
23 /* Returns a new reference which points to the byte -array parameter */
24 public static class CopyByRef extends Copy{
25 public byte[] copy(byte[] a){
26 System.out.println("CopyByRef");
27 byte[] _return=a;
28 return _return;
29 }
30 }
31
32 /* Copies every element from the byte -array parameter to the return array */
33 public static class CopyByValue extends Copy{
34 public byte[] copy(byte[] a){
35 System.out.println("CopyByValue");
36 byte[] _return = new byte[a.length ];
37 for(int i = 0; i < a.length; i++){
38 _return[i] = a[i];
39 }
40 return _return;
41 }
42 }
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Listing 3.20: Analysis-report for the INHERITANCE-example in Listing 3.19.
1 <source >
2 <id>Source0 </id>
3 <location >..main (.) V:38</location >
4 <signature >.. source(Ljava/lang/String ;)Ljava/lang/String;</signature >
5 <return/>
6 </source >
7 <sink>
8 <id>Sink0</id>
9 <location >..main (.) V:113</location >
10 <signature >..sink(Ljava/lang/String ;)V</signature >
11 <param index="1"/>
12 </sink>
13 <flows >
14 <sink id="Sink0">
15 <source id="Source0"/>
16 <chop>
17 <chopNode bci="1" lab="<init >;()" om="Copy.<init >;()V"/>
18 <chopNode bci="10" lab="v8 = new []" om="Copy.copy([B)[B"/>
19 <chopNode bci="12" lab="return v8" om="Copy.copy([B)[B"/>
20 <chopNode bci="1" lab="this.<init >;()" om="CopyByRef.<init >;()V"/>
21 <chopNode bci="9" lab="v7 = p1" om="CopyByRef.copy([B)[B"/>
22 <chopNode bci="11" lab="return p1" om="CopyByRef.copy([B)[B"/>
23 <chopNode bci="1" lab="this.<init >;()" om="CopyByValue.<init >;()V"/>
24 <chopNode bci="-8" lab="PHI v17 = #(0), v15" om="CopyByValue.copy([B)[B"/>
25 <chopNode bci="9" lab="v7 = p1.length" om="CopyByValue.copy([B)[B"/>
26 <chopNode bci="10" lab="v8 = new []" om="CopyByValue.copy([B)[B"/>
27 <chopNode bci="14" lab="v11 = #(0)" om="CopyByValue.copy([B)[B"/>
28 <chopNode bci="22" lab="v13 = p1[v17]" om="CopyByValue.copy([B)[B"/>
29 <chopNode bci="23" lab="v8[v17] = v13" om="CopyByValue.copy([B)[B"/>
30 <chopNode bci="24" lab="v15 = v17 + #(1)" om="CopyByValue.copy([B)[B"/>
31 <chopNode bci="34" lab="return v8" om="CopyByValue.copy([B)[B"/>
32 <chopNode bci="38" lab="v20 = source (#( Test))" om="..main (.)V"/>
33 <chopNode bci="41" lab="v22 = v20.getBytes ()" om="..main (.)V"/>
34 <chopNode bci="46" lab="v25 = new Copy[]" om="..main (.)V"/>
35 <chopNode bci="51" lab="v27 = new Copy" om="..main (.)V"/>
36 <chopNode bci="58" lab="v25 [#(0)] = v27" om="..main (.)V"/>
37 <chopNode bci="61" lab="v30 = new CopyByRef" om="..main (.)V"/>
38 <chopNode bci="68" lab="v25 [#(1)] = v30" om="..main (.)V"/>
39 <chopNode bci="71" lab="v33 = new CopyByValue" om="..main (.)V"/>
40 <chopNode bci="78" lab="v25 [#(2)] = v33" om="..main (.)V"/>
41 <chopNode bci="98" lab="v41 = v25[v39]" om="..main (.)V"/>
42 <chopNode bci="100" lab="v43 = v41.copy(v22)" om="..main (.)V"/>
43 <chopNode bci="105" lab="v45 = new java.lang.String" om="..main (.)V"/>
44 <chopNode bci="110" lab="v45.<init >;(v43)" om="..main (.)V"/>
45 <chopNode bci="113" lab="sink(v45)" om="..main (.)V"/>
46 </chop>
47 </sink>
48 </flows >
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Those Java objects are derived from the Java classCopyand overwrite its methodcopy(byte[]
a) with an own individual copying behavior. The super-class method Copy.copy(byte[] a)
always returns a new byte-array, irrespective of parameter a’s value, whereas the sub-class
methods either return a new reference (cf. CopyByRef.copy(byte[] a)) or a copy-by-value
copy (cf. CopyByValue.copy(byte[] a)) of the passed byte-array parameter “a”. The main
difference between those copy methods is, that the latter one allocates new memory for the
copied byte-array, whereas the former one provides a new reference to the same memory region.
Depending on the randomly chosen Java object, one of those copy-method implementations
is invoked in Listing 3.19 line 8 and transfers data from its input parameter to its return value.
Listing 3.20 shows an excerpt from the static analysis-report for Listing 3.19 (the complete
analysis-report is provided in Listing A.2). As J O A N A performs a whole-program analysis the
flow of data between the source- and sink-method, as well as its corresponding chop-nodes,
are reported, taking into account the different copy(byte[] a) method implementations,
which potentially could be invoked in Listing 3.19 line 8. Listing 3.20 line 17 – line 19 list all
chop nodes which belongs to the method Copy.copy(byte[] a); line 20 – line 22 list all chop
nodes which belongs to the methodCopyByRef.copy(byte[] a); line 23 – line 31 list all chop
nodes which belongs to the method CopyByValue.copy(byte[] a). Line 42 in Listing 3.20
is the most crucial one: this chop node represents the copy-method invocation on a randomly
chosen Java object from the array copies (cf. line 8 and line 6 in Listing 3.19); the identifier
v41 in Listing 3.20 line 42 represents the randomly chosen Java object on which this method is
invoked. Note, line 34 – line 40 in Listing 3.20 provides all the chop nodes which create and fill
up the copies array with the corresponding Copy objects (v25 is the corresponding identifier
from J O A N A’s SSA representation).
Listing 3.21: H D F T++’s PIP state with executed Copy.copy(byte[] a) method.
1 .. Source0 ---> Source0
2 ..3863889976| sample ()V|v20 ---> Source0
3 ..3863889976| sample ()V|v22 ---> Source0
As every copy(byte[] a) method-implementation has a different behavior regarding the
way how data is transferred from the input parameter “a” to the return value, we run H D F T++
several times on the code in Listing 3.19 to examine how the PIP-state evolves when each of
those different method-implementations is executed in line 8. Listing 3.21 shows the PIP-state
when the method Copy.copy(byte[] a) is executed. As this method always returns a new,
empty byte-array, the PIP-state does not report a flow of data from the source to the sink.
Similar as in sample 1 and 2, the intermediate identifiers v20 and v22 are pointing to the return
value from the source-method (cf. Listing 3.20 line 32 and line 33).
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Listing 3.22 shows the PIP-state when the methodCopyByRef.copy(byte[] a) is executed.
As this method returns a new reference to the byte-array parameter “a”, the PIP-state reports that
data has flowed from the source to the sink (cf. Listing 3.22 line 7). The intermediate identifier
v43 points to the return value from the copy(byte[] a) method invocation (cf. Listing 3.20
line 42), whereas v45 points to the method parameter which is passed to the sink-method (cf.
Listing 3.20 line 45).
Listing 3.22: H D F T++’s PIP state with executed CopyByRef.copy(byte[] a) method.
1 .. Source0 ---> Source0
2 .. CopyByRef |3871454440| copy([B)[B|p1 ---> Source0
3 ..3863890152| main (.)V|v20 ---> Source0
4 ..3863890152| main (.)V|v22 ---> Source0
5 ..3863890152| main (.)V|v43 ---> Source0
6 ..3863890152| main (.)V|v45 ---> Source0
7 ..Sink0 ---> Source0
Listing 3.23 shows the PIP state when the CopyByValue.copy(byte[] a) is executed. As
this method returns an identical copy of the byte-array “a” the PIP-state reports that data has
flowed from the source to the sink (cf. Listing 3.23 line 7). Note, as copying of data happens
in a copy-by-value manner inside the method CopyByValue.copy(byte[] a) H D F T++ ++
also reports v8 in Listing 3.23 line 4 which basically corresponds to the variable _return in
Listing 3.19 line 38.
Listing 3.23: H D F T++’s PIP state with executed CopyByValue.copy(byte[] a) method.
1 .. Source0 ---> Source0
2 ..3863890024| main (.)V|v20 ---> Source0
3 ..3863890024| main (.)V|v22 ---> Source0
4 .. CopyByValue |3871626072| copy([B)[B|v8 ---> Source0
5 ..3863890024| main (.)V|v43 ---> Source0
6 ..3863890024| main (.)V|v45 ---> Source0
7 ..Sink0 ---> Source0
We also analyzed the code in Listing 3.19 with S H R I F T to investigate how the randomly
chosen Java object in Listing 3.19 line 8 may influence the tracking result. However, here we
could observe the same behavior as in the previous samples: as S H R I F T does not take into
account any run-time information, the tracking result in Listing 3.24 stays always the same.
Even if the method Copy.copy(byte[] a) is executed in Listing 3.19 line 8, which even does
not transfer any data, S H R I F T still reports a flow of data.
Listing 3.24: S H R I F T’s PIP-state after executing the code in Listing 3.20.
1 .. Source0 ---> Source0
2 ..Sink0 ---> Source0
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3.6.3. Performance
To track the flow of data from a source to a sink, S H R I F T and H D F T++ inject additional instruc-
tions into the AuS. As any additional instruction needs to be processed at run-time, it may affect
and influence the native execution time of the AuS, i.e. the time the AuS would need without
being monitored. This sub-section addresses Caveat 2 and describes the experiments, including
their evaluation results, to investigate the performance overhead S H R I F T and H D F T++ impose
on the AuS.
We set up the following experimental setting: before running each performance experiment
each AuS has been statically analyzed concerning possible information flows (cf. Section 3.6.1).
As J O A N A is highly configurable, like with or without object-sensitiveness [74], the static analy-
sis phase needs more or less resources depending on the configuration setting (cf. Table 3.1).
However, because of its good trade-off between (high) precision and resource consumption
all AuSs have been statically analyzed with object-sensitiveness and explicit flows only (cf. Sec-
tion 3.6.1); any other points-to analysis would generate statistically indistinguishable run-time
performance [71]. Prior to the experiment’s execution and to factor out needed instrumentation-
time, we statically instrumented the AuS according to the analysis report. All performance
experiments have been executed on a virtual system with a 8-core CPU (2.6 GHz Xeon-E5) and
10GB of RAM. To weed out possible environmental noise, median values for 30 runs are reported
in Table 3.3.
To evaluate the performance overhead of our approaches, a test-suite of different Java-based
standalone- (JZip and JFTP) and web-applications (BirthdayApp, SnipSnap, WebGoat, and
PersonalBlog) have been used, whose computational loads range from low to high. While the
former ones are directly executed in the Java Virtual Machine (JVM), web-applications need a
run-time-container to operate; Apache Tomcat 8.0.9 has been used for that. Further, all required
S H R I F T- or H D F T++-classes have been added to the Java classpath on startup to be available
at run-time for the injected PEP inside the AuS.
Table 3.3 shows the performance evaluation of our test-suite. Column “native” yields the
execution time without, and columns “S H R I F T” and “H D F T++” provide the execution time
with the corresponding tracking logic in place. To trigger different dependencies inside the AuS,
we run experiments with different inputs (like using different file sizes) or we executed different
tasks inside the AuS (like LI or LO for BirthdayApp).
For the JZip and JFTP experiments, we vary the file-size (1MB and 10MB) and their internal
buffer for file- and network-I/O operations. By default, both applications use a 1-kByte internal
buffer for reading and writing data. We increased this buffer to 32-kByte for the experiments
JZip 32 and JFTP 32 to investigate how a larger buffer affects the run-time performance overhead.
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In case of the BirthdayApp application, we executed different tasks (cf. BirthdayApp-block in
Table 3.3): display the start page (row SP), login to (row LI) and logout from (row LO) Facebook.
Finally, for the SnipSnap and PersonalBlog web-application we executed a use-case scenario:
display the start- and login-page, editing and creating a new post, and logout from the web-
application (row UC).
These evaluation results reveal that tasks with a higher native execution time exhibit a lower
relative run-time overhead (column “S H R I F T/native” and “H D F T++/native” in Table 3.3).
For instance, as the BirthdayApp’s facebook-login task LI needs to query Facebook’s API to
authenticate a user its relative run-time overhead is lower than rendering the start page after
logout SPLO. However, this observation does not hold for all experiments: as zipping a 10MB file
with a 1-kByte internal buffer takes natively longer than a 1MB file, the relative overhead increases
with the file size. In case of BirthdayApp though, the time expensive Facebook authentication
happens only once at the beginning, and thus, absorbs the imposed run-time overhead.
Moreover, we discovered that the program structure, that is passed by a dependency inside
the AuS, has also an influence on the performance overhead. For instance, in case of JZip the
dependency (i.e. chop) crosses a loop structure that encompasses chopCMDs for reading and
writing source-files to the zipped-file. Because of that, a lot of notification events are exchanged
between the PEP and the other UC components. To confirm this statement, we repeat the
JZip experiments but with a 32-kByte internal buffer (row JZip 32 in Table 3.3) for reading and
writing data. Our evaluation results show, that with a larger internal buffer the total performance
overhead gets smaller. The same also holds for JFTP.
To benchmark our hybrid approaches with competitive data flow trackers, the same experi-
ments have been conducted with L I B DFT [54] and (partially) with P H O S P H O R [10]. L I B DFT is
a dynamic data flow tracker for x86-binaries and instruments every single instruction inside the
binary. Our proposed hybrid approaches outperform performance-wise L I B DFT in all experi-
ments and achieve better results because data flow tracking happens only selectively at those
program locations that actually lead to a flow of data. Such a comparison may be considered
as unfair because L I B DFT injects its tracking logic into the JVM itself to monitor executed
bytecode commands, and therefore, its total performance overhead would be also influenced by
the JVM’s bootstrapping- and shutdown-time. However, we were very careful the way how we
conducted the comparison: we measured and compared the performance overhead between
the start and the end of each executed use-case in Table 3.3. For instance, for JZip we measured
the performance overhead between the start and the end of the Java main-method; in case of
web-applications we measured the time between entering and exiting the HTTP(-GET) method.
This way we were able to factor out bootstrapping- and shutdown-time required by the JVM.
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As L I B DFT is specially designed for x86-binaries, we also benchmarked our approaches
against P H O S P H O R, a pure dynamic data flow tracker for Java, and Java-bytecode in particular.
P H O S P H O R requires that the AuS, as well as the complete run-time environment, has to be
instrumented to propagate data flows. This includes not only Java system classes but also any
middleware or third-party library used by the AuS. Because of that, the same experiments
could not be evaluated on the whole test-suite with P H O S P H O R, as some of the Java classes
belonging to the Tomcat-web-server and/or third-party framework (like Spring [110] or Java
Cryptography Extension) did not pass the JRE signature verification, and hence, could not be
loaded after instrumentation. The results achieved in the experiments JFTP, JFTP 32, and JZip 32,
outperform P H O S P H O R, whereas for JZip the proposed approach slows down the execution
time about∼1.0x compared to P H O S P H O R. The reason is, that the latter experiments stress-test
the hybrid approach: zipping files in chunks of 1 kByte leads to a lot notifications between PEP
and the other UC components. JZip32 underpins this statement as here the larger internal buffer
(32-kByte) leads to fewer notifications, and hence, to a reduced performance-overhead.
Remarks on performance: S H R I F T and H D F T++ inject a minimal IRM into the AuS, that
tracks point-wise only those program locations that actually lead to a flow of data. As both
approaches monitor fewer program locations than a pure dynamic data flow tracker does
(with full instrumentation), we could achieve performance-wise better results (cf. Section 3.6).
Moreover, instead of signaling extracted context information on every PoI’s execution which
actually impose unnecessary performance overhead and does not provide better tracking results,
S H R I F T and H D F T++ transmit collected information only the first time when a PoI is executed.
Moreover, the PEP signals executed chopCMDs and sinks only when their respective source
was executed before.
Remarks on portability: S H R I F T and H D F T++ are able to increase the portability of the
monitored AuS, as run-time tracking logic is only injected in the application’s program code
(cf. Figure 1.6), excluding 3rd-party libraries and Java’s JRE system-classes. As the static analy-
sis phase in S H R I F T and H D F T++ performs a whole-program data flow analysis, taking into
account the entire application’s code, data flow dependencies which start and end at the ap-
plication program code and pervade the entire JRE are detected. Because of that, the present
work argues that S H R I F T’s and H D F T++’s run-time tracking logic is not necessarily required
for the excluded code parts. Thus, the monitored AuS can be executed on any off-the-shelf JRE.
Concerning tracking precision, we have to rely on the static analysis results for the excluded
code parts. At run-time, however, this might lead to imprecision as we are not able to handle
properly situations inside Java system classes or 3rd-party libraries (cf. Section 3.4 Listing 3.4).
However, at the end the tradeoff between precision versus portability and performance remains:
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a more precise tracking result requires to spread tracking logic over the entire AuS (i.e. applica-
tion’s program code, 3rd-party and system libraries) at the expense of less portability and higher
performance overhead (cf. section 3.6.3), and vice versa.
3.6.4. Threats to Validity
Although we evaluated our proposed approaches carefully there are several threats to validity
which are discussed in the following.
Evaluation Environment. We used a virtual machine with a pre-installed Tomcat web-server
instance to run our performance experiments in Section 3.6.3. One may argue that such an
environmental setting does not properly reflect a PaaS cloud scenario as we have motivated in
Section 1.2. Though this is a valid argument, we advocate that our employed environmental
setting is pretty similar to the way how PaaS cloud platforms are providing their execution
environments. For instance, Amazon’s Elastic Beanstalk [2] provides a Java-Tomcat software
stack at its central core to run Java-based web-applications. Thus, we advocate that running our
experiments on a full-blown PaaS cloud platform would result in the same, comparable relative
performance overhead. Moreover, we would like to emphasize that the present work considers
the immediately enclosing unit which runs the AuS’s code as a “run-time environment". For
instance, in case of a Java program the Java Runtime Environment is the “run-time environment”
which runs the AuS’s code, or the Python interpreter in case of a Python application. We do not
subsume under the term “run-time environment” all other components inside a PaaS cloud
platform, like load balancers, containers, virtualization, etc.
Generalisability to arbitrary applications. How well do S H R I F T and H D F T++ generalize to
arbitrary Java applications? As SIFA is a central element in the present work our approaches
also inherit their limitations. This means in reverse, our approaches generalize to arbitrary
applications as good as SIFA tools are able to do it. For instance, Java reflection and system
callbacks are fundamental limitations in the field of SIFA for which no general solution is
available (cf. Section 3.7 for a thorough discussion on that). As some applications in our test-
suite are using such Java features, our test-results do not cover those source code regions inside
the AuS which are called via system callbacks or reflection.
Further, the required memory resources to run static analysis also affect the generalisability
of our approaches. SIFA tools, like J O A N A or F L O W D R O I D, rely on SDGs which are an ab-
stract, whole-program representation of the complete AuS, including all required system- and
third-party-libraries. Depending on the application size, generating and storing an SDG may
require different large memory space. As our results show in Section 3.6.1 analyzing even small
applications, like JZip (which has approximately 330 lines of program code and one external
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library), needs already non-negligible memory resources. With larger applications, like SnipSnap
(which has approximately 26000 lines of code and 36 external libraries), those requirements get
larger (cf. Table 3.2). A common technique to approach that issue are flow models [7]. These
are pre-computed summaries about data flows inside specific code regions of the AuS. During
the actual static analysis those information are reused, instead of analyzing those code regions
represented by the flow models again. Applying flow models, for instance, on Java system- and
third-party-libraries can reduce the memory consumption for static analysis as a full analysis
of those libraries is not needed. However, in the end SIFA techniques are able to scale and to
generalize to a certain degree, and not in general to arbitrary Java applications. Potential future
research work in that direction could be to run static information flow analysis on a distributed
cluster of interconnected machines, instead on a single machine, as current approaches in the
field of SIFA are doing it.
Test-suite. We chose a set of different Java-based standalone- and web-applications for our
evaluation. Those applications have different sizes regarding lines of code and number of used
third-party libraries. For instance, JZip is our smallest application with approximately 330 lines
of code and uses one external library to parse command line parameters. In contrast, SnipSnap
is the largest application in our test-suite with approximately 26000 lines of code and with
36 external libraries. The remaining applications are somewhere in between: PersonalBlog
has 3606 lines of code and 33 external libraries, BirthdayApp has 1931 lines of code and 7
external libraries, and JFTP has 3010 lines of code and no external libraries. Further, some
applications were developed by us, like JZip, and some were downloaded from the internet,
like PersonalBlog. With this collection of applications, we aime to achieve a diversified test-
suite which exhibit different sizes and different levels of complexity, in order to investigate how
S H R I F T and H D F T++ behaves not only on small and less complex programs, like JZip, but also
on larger and more complex applications, like Snipsnap or BirthdayApp (which, for example, are
using XML-parser- or REST-Client-libraries). We do not claim for completeness of our test-suite,
more-complex and larger applications can be added to our test-suite, keeping limitations of
static analysis in mind.
Precision. Our primary driver to improve data flow tracking precision is the reduction of
overapproximation in a black-box tracking approach (cf. Section 1.3) where every source flows to
every sink, i.e. the number of potential data flow dependencies is #flowsb = #sources×#sinks. We
quantified our precision improvement in Section 3.6.1 as the number of data flow dependencies
which can be safely discarded from #flowsb, i.e. the number of data flows which would mistakenly
be reported in a black-box approach. Depending on the static analysis configuration, the number
of discarded dependencies differ, and thus, provides different precision results according to our
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metric (cf. Section 3.6.1). Thus, as S H R I F T and H D F T++ are reusing those results at run-time
both provide by design at least a better tracking precision than a pure black-box approach
(cf. Section 3.6.1). H D F T++ is an extension of S H R I F T and additionally tracks intermediate
instructions on a sink-source data flow dependency, aiming to weed out mistakenly reported
dependencies, which may not occur at run-time due to different run-time values. Because
S H R I F T does not take into account instructions on a data flow dependency path, S H R I F T is
not able to distinguish if a data flow dependency is still critical or not when its sink is reached.
Quantifying H D F T++’s precision gain over S H R I F T with a general metric is non-trivial, as it
highly depends on the actual run-time values, and thus, on the taken data flow path inside
the application (cf. Section 3.4 Listing 3.4). To the best of our knowledge, we illustrated in
Section 3.6.2 H D F T++’s precision gain compared to S H R I F T along the lines of a use case study
and point-out under which conditions H D F T++ provides a more precise tracking result than
S H R I F T. However, it may happen that a crucial instruction which leads to a data flow, like
line 4 Listing 3.4, may also be located inside a RTE’s system- or a 3rd-party-library-class which
is not monitored by H D F T++ for the sake of portability. In this case, H D F T++ would miss it
and also mistakenly report a flow of data although a flow may not happen. But in the end, the
tradeoff between precision and portability remains: more precise tracking results require data
flow tracking inside the entire AuS at the cost of less portability, and vice versa.
3.7. Strengths and Limitations
Compared to pure dynamic taint tracking, like P H O S P H O R [10] or L I B DFT [54], S H R I F T and
H D F T++ do not require to instrument each command within the AuS. By utilizing statically pre-
computed analysis results a “minimal” IRM is injected which monitors only those instructions
that lead to a flow of data. This way, the run-time performance overhead of our hybrid approach
exhibits less or comparable performance overhead than a pure dynamic tracker, while collecting
valuable information about executed and passed data flow dependencies.
To address RQ2 and RQ3, S H R I F T and H D F T++ are able to inject their tracking logic only
inside a selected code region, and thus, are able to preserve application’s portability. Figure 3.4 il-
lustrates this aspect along the lines of our BirthdayApp application from our running example (cf.
Section 1.2). Considering Figure 1.6, we divide BirthdayApp into the code blocks: BirthdayApp-
program (which contains the main application logic), REST-Client (which enables to call OSN’s
REST-API), a Tomcat-Webserver (which provides all libraries for Java web-service support, i.e.
those implement the JSR 109), and Java system classes (which are provided by the standard
JRE installation); note, for the sake of simplicity we illustrate only one external library in Fig-
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(a) Tracking logic is injected inside the Birth-
dayApp program block and the REST-Client.
Java system-classes and Tomcat web-server
are excluded.
Java System Classes
(run-time environment)
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(program)
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(3rd-party library)
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(run-time environment)
(b) Tracking logic is distributed over all
code blocks, including BirthdayApp program,
REST-Client, Tomcat web-server, and Java
system-classes.
Figure 3.4.: BirthdayApp is modularised into a program block, which contains the actual ap-
plication logic, a REST-Client, to call OSN’s REST-API, a Tomcat web-server, which
provides libraries to run Java web-services, and Java system-classes. Figure 3.4a illus-
trates the S H R I F T and H D F T++ approach: tracking logic is injected selectively
at the BirthdayApp program block and into the REST-Client. Contrary, dynamic data
flow trackers, like P H O S P H O R, also injects its tracking logic inside the Tomcat web-
server and Java system-classes, in order to propagate the flow of data across every
single command (cf. Figure 3.4b). Thus, all components are tightly interwoven.
ure 3.4, viz. REST-Client, although BirthdayApp has in total 7 libraries. A pure dynamic data
flow tracker, like P H O S P H O R, disperses and injects its tracking logic into all those code
blocks (cf. Figure 3.4b) in order to track the flow of data from inputs to outputs. Thus, all code
blocks get tightly coupled and interwoven so that they need each other to operate at run-time. In
particular, BirthdayApp-program, which contains the main application logic, gets dependent on
appropriately instrumented Java system-classes, REST-Client- and Tomcat web-server-library.
In contrast, as S H R I F T and H D F T++ are based on a static analysis phase, which takes into
account the entire code base, they are able to track data flow dependencies only inside selected
code regions and exclude designated code blocks at run-time. For instance, based on the static
analysis-report S H R I F T and H D F T++ monitor only those program instructions inside the
BirthdayApp-program code block that are relevant for a flow of data, and do not rely on any
components or modifications inside the run-time environment, i.e. the JVM or the Java system
classes in particular (cf. Figure 3.4b). Because of that, the monitored BirthdayApp-program
can be easily transferred and executed, together with the injected tracking logic, on different
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off-the-shelf JRE run-time environments without requiring specially instrumented Java system-
classes or third-party-libraries. We argue, that the portability benefits of our proposed approach
come into full effect inside domains where computational resources are costly and therefore
shared among different applications; for instance, inside the cloud domain where a common
run-time execution platform is shared among multiple cloud services, i.e. technically those
cloud services are executed on the same JRE (cf. Section 1.2). Moreover, as our experiments
show, instrumenting the entire environment may also lead to non-operational applications (cf.
Section 3.6.3). However, in the end the portability benefits of our proposed approach highly
depends on which code blocks are instrumented and equipped with the tracking logic inside
the AuS (cf. the schematic illustration in Figure 1.6). Although it is technically possible to place
tracking logic inside all code blocks of an application and to reuse them inside other applications,
we do not recommend this method as it can lead to falsified run-time data flow tracking results.
For instance, reusing the instrumented REST-Client library from BirthdayApp inside another
application, like PersonalBlog, would lead to the case that excuted chopCMDs, which belong to
data flow dependencies from BirthdayApp, are also reported under the execution of PersonalBlog.
Because of that, this thesis advocates to place tracking logic only inside those code blocks which
are not shared between applications at run-time. As Java system classes are usually shared
between all Java applications which run on the JRE, we do not inject our tracking logic inside
those system classes and rely, with regard to data flow dependencies, on the static analysis-report
for the excluded code blocks. As third-party libraries, like BirthdayApp’s REST-Client, are usually
bundled and deployed together with an application we also inject our tracking logic into them
(cf. Figure 3.4a) – we assume that third-party libraries are integral components of applications,
and thus, are not shared betwen applications at run-time. But, however, if third-party libraries
are also shared between applications at run-time (the same case as with Java system classes)
the present approaches also support to exclude tracking logic inside those third-party libraries
(because of the same, previously described reasons). In the end, it is a matter between tracking
precision and run-time overhead. A more precise tracking result demands to inject tracking
logic into all code blocks at the expense of higher performance run-time overhead and vice
versa.
As S H R I F T and H D F T++ are based on static information flow analysis techniques they inherit
and suffer from their limitations. By its nature, static information flow analysis is not able to
distinguish every possible execution and therefore introduces overapproximation which results
in imprecision in the information flow analysis. One possibility to improve precision is the
use of a more precise points-to analysis. But this usually comes at the price of considerably
longer analysis times and higher memory consumption, meaning scalability problems [71]. The
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scalability problems are worsened by the fact that even small Java applications use large parts
of the Java standard library – sometimes just referencing a prominent class name makes the
structures which J O A N A constructs (callgraph and SDG) very large. Currently, J O A N A performs
a whole-program analysis which means that all libraries used by the AuS need to be analyzed
every time. There exists an approach to make the PDG construction more modular by pre-
computing appropriate approximations of library PDGs and re-using them when calls of library
methods are encountered [7, 35], but this approach has not been fully integrated yet, so it is
unclear whether it brings considerable performance gains in practice. In the end, however, the
problem remains a trade-off between precision and performance.
Another limitation of J O A N A is the inability to properly analyze applications that do not
have a main entry point, but are rather used through callback handlers which originate from
system calls/interrupts (e.g. UI-interactions, like mouse-clicks, in Swing). Callback handlers
and reflective code are critical programming constructs that impose further challenges for static
whole-program analysis. Analyzing callback-based applications requires a model that captures
the way callback handlers are used (e.g. which simulates the user). Such a model, for example,
could be obtained by running the application, by specification in a dedicated language, or by
simulating all possible callback connections.
Furthermore, like callbacks, dealing with reflection in a sound but not overly imprecise way
is not a J O A N A-specific issue but rather a fundamental challenge in static information flow
analysis, for which a general precise solution is impossible. Additional analyses, like string
analysis or run-time information [11], may help to resolve reflection (e.g. find out the name of a
dynamically loaded class), but in general either very coarse assumptions have to be made or
unresolvable reflective code has to be ignored. Further, the contribution of this work does not
focus on side-channel attacks, like timing or power analysis attacks, which could be used to
infer information or features about a specific data item. In a worst-case scenario, such an attack
may expose the original data item, and thus, would allow an attacker to use the data item in an
unrestricted manner.
The notion of soundness depends on the notion of information flow. In the present approach,
information flows solely caused by exceptions are intentionally ignored. This has to do with the
fact that every I/O operation may cause an exception, making the execution of every source
influencing every following sink by possible failing. J O A N A can handle exceptional control-flow,
but during our evaluation this feature was disabled.
If we run the static analysis phase to detect explicit flows only then the inlined reference moni-
tor inside the application guarantees a property similar to Volpano’s weak secrecy [119]. However,
it would be easy to circumvent the analysis by transforming each direct assignment within the
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application into an “indirect” assignment (i.e. a loop that leaks the value of a variable one bit at
a time via a control-flow dependency). This way, the analysis would report no dependencies
between sources and sinks. However, sound and precise system-wide non-interference assess-
ments (including implicit flows) require a static analysis of all applications together at once. This
is, because independent analyses for single applications are inherently non-compositional, they
cannot model dependencies generated by the concurrent interactions on shared resources [103].
Due to its exponential nature, a global all-at-once analysis would be unfeasible even for a small
number of applications of a reasonable size and would also likely lead to results that are too
conservative to be useful (i.e. too many false positives). The proposed approach resides some-
how in-between these two extremes: by considering all possible flows during the intra-process
analysis, non-interference between inputs and outputs is guaranteed for each application if
they do not appear in the report, while data flows through and across applications are captured
at run-time. This property is stronger than weak secrecy, which ignores intra-process implicit
flows, but still weaker than system-wide non-interference, due to the aforementioned general
lack of compositionality of the analyses for different applications.
3.8. Summary and Conclusion
In summary, this chapter presents S H R I F T and its extension H D F T++, two hybrid data flow
tracking solutions. Both approaches are specifically designed to provide a reasonable balance
between performance and portability of the AuS. Furthermore, these solutions are innovative
as they minimize the number of and track only those program instructions at the application’s
program code level (cf. Figure 1.6) that actually contribute to a flow of data from sources to sinks.
At run-time S H R I F T and H D F T++ collect valuable information about the executed data flows
in order to support UC policy enforcement, like Policy P1. Conceptually, S H R I F T and H D F T++
share the same methodological steps (cf. section 3.2):
(i) statically analyze the AuS for sinks, sources, and possible dependencies between them.
(ii) instrument program instructions inside the AuS based on the analysis result from (i).
S H R I F T instruments only instructions that correspond to a source or sink, whereas
H D F T++ also instruments all instructions in between sources and sinks.
(iii) extract and signal context information, like read files, to the UC PIP component that
keeps track of flowed data inside the AuS.
We instantiated S H R I F T and H D F T++ prototypically for Java and evaluated them on a set of
different Java applications. Our results (cf. Section 3.6) show that the run-time performance
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overhead highly depends on the program structure of the analyzed application as well as on
the computational load of its native execution. Nevertheless, we observed that the relative
performance overhead gets smaller for computational-intensive than for non-computational-
intensive applications. Furthermore, compared to L I B DFT [54] and P H O S P H O R [10], S H R I F T
and H D F T++ impose less or approximately similar run-time slow-down. By design, both ap-
proaches ensure the portability of the AuS as they do not rely on tracking logic inside the
run-time environment (cf. Figure 3.4). That way, once a AuS is equipped with such a solution it
can be executed on any run-time environment. Furthermore, our design decision also provides
for both approaches at least a better tracking precision than a pure black-box approach. Further,
as S H R I F T and H D F T++ exhibit a different run-time behavior, which results in different tracking
precisions, we also conducted in Section 3.6.2 a comparison between S H R I F T and H D F T++.
We illustrate along the lines of sample source codes in which situations H D F T++ provides a
more precise tracking result than S H R I F T.
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4. Related work
This chapter relates the present work to related and similar work from the literature. In particular,
it discusses the substantial distinctions in terms of Information Flow Tracking (cf. Section 4.1)
and distributed Data Usage Control (cf. Section 4.1), the two major pillars this thesis builds
upon.
4.1. Information Flow Tracking
The research field of Information Flow Tracking (IFT) tackles the question of how data flows
inside a data processing system from its inputs to its outputs. A clear understanding of how data
flows through a system may contribute to solving different problems, e.g. malware detection
[125], privacy protection [23] or Usage Control policy enforcement [92], as it is envisaged in
this thesis. Beyond that, IFT solutions have also been successfully applied within different
domains to secure the confidentiality and integrity of data (like Android [8], Web-Applications
[114], Java-Application [10]). Those solutions mostly follow a static or dynamic approach [102].
Hybrid approaches, where statically computed results are combined with dynamic run-time
information are rare but become increasingly attractive. The following shortly recaps static IFT
approaches and broadly discusses dynamic and hybrid IFT approaches, as the present work is
closely related to the latter; cf. Section 3.3 for a more thorough discussion of static information
flow analysis.
To detect possible information flows, static approaches analyze the complete code of the AuS
without executing it and consider all possible information flow traces at once [20, 120]. A given
program is certified as secure if no flow of information between sensitive sources and public
sinks can be found. Such a static certification can be used, for example, to reduce the need
for runtime checks [21]. Various approaches (apart from PDGs) can be found in the literature,
usually based on type checking [76, 88, 120], hoare logic [9], or taint analysis [3, 4]. Because of
their nature, static approaches have problems with handling dynamic aspects of applications
like callbacks or reflective code (Section 3.7) and are confined to the application under analysis.
In contrast, dynamic approaches mark sensitive data items with a dedicated label and propa-
gate this label along the lines of executed commands at run-time. Moreover, they are able to
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leverage additional run-time information, like concrete user input or the file that was read by a
source. Strictly speaking, and in a more abstract sense, S H R I F T and H D F T++ are also a kind
of dynamic data flow tracker. But in contrast to pure dynamic approaches from the literature,
S H R I F T and H D F T++ optimize the number of program locations that need to be monitored
at run-time as they rely on statically pre-computed results. Therefore, the remaining section
focuses on pure dynamic approaches and discusses their demarcation to the work in this thesis;
a discourse on static approaches for data flow analysis is provided in Section 3.1.
L I B DFT [54] provides a pure dynamic data flow tracker for x86 binaries by using shadow
tag maps to store taint marks for every single register and memory address. At run-time, those
taint marks are properly propagated along the lines of executed binary instructions. Although
L I B DFT’s reported evaluation results show little performance overhead [54] those numbers
were not reproducible during our evaluation (cf. Section 3.6.3): on most of the use cases in
Table 3.3 L I B DFT imposes a larger performance overhead than the presented approach.
S H A D O W R E P L I C A [46, 47], which builds upon L I B DFT, is a dynamic data flow tracker for x86
binaries. Instead of inlining, S H A D O W R E P L I C A decouples and offloads its data flow tracking
logic in a separated analyzer-thread. Only a small, optimized piece of code is injected into the
AuS which collects and transmits run-time data, like involved memory addresses of an instruc-
tion, via a ring-buffer to the analyzer. This way, the AuS run-time performance is only affected by
the piece of code which collects run-time data. Compared to our approach, S H A D O W R E P L I C A
relies on a whole run-time instrumentation and does not consider an AuS as a composition
of different code blocks. Because of that, this thesis advocates that S H A D O W R E P L I C A affects
the portability of AuS, and especially, is not well applicable within domains where run-time
environments are simultaneously shared between different applications, like in our running
sample in Section 1.2.
Nair et al. propose T R I S H U L [77], a policy-based information flow control framework for Java-
based applications. For one thing, T R I S H U L injects its tracking logic into all parts (cf. Figure 1.6)
of an AuS, and for another thing, T R I S H U L requires a dedicated JVM which is equipped with
a modified JavaCC compiler in order to rearrange the method code layout. According to the
authors, the latter implementation is required to retrieve the object of a polymorphic method
invocation. Anyway, as one may notice the T R I S H U L approach is quite invasive and definitely
handicaps the portability of a monitored AuS, as a properly modified JVM is always required to
run the application.
In contrast to T R I S H U L, Bell et al. provide P H O S P H O R [10], a pure dynamic data flow tracker
for Java-based applications, which tracks the flow of data at the Java bytecode level and does
not require a modified JVM. To do so, P H O S P H O R requires to instrument all Java classes which
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belong to the AuS including the program, third-party libraries, and Java system-classes (cf.
Figure 1.6). Moreover, P H O S P H O R also requires to modify the method signatures of all Java
classes in order to properly propagate taint-labels at run-time. We argue that such an approach
negatively affects the portability of the AuS as every execution of the program, which contains the
actual AuS’s logic, requires properly instrumented Java system-classes and third-party libraries.
Moreover, P H O S P H O R considers methods with return values as possible sources and therefore
introduces a taint-label value at the end of a method implementation. Introducing taint-label
values this way makes the portability of the AuS more worse, especially when potential source
methods belong to Java system-classes. Beyond that, for computational environments where
resources (e.g. Java system-classes) are shared among different applications, e.g. in the cloud
where a single JRE runs multiple cloud services (cf. Section 1.2), the P H O S P H O R approach
would require dedicated instrumented Java system-classes for any single monitored service,
which practically jacks up the costs. In contrast, our approach instruments and tracks only
dedicated program locations at the code level that lead to a flow of data. Because of that, our
approach additionally ensures by design the portability of the AuS once it is equipped with our
tracker.
Apart from the literature which investigates IFT for particular programming languages or one
of its intermediate representation, a major body of work is devoted to research IFT problems
within different domains. In what follows, we exemplarily describe related work from the cloud
and Android domain.
Pappas et al. propose C L O U D F E N C E [81], a data flow tracking framework for the cloud
domain. The authors intend that C L O U D F E N C E is offered by cloud hosting providers, like
IaaS- or PaaS-providers, to their tenants, i.e. service providers which run their services on an
Infrastructure as a Service (IaaS)-/ PaaS-infrastructure. Via a dedicated API, service providers
are able to integrate C L O U D F E N C E into their services and mark sensitive user input, that needs
to be protected, with a dedicated label. However, integration of C L O U D F E N C E happens in a
discretionary manner where service providers are not obliged to use C L O U D F E N C E or may even
put API-calls deliberately wrong. Contrarily, our approach tracks the data flow in a mandatory
manner and focuses on collecting detailed run-time information about the executed program
instructions. Beyond that, C L O U D F E N C E uses PIN [87], an analysis-tool which performs whole
process instrumentation, i.e. data flow tracking logic is dispersed over the entire codes base.
Contrary to our approach, such a solution negatively affects the portability of the AuS.
To detect data leakages between multiple PaaS tenants (which for example may happen by
a misconfigured cloud software stack), Priebe et al. propose C L O U D S A F E T Y N E T [96], a data
flow tracker at the network layer. To do so, C L O U D S A F E T Y N E T provides a Javascript-based
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client-library which enables a cloud service consumer to tag sensitive user input, e.g. an HTML
form field. A tag is encrypted with the tenant’s public key. Furthermore, C L O U D S A F E T Y N E T
equips a tenant’s cloud service with a dedicated socket-level monitor which analyzes and parses
all incoming and outgoing data traffic, with the aim of detecting tagged user input. A data leakage
exists if such a monitor is not able to decrypt a submitted tag and therefore assumes that it must
be a foreign tag label. Thus, the quintessence is that a data leakage is detected once a service client
request or response contains tags from different PaaS-tenants. However, C L O U D S A F E T Y N E T
does not track the flow of data inside a PaaS-tenant’s service, and therefore, exhibits conceptually
similarities to the black-box approach and also suffers from the overapproximation problem (cf.
Figure 1.4a).
TA I N T D R O I D [23] provides a purely dynamic data flow tracking approach at the program-
variables-, method-, file-, and message-level for system-wide real-time privacy monitoring
within Android. To do so, TA I N T D R O I D places dedicated monitors not only at the program’s
code level but also inside the Android operating system. Although the results show a relatively
small runtime overhead, TA I N T D R O I D has to place data flow monitors not only at the applica-
tion level but also into the operating system. Thus, TA I N T D R O I D limits the overall portability
of the Android application. For instance, to monitor a specific application with TA I N T D R O I D
the entire Android device needs to be flashed.
Yin et al. [125] propose PA N O R A M A to detect malware in Windows systems. To do that,
PA N O R A M A relies on taint graphs whose vertices represent operating system resources and
edges represent the flow of data from one resource to another. Based on taint graphs and
a set of policies, which describe the characteristic of malign behavior, PA N O R A M A detects
patterns inside the taint graph that matches the malicious behavior. A further key element in
PA N O R A M A’s data flow tracking solution is a so-called shadow memory which stores the taint
status of each physical memory, CPU’s registers, the hard disk, and network interface buffer.
Once a data source gets tainted, PA N O R A M A performs a fine-grained hardware-level taint
tracking and monitors every CPU instruction or Direct Memory Access (DMA) operation which
affects the taint status of the shadow memory. This way PA N O R A M A is able to track data flows
system-wide in a Windows operating system. Although PA N O R A M A detects all malware samples
from their test set with a zero false-negative rate, its data flow tracking approach slows down
the AuS’s run-time performance by an average factor of 20. However, as S H R I F T and H D F T++
reuse statically precomputed information flow results at run-time, both solutions impose much
less performance overhead than PA N O R A M A.
Demsky [19] presents G A R M, a tool to track data provenance information across multiple
applications and machines. G A R M instruments the application binary to track and to store the
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flow of data within and across applications, and beyond that, to monitor interactions with the
OS. Similar to our approaches, G A R M leverages static analysis to generate optimized dynamic
instrumentation by eliminating redundant provenance computations which may happen when
the same value or variable is repeatedly combined with other values. However, G A R M’s static
analysis focuses on optimizing dynamic instrumentation for a single basic block, which is defined
as a sequence of instructions with one entry and possibly multiple exit points. In contrast, the
present approach relies on static analysis which performs a whole-program information flow
analysis. This way, the present results are able to optimize dynamic intra-application data flow
tracking by monitoring all source-, sink-, and chop-node-instructions which are relevant for a
data flow dependency.
Zhang et al. [127] present N E O N, a fine-grained data flow tracking approach for derived data
management. N E O N is implemented as an extension for the XEN virtual machine monitor
and tracks data flows on the granularity of individual bytes by tainting each memory address
with an n-bit taint mark. Taint marks are propagated on each memory write or read access
through and across systems. Although N E O N presents a sophisticated fine-grained tracking
approach it suffers from a high false-negative rate, where derived data from a tainted source
does not acquire a taint, and false positives, where data becomes tainted through an unintended
dependency. Additionally, the performance overhead that is imposed by N E O N is too high for
daily-used applications.
Hybrid approaches aim at combining static and dynamic data flow tracking techniques to
optimize certain aspects of data flow trackers. For instance, one aspect could be to mitigate run-
time overhead by reducing the number of tracking points inside the AuS or to cope with implicit
flows at run-time. Usually, the AuS first undergoes a static analysis phase and subsequently a
dynamic analysis phase, based on the previous results.
As a step toward this direction, Chandra et al. [13] present a fine-grained information flow
analysis approach for Java-based applications. Under the assumption to have only the Java
bytecode available, their approach composes static and dynamic techniques with the aim to
make dynamic analysis more intelligent about implicit flows. During the static phase their
approach computes security annotations that are used to inject compensating commands into
the AuS for taken and non-taken control flow paths. At run-time, those annotations reveal which
branch is executed and how its execution affects the variable taint-labels within the executed
and non-executed branches. However, their approach requires to instrument all instructions
that might lead to a flow of data including even those that do not contribute to a data flow. In sum,
Chandra et al. [13] provides primarily a dynamic data flow tracker which leverages static analysis
to also track implicit flows at run-time; however, taking implicit flows into account might result
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in less tracking precision, cf. Section 3.3. Contrarily, the present approach uses static analysis to
instrument only those program locations that actually lead to a flow of information between
a source and a sink. This way, our approach optimizes and reduces run-time performance
overhead and improves the precision of tracking results.
J A D A L [75] is probably the most related approach to ours. To detect data leaks inside Java-
based applications, the authors propose a two-stage approach to detect data flows from high-
level inputs to low-level outputs. In the first stage, the AuS is statically analyzed to compute all
those program instructions that may contribute to, and thus, are relevant for data leakage. In a
second stage, J A D A L injects its tracking logic into the AuS only at those program locations that
are reported from the previous stage. This way, J A D A L monitors only those program instructions
at run-time that are relevant for a flow of data, excluding all other program instructions. However,
to do that J A D A L requires to inject and to spread its tracking logic over the entire AuS’s codebase.
We argue, that compared to our approach, such an approach negatively affects the portability
of the AuS as all three application code parts, i.e. the program, 3rd-party libraries, and Java
system-classes (cf. Figure 1.6) are tightly weld together by the tracking logic. Furthermore, our
approach provides a semantic model that shows how the flow of data is propagated at run-time,
at every single instruction, residing on a chop. Unfortunately, we were not able to benchmark
H D F T++ and S H R I F T against J A D A L, as we could not get access to J A D A L’s implementation
(even after contacting J A D A L’s authors several times).
As pure non-interference is too strict to be practical, Rocha et al. [100] propose a hybrid data
flow tracking approach in combination with declassification rules in order to allow data flows
if they satisfy certain conditions. During the static analysis phase, their approach computes
possible dependencies between sinks and sources as well as, based on declassification rules,
possible program locations that might downgrade the security level of a dependency path
from high to low. This way, a tainted data item may be safely released to a sink if it passes a
downgrading instruction at run-time. Although their approach shows promising results, their
primary goal is to relax non-interference: the security label of a data flow is only downgraded if
certain declassification criteria are satisfied at run-time on a data flow dependency, and thus,
would permit that data flows into the corresponding sink. The present work, in contrast, aims
to improve the tracking precision with a hybrid data flow tracking approach and monitors
only those program instructions that reside on a dependency path. This way, we are able to
distinguish if a data flow really happens or not, whereas Rocha et al. assume that a reported
data flow will always happen, irrespective of the executed instructions in between of a data flow
dependency path. From our point of view the present work and the results from Rocha et al. are
complementary to each other; combining both results is a potential candidate for future work.
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To use the (statically computed) information flow dependencies at run-time our hybrid ap-
proach uses a technique called Inline Reference Monitor (IRM) [25]. Different IRM approaches
have been proposed in the literature for different abstraction layers [118, 126], including the
Java bytecode layer [24]. To enforce security properties, IRMs usually inject code into a target
application to intercept and process sensitive events. Typically, this happens inside the moni-
tored process. Our approach, in contrast, offloads and outsources such event processing to an
external tracker. This allows us to aggregate data flow tracking results across and from multiple
distributed systems, and to have the flexibility of changing policies for data and for applications
at runtime, without requiring restarting nor re-instrumenting the running applications.
4.2. Usage Control
As described in Chapter 2, Usage Control (UC) is an extension of access control and tackles the
question of how data may or may not be used once initial access has been granted. Originally,
UC was introduced and coined by Park et al. in [82, 84], and further extended to UCONABC [83,
107] by the same authors. In particular, the latter one provides a comprehensive formal model
which imposes to evaluate obligations before, during, and after the usage of an object. However,
their model has a container-centric characteristic, i.e. obligation constraints are specified on
one particular object-item and do not take into account multiple copies of a protected object.
Hilty et al. investigate the problem of a clear and precise understanding of how data protec-
tion requirements have to be specified and enforced in a system [43]. The authors propose to
differentiate between observable- and non-observable-obligations which forms the foundations
to distinguish between preventive and detective enforcements [93]. Furthermore, this frame-
work was refined and extended in [42] to Obligation Specification Language (OSL), a formal
language to specify data usage obligations in the form of propositional-, temporal-, and cardinal-
constraints. In [60, 61] Kumari et al. provide a framework to translate high-level OSL-based data
usage requirements into low-level, machine-readable policies. Apart from OSL, other usage
control frameworks and policy languages have been proposed, like UCONABC [83], XACML [79],
Ponder [17, 117], or PrimeLife Policy Language [6, 12, 113]. Howbeit, a comparison of those
policies is provided in [38, 58] and not further discussed at this point.
As OSL’s main purpose focuses on the specification of data usage restrictions by the data
owner, Pretschner et al. provide in [90] a formal model to characterize enforcement mechanisms
in terms of traces on top of OSL. According to the authors, these mechanisms are categorized
into executors (which allows a particular data usage), modifiers (which modify some parts of
a data usage), inhibitors (which inhibit a particular data usage), and delayers (which delay a
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particular data usage). In its original form, UC policies are expressed and enforced on data in
a container-centric manner, i.e. data usage restrictions are specified in terms of the container
name where data was stored. For instance, to protect a secret that is stored in a file “private.txt”
from dissemination a possible policy would be “Do not disseminate private.txt”. However, in a
data processing system where data may be copied, e.g. file “private.txt" gets copied to “public.txt",
a container-centric approach requires to write a UC policy also for “public.txt" and for all other
copies as well. As this might become a tedious and cumbersome task if the number of copies
grows, Harvan et al. [39] extend the UC model and integrates a generic data flow model which
provides a holistic solution to enforce data usage restrictions on all possible copies of a data item.
Furthermore, this way it has become possible to specify data usage restrictions in a data-centric
manner where data usage restrictions are centralized around a concrete data item instead of its
representation.
In further works, UC infrastructures have been designed and implemented for different
ecosystems, like Android [26], MS Windows [124], MS Office [108], X11 [95], the IP Internet
Protocol [53], Thunderbird [69], SIP [50], Grid Computing [14, 73], or Online Social Networks
[51, 62]. As those solutions are tailored for one particular abstraction layer they are able to take
into account layer-specific domain knowledge in order to track the flow of data and to enforce
UC-policies. Thus, depending on the collected domain knowledge tracking and enforcement
results are more or less fine-grained. Howbeit, a comprehensive survey on UC enforcement
mechanisms and usage control is provided in [67, 78].
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This chapter summarises and concludes the present work in Section 5.1 and discusses and
points out future work in Section 5.2.
5.1. Conclusion
The research field of DUC tackles the fundamental question of how data may or may not be used
once initial access has been granted by the data owner. In order to implement such functionality,
modern DUC systems heavily rely on IFT systems to capture the distinction between data
and its concrete representation. This way, it is possible to track and to enforce DUC policies
on all copies of a policy affected data item. In recent years, a body of work has been published
in the literature that addresses this aspect and proposes different approaches and solutions
to track the flow of data. However, as pointed out in Section 1.3 those solutions (i) suffer from
overapproximation (Caveat 1) [39, 53, 124], (ii) or they impose too much performance overhead
(Caveat 2) [54], (iii) or they affect the portability of the AuS (Caveat 3)[10].
To address those caveats, this thesis contributes with a novel data flow tracking approach
for DUC systems, and addresses the research questions (cf. Section 1.3) How can we improve
the tracking precision, and thus, reduce overapproximation of the tracking results compared to a
pure black-box approach? (RQ1), How can we track efficiently and effectively data flows inside
an AuS from its input- to its output-channels, and simultaneously, preserve and maintain the
portability of the AuS? (RQ2), How can we track the flow of data separately inside different AuS
that share the same RTE? (R3).
To address these research questions, this work contributes with a two-staged hybrid data flow
tracking solution which combines static and dynamic data flow analysis techniques. The first
stage statically analyzes the AuS on possible data flow dependencies and dumps the result into
an analysis-report. This stage detects all instructions that correspond either to a source (i.e.
data flows into the AuS), a sink (i.e. data flows out of the AuS), or an instruction that resides
on a data flow dependency path. The second stage uses those results and injects a minimal
run-time monitor into the AuS which monitors only those program locations that are reported
in the analysis-report, as only those program locations are actually relevant for a flow of data.
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We propose two variants of instrumentation: S H R I F T and its extension H D F T++ (cf. Chapter 3).
While S H R I F T monitors source and sink instructions only, and propagates the flow of data
based on a static mapping, H D F T++ takes also into account all instructions that reside on a data
flow dependency path from a source to a sink. This way, H D F T++ is able to take a more accurate
decision if a data flow path is still critical once the program flow reaches a sink instruction (cf.
Listing 3.4). However, this surplus is implemented on the costs of a slightly worse run-time
performance overhead compared to S H R I F T, as our evaluation results reveal in Section 3.6.3.
By design S H R I F T and H D F T++ are able to inject their tracking logic only at the program-code
level (cf. Figure 1.6) and abstract away shared third-party- or Java system-classes. This way, they
preserve the portability of the AuS as they rely only on tracking logic inside the program-code,
and thus, are able to execute the monitored AuS on any off-the-shelf JVM. In contrast, compared
solutions from the literature, like P H O S P H O R [10], also require to inject tracking logic inside
the Java system-classes or the JVM, and therefore, negatively affect the AuS’s portability.
In sum, our solution contributes to modern DUC systems by mitigating the overapproxima-
tion concerns (cf. Figure 1.4) and increasing the portability of the monitored AuS. Of course,
someone may argue that existing data flow trackers, like P H O S P H O R [10], may be sufficient
to track the flow of data for DUC policy enforcement and there is no need to keep the AuS
portable. But in the end, however, we learned that this point of view highly depends on the
setting and environment where the flow of data has to be tracked for DUC policy enforcement.
For instance, we would not benefit that much from the portability advantages if applying our
proposed approach on a single Java-based application, which runs in a single Java process.
In that case, we could also simply use e.g. P H O S P H O R which disseminates its tracking logic
over the entire process. However, for a setting where multiple applications run within the same
Java process, as it happens for web-applications in our running scenario (Section 1.2), our ap-
proach definitely provides great benefits. With our approach we are able to track the flow of
data selectively, modularized within different applications, running within the same process.
5.2. Future Work
The results presented in this thesis provide a basement in several directions for future work.
Static information flow analysis is a fundamental element in our overall approach as our run-
time data flow tracker is based on the generated analysis-report. Therefore, the more powerful
static information flow analysis performs, the more precise we can track the flow of data at
run-time. However, current state-of-the-art static information flow analyzers are not able to
handle properly reflection during the analysis. Although some solutions have been proposed in
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the literature [11], a general approach for reflection-handling has not been found. Callbacks
are another type of programming language constructs that challenge static information flow
analyzer. The main problem is, that callbacks are triggered and called at any point in time by
components that are outside of the process, e.g. a mouse click event is passed via the operating
system into the application where a callback-method handles the event properly. Therefore,
callbacks are pretty hard to statically analyze with respect to information flow.
Extension for distributed applications: This thesis focuses on applications that run at most in
one process. Applications whose logic is spread across different processes or across multiple
machines are not covered by our solution. Kelbert [52] provides already a data flow model to
track data flows in a distributed setting. Integrating his solution with ours would provide a
solution where data flows are tracked comprehensively in a distributed setting.
Evaluation: This thesis’s evaluation shows that the precision improvement compared to a pure
black-box approach highly depends on the chosen analysis configuration. Considering explicit
flows only provides a better precision result in all our experiments, than taking into account
additional implicit flows. However, H D F T++ monitors not only source and sink instructions, as
S H R I F T do, but also all instructions in between which contribute to the flow of data. This way,
H D F T++ is able to assess if a data flow is still critical or not once a sink is reached (cf. Section 3.4).
In order to understand and to provide a formal description about the actual precision gain of
H D F T++ compared to S H R I F T further investigations and experiments are required. As one
may notice, quantifying such an improvement in general is a non-trivial task as the precision
gain of H D F T++ highly depends on actual run-time values, which influence if a particular code
may be executed or not at run-time (cf. variable condition in Listing 3.4).
Declassification: The research field of declassification provides means and mechanisms to
specify and enforce declassification policies, and thus, to relax non-interference [33], i.e. reducing
the sensitivity level of a data flow dependency. For instance, consider that a data item gets
encrypted on a data flow dependency path at run-time. Under the assumption, that only the
data owner knows the private key for decryption, a declassification mechanism may allow to
release encrypted data into a sink as only the private-key owner is able to decrypt and recover
the original data. However, extending H D F T++ and S H R I F T with the notion of declassification
will definitely contribute reducing the overapproximation problem, and thus, to provide a more
precise PIP-state. As already suggested in Section 4.1, combining and complementing the
present results with the work from Rocha et al. [100] will be definitely a potential candidate for
future work. In the end, such an extension contributes to DUC systems as it allows to take data
usage policy decisions more precisely only on policy-affected data items.
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A.1. Analysis reports
This section shows the complete analysis-reports for our examples in Listing 3.5 (cf. Listing A.1)
and Listing 3.19 (cf. Listing 3.20). Those analysis-reports show all sources, sinks, and chopCMDs
(cf. chop-tags) of all detected data flow dependencies.
Listing A.1: The complete static analysis-report from the example in Listing 3.5, where a secret
value is read from a file and transmitted to a remote server. Depending on a random
value, the secret value is overwritten with a public value.
1 <source >
2 <id>Source0 </id>
3 <location >SampleReadSend.readFile(Ljava/lang/String ;)...
4 ... Ljava/lang/String;:51</location >
5 <signature >java.io.BufferedReader.readLine () Ljava/lang/String;</signature >
6 <return/>
7 </source >
8 <sink>
9 <id>Sink0</id>
10 <location >SampleReadSend.sample () V:195</location >
11 <signature >java.io.PrintWriter.write(Ljava/lang/String ;)V</signature >
12 <param index="1"/>
13 </sink>
14 <flows>
15 <sink id="Sink0">
16 <source id="Source0"/>
17 <chop>
18 <chopNode bci="-8" lab="PHI v20 = #(), v19"
19 om="SampleReadSend.readFile(Ljava/lang/String ;)Ljava/lang/String;"/>
20 <chopNode bci="6" lab="v5 = new java.io.FileReader"
21 om="SampleReadSend.readFile(Ljava/lang/String ;)Ljava/lang/String;"/>
22 <chopNode bci="11" lab="v5.&lt;init&gt;(p1)"
23 om="SampleReadSend.readFile(Ljava/lang/String ;)Ljava/lang/String;"/>
24 <chopNode bci="16" lab="v7 = new java.io.BufferedReader"
25 om="SampleReadSend.readFile(Ljava/lang/String ;)Ljava/lang/String;"/>
26 <chopNode bci="22" lab="v7.&lt;init&gt;(v5)"
27 om="SampleReadSend.readFile(Ljava/lang/String ;)Ljava/lang/String;"/>
28 <chopNode bci="27" lab="goto 51"
29 om="SampleReadSend.readFile(Ljava/lang/String ;)Ljava/lang/String;"/>
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30 <chopNode bci="30" lab="v12 = new java.lang.StringBuilder"
31 om="SampleReadSend.readFile(Ljava/lang/String ;)Ljava/lang/String;"/>
32 <chopNode bci="35" lab="v14 = valueOf(v20)"
33 om="SampleReadSend.readFile(Ljava/lang/String ;)Ljava/lang/String;"/>
34 <chopNode bci="38" lab="v12.&lt;init&gt;(v14)"
35 om="SampleReadSend.readFile(Ljava/lang/String ;)Ljava/lang/String;"/>
36 <chopNode bci="42" lab="v17 = v12.append(v10)"
37 om="SampleReadSend.readFile(Ljava/lang/String ;)Ljava/lang/String;"/>
38 <chopNode bci="45" lab="v19 = v17.toString ()"
39 om="SampleReadSend.readFile(Ljava/lang/String ;)Ljava/lang/String;"/>
40 <chopNode bci="51" lab="v10 = v7.readLine ()"
41 om="SampleReadSend.readFile(Ljava/lang/String ;)Ljava/lang/String;"/>
42 <chopNode bci="56" lab="if (v10 != #(null)) goto 30"
43 om="SampleReadSend.readFile(Ljava/lang/String ;)Ljava/lang/String;"/>
44 <chopNode bci="60" lab="return v20"
45 om="SampleReadSend.readFile(Ljava/lang/String ;)Ljava/lang/String;"/>
46 <chopNode bci="-8" lab="PHI v41 = v36 , v40"
47 operation="assign" om="SampleReadSend.sample ()V"/>
48 <chopNode bci="107" lab="v36 = this.readFile (#( public.txt))"
49 om="SampleReadSend.sample ()V"/>
50 <chopNode bci="114" lab="if (v7 &lt;= #(5)) goto 125"
51 om="SampleReadSend.sample ()V"/>
52 <chopNode bci="120" lab="v40 = this.readFile (#( secret.txt))"
53 om="SampleReadSend.sample ()V"/>
54 <chopNode bci="125" lab="v42 = new java.net.Socket"
55 om="SampleReadSend.sample ()V"/>
56 <chopNode bci="131" lab="v43 = v32 [#(0)]"
57 om="SampleReadSend.sample ()V"/>
58 <chopNode bci="134" lab="v44 = v32 [#(1)]"
59 om="SampleReadSend.sample ()V"/>
60 <chopNode bci="135" lab="v46 = parseInt(v44)"
61 om="SampleReadSend.sample ()V"/>
62 <chopNode bci="138" lab="v42.&lt;init&gt;(v43 , v46)"
63 om="SampleReadSend.sample ()V"/>
64 <chopNode bci="143" lab="v48 = java.lang.System.out"
65 om="SampleReadSend.sample ()V"/>
66 <chopNode bci="146" lab="v49 = new java.lang.StringBuilder"
67 om="SampleReadSend.sample ()V"/>
68 <chopNode bci="152" lab="v49.&lt;init&gt;(#( Sending data to ))"
69 om="SampleReadSend.sample ()V"/>
70 <chopNode bci="157" lab="v52 = v32 [#(1)]"
71 om="SampleReadSend.sample ()V"/>
72 <chopNode bci="158" lab="v54 = v49.append(v52)"
73 om="SampleReadSend.sample ()V"/>
74 <chopNode bci="163" lab="v57 = v54.append (#( ))"
75 om="SampleReadSend.sample ()V"/>
76 <chopNode bci="167" lab="v59 = v57.append(v7)"
77 om="SampleReadSend.sample ()V"/>
78 <chopNode bci="170" lab="v61 = v59.toString ()"
79 om="SampleReadSend.sample ()V"/>
104
A.1. Analysis reports
80 <chopNode bci="173" lab="v48.println(v61)"
81 om="SampleReadSend.sample ()V"/>
82 <chopNode bci="176" lab="v63 = new java.io.PrintWriter"
83 om="SampleReadSend.sample ()V"/>
84 <chopNode bci="182" lab="v65 = v42.getOutputStream ()"
85 om="SampleReadSend.sample ()V"/>
86 <chopNode bci="186" lab="v63.&lt;init&gt;(v65 , #(1))"
87 om="SampleReadSend.sample ()V"/>
88 <chopNode bci="195" lab="v63.write(v41)"
89 om="SampleReadSend.sample ()V"/>
90 </chop>
91 </sink>
92 </flows >
Listing A.2: The full analysis-report for Listing 3.19. It shows a data flow dependency which
contains an inheritance relation on its path from a source to a sink.
1 <source >
2 <id>Source0 </id>
3 <location >..main (.) V:38</location >
4 <signature >.. source(Ljava/lang/String ;)Ljava/lang/String;</signature >
5 <return/>
6 </source >
7 <sink>
8 <id>Sink0</id>
9 <location >..main (.) V:113</location >
10 <signature >..sink(Ljava/lang/String ;)V</signature >
11 <param index="1"/>
12 </sink>
13 <flows>
14 <sink id="Sink0">
15 <source id="Source0"/>
16 <chop>
17 <chopNode bci="1" lab="<init >;()" om="Copy.<init >;()V"/>
18 <chopNode bci="0" lab="v4 = java.lang.System.out" om="Copy.copy([B)[B"/>
19 <chopNode bci="5" lab="v4.println (#( Copy))" om="Copy.copy([B)[B"/>
20 <chopNode bci="10" lab="v8 = new []" om="Copy.copy([B)[B"/>
21 <chopNode bci="12" lab="return v8" om="Copy.copy([B)[B"/>
22
23 <chopNode bci="1" lab="this.<init >;()" om="CopyByRef.<init >;()V"/>
24 <chopNode bci="0" lab="v4 = java.lang.System.out" om="CopyByRef.copy([B)[B"/>
25 <chopNode bci="5" lab="v4.println (#( CopyByRef ))" om="CopyByRef.copy([B)[B"/>
26 <chopNode bci="9" lab="v7 = p1" om="CopyByRef.copy([B)[B"/>
27 <chopNode bci="11" lab="return p1" om="CopyByRef.copy([B)[B"/>
28
29 <chopNode bci="1" lab="this.<init >;()" om="CopyByValue.<init >;()V"/>
30 <chopNode bci="-8" lab="PHI v17 = #(0), v15" om="CopyByValue.copy([B)[B"/>
31 <chopNode bci="0" lab="v4 = java.lang.System.out" om="CopyByValue.copy([B)[B"/>
32 <chopNode bci="5" lab="v4.println (#( CopyByValue ))" om="CopyByValue.copy([B)[B"/>
33 <chopNode bci="9" lab="v7 = p1.length" om="CopyByValue.copy([B)[B"/>
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34 <chopNode bci="10" lab="v8 = new []" om="CopyByValue.copy([B)[B"/>
35 <chopNode bci="12" lab="v9 = v8" om="CopyByValue.copy([B)[B"/>
36 <chopNode bci="14" lab="v11 = #(0)" om="CopyByValue.copy([B)[B"/>
37 <chopNode bci="15" lab="goto 29" om="CopyByValue.copy([B)[B"/>
38 <chopNode bci="22" lab="v13 = p1[v17]" om="CopyByValue.copy([B)[B"/>
39 <chopNode bci="23" lab="v8[v17] = v13" om="CopyByValue.copy([B)[B"/>
40 <chopNode bci="24" lab="v15 = v17 + #(1)" om="CopyByValue.copy([B)[B"/>
41 <chopNode bci="29" lab="v12 = p1.length" om="CopyByValue.copy([B)[B"/>
42 <chopNode bci="30" lab="if (v17 < v12) goto 22" om="CopyByValue.copy([B)[B"/>
43 <chopNode bci="34" lab="return v8" om="CopyByValue.copy([B)[B"/>
44
45 <chopNode bci="38" lab="v20 = source (#( Test))" om="..main (.)V"/>
46 <chopNode bci="41" lab="v22 = v20.getBytes ()" om="..main (.)V"/>
47 <chopNode bci="44" lab="v23 = v22" om="..main (.)V"/>
48 <chopNode bci="46" lab="v25 = new Copy[]" om="..main (.)V"/>
49 <chopNode bci="51" lab="v27 = new Copy" om="..main (.)V"/>
50 <chopNode bci="55" lab="v27.<init >;()" om="..main (.)V"/>
51 <chopNode bci="58" lab="v25 [#(0)] = v27" om="..main (.)V"/>
52 <chopNode bci="61" lab="v30 = new CopyByRef" om="..main (.)V"/>
53 <chopNode bci="65" lab="v30.<init >;()" om="..main (.)V"/>
54 <chopNode bci="68" lab="v25 [#(1)] = v30" om="..main (.)V"/>
55 <chopNode bci="71" lab="v33 = new CopyByValue" om="..main (.)V"/>
56 <chopNode bci="75" lab="v33.<init >;()" om="..main (.)V"/>
57 <chopNode bci="78" lab="v25 [#(2)] = v33" om="..main (.)V"/>
58 <chopNode bci="79" lab="v35 = v25" om="..main (.)V"/>
59 <chopNode bci="81" lab="v36 = new java.util.Random" om="..main (.)V"/>
60 <chopNode bci="85" lab="v36.<init >;()" om="..main (.)V"/>
61 <chopNode bci="89" lab="v39 = v36.nextInt (#(3))" om="..main (.)V"/>
62 <chopNode bci="92" lab="v40 = v39" om="..main (.)V"/>
63 <chopNode bci="98" lab="v41 = v25[v39]" om="..main (.)V"/>
64 <chopNode bci="100" lab="v43 = v41.copy(v22)" om="..main (.)V"/>
65 <chopNode bci="103" lab="v44 = v43" om="..main (.)V"/>
66 <chopNode bci="105" lab="v45 = new java.lang.String" om="..main (.)V"/>
67 <chopNode bci="110" lab="v45.<init >;(v43)" om="..main (.)V"/>
68 <chopNode bci="113" lab="sink(v45)" om="..main (.)V"/>
69 </chop>
70 </sink>
71 </flows >
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